Strank v. Mercy Hospital of Johnstown

• Citation: 376 Pa. 305,102 A.2d 170
• Parties: STRANK v. MERCY HOSPITAL OF JOHNSTOWN et al. Appeal of MERCY HOSPITAL OF JOHNSTOWN. Appeal of JOSEPH.
• Decision Date: 04 January 1954
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 170

102 A.2d 170

376 Pa. 305

STRANK v. MERCY HOSPITAL OF JOHNSTOWN et al.

Appeal of MERCY HOSPITAL OF JOHNSTOWN.

Appeal of JOSEPH.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 4, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1954.

Leonard Shapiro, Pittsburgh, Harkins & Wharton, edward J. Harkins, Robert J. Wharton, Johnstown, for appellants.

Frank P. Barnhart, Johnstown, for appellee.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, and ARNOLD, JJ.

CHIDSEY, Justice.

These two appeals were taken by the respective defendants, under the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, 12 P.S. § 672, from an order of the court below refusing to dismiss an action of mandamus for want of jurisdiction.

As the merits of the case are not involved in this appeal, it is not necessary to state the facts in detail. The complaint in mandamus sets forth that the plaintiff enrolled as a student nurse and paid the expenses incidental thereto, at the defendant institution, The Mercy Hospital of Johnstown. This institution conducts a School of Nursing in conjunction with its primary purpose of maintaining a hospital in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. She alleges that after having successfully completed the work prescribed for the first two years, she was dismissed from the School of Nursing in her theird and final year of training because she had broken a rule of the school in remaining away overnight without permission. The rules provided that an infraction of any of them would automatically cause the dismissal of the student from the nursing school and in the event of such dismissal no transfer of credits of such student nurse would be given. The other defendant, known in this proceeding as M. John Joseph, occupied the position of Director of Nurses and was joined as a defendant in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. No. 1094(b), 12 P.S.Appendix, as the particular person concerned in the performance of the act or duty.

By her complaint, the plaintiff sought to obtain a judgment against both defendants, commanding them to give to her transfer credits for the two years' work she had completed in order to secure advanced standing in some other nursing school. She does not seek reinstatement as a student in the School of Nursing and in fact acquiesces in the action of defendants in dismissing her from the school.

From the petition raising a question of jurisdiction under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1017(b)(1) and the answer filed thereto by the plaintiff, it is admitted by the plaintiff that The Mercy Hospital of Johnstown is a non-profit corporation, incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, operating a school of nursing for the education and training of nurses. It is also admitted that Mercy Hospital is a privately conducted institution, which receives no State aid, having a Board of Incorporators, a Board of Directors and a Board of Managers. Although the averment in the petition that defendant is a private institution, receiving no State aid, was not specifically admitted, an averment of lack of knowledge is not a sufficient denial under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1029 (c) when it is manifest from the fact averred in the pleading that the means of proof are matters of public record. If a defendant has no knowledge he must make a reasonable investigation to ascertain whether the facts alleged are true. If inquiry had been made, the public records of the Commonwealth would have readily revealed the truth or falsity of the averment.

Since the present appeal is under the Act of March 5, 1925, ¹ supra, the sole question within the scope of our inquiry on this appeal is whether the cause of action sued upon and sought to be enforced by mandamus against a private institution, is within the general class of controversies committed to the lower court. ² See Witney v. Lebanon City, 369 Pa. 308, 85 A.2d 106. In the Witney case, the present Chief Justice, Horace Stern, reviewed at length the cases in Pennsylvania dealing with the question of jurisdiction of subject matter and then enunciated principles that guide us in resolving the instant question. It was there held that the test for determining whether a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter is the competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for its consideration belongs, and the controlling question is whether the court had power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether it might ultimately decide that it was unable to grant the relief sought in the particular case. It was further held that the Act of 1925 was not concerned with matters going to the right of the plaintiff to recover on his cause of action but only with his right to have his cause of action heard and determined. Again in Upholsterers' International Union of North America v. United Furniture Workers of America, C. I. O., 356 Pa. 469, 473, 52 A.2d 217, 219, Mr. Justice Jones, speaking for the Court, declared that, '* * * The thing of chief importance on a question of jurisdiction of subject-matter is not whether the plaintiff may recover in the particular forum on the cause of action pleaded but whether the court is empowered to hear and determine a controversy of the character involved: * * *.'

Before this power to enter upon the inquiry can be affirmed to exist, it must initially be made to appear that the...