Stratford v. Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters

• Decision Date: 23 March 1999
• Docket Number: LOCAL,AFL-CI
• Citation: 728 A.2d 1063
• Parties: (Conn. 1999) TOWN OF STRATFORD v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS,998 (SC 15966)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

728 A.2d 1063 (Conn. 1999)

TOWN OF STRATFORD v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 998

(SC 15966)

Connecticut Supreme Court

Argued January 20

March 23, 1999

Richard J. Buturla, for the appellant (plaintiff).

J. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (defendant).

Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

Katz, J.

OPINION

The principal issue in this certified appeal involves the extent to which an arbitrator is bound, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, by a prior arbitration award involving the interpretation of the same provision of a contract between the same parties. We conclude that, as a matter of public policy, arbitrators are not required to give collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitral awards.

The following facts, which appear in the Appellate Court opinion, are pertinent to this appeal. "The plaintiff, the town of Stratford (town), and the defendant, the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 (union), at all relevant times were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) that contained an arbitration clause. Under the arbitration clause, the parties agreed to submit unresolved grievances to the state board of mediation and arbitration (board). The parties further agreed that an arbitration decision by the board would be final.

"On December 12, 1991, the date on which the grievances involved in this appeal were filed, article I of the agreement provided that `the positions of assistant fire prevention chief, assistant fire chief, deputy fire chief and chief are not members of the union bargaining unit.' Article XXII, § 1, of the agreement, however, provided that `all promotions in the Fire Department shall be made from eligibility lists for each promotional classification which lists shall be established through competitive merit examinations . . . .' The agreement also provided that when a vacancy occurred, it was to be filled by one of the three highest ranking candidates and that subsequent appointments were to be generated in the order of standing on the list. Moreover, the agreement provided that when an eligibility list expired, a new list had to be established within ninety days.

"In 1991, the eligibility lists for the positions of assistant fire chief and lieutenant in the fire prevention bureau expired, and replacement lists were not created within ninety days. On December 12, 1991, the union filed a class action grievance against the town, no. 91-04, on behalf of the firefighters seeking positions in the fire prevention bureau. The grievance alleged that the town had violated the agreement because it had failed to establish new examinations and eligibility lists for the positions of assistant fire chief and lieutenant for the fire prevention bureau.

"On December 12, 1991, the union also filed grievance no. 91-03, which was submitted to the board to determine if it was arbitrable. As did grievance no. 91-04, which was filed on the same day, no. 91-03 alleged that the town had violated article XXII, § 1, of the agreement. This grievance concerned the following events, which had occurred earlier in 1991. In April, 1991, the town administered a promotional examination for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. On May 30, 1991, the results of the examination were posted and a list was established with eight individuals, ranked one through eight, with the candidate receiving the highest score ranked as number one. On or about June 3, 1991, the town interviewed the first three candidates on the eligibility list for a vacancy for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. This vacancy was filled by the candidate who was ranked first. On or about December 11, 1991, the town interviewed the candidates ranked two through four for the assistant fire chief position, and the town selected the third ranked candidate over the second ranked candidate. On or about January 4, 1993, the town interviewed the remaining candidates for the assistant fire chief position for two additional vacancies in the fire suppression division. The town again selected lower ranked candidates over individuals with higher ranks. The union's ground for grievance no. 91-03 was that the town had failed to promote employees on the eligibility list to assistant fire chief vacancies in the fire suppression division in the manner in which firefighters are to be selected from such lists as provided by § 1 of article XXII.

"On December 28, 1993, a panel of arbitrators of the board issued an award in grievance no. 91-04 [first award], holding that article XXII of the agreement did not apply. The board found that the grievance was not arbitrable because the promotions clause of the agreement did not apply to promotions to jobs outside of the bargaining unit, including promotions to the position of assistant fire prevention chief. A unanimous panel rejected the union's contention that the parties had agreed orally in the 1987 negotiations to continue to apply article XXII to the assistant fire chief position.

"On March 17, 1994, a different panel of arbitrators issued an award holding that grievance no. 91-03 was arbitrable, which was inconsistent with the earlier decision. This second panel also decided that the issue to be decided was whether article XXII applies to employee promotions to the assistant fire chief position. The subject matter of this grievance thereafter proceeded on the merits before a third panel of arbitrators.

"On May 25, 1995, the third panel of arbitrators addressed the merits of no. 91-03 and issued an award [second award] ¹ holding that article XXII, § 1, did apply to promotions to the position of assistant fire chief and that the town had violated this provision. The two panels of arbitrators deciding aspects of grievance no. 91-03, therefore, reached Conclusions on the issue of arbitrability that were at odds with the prior arbitration award, namely, that article XXII applies to promotions to the assistant fire chief position.

"On February 22, 1996, the town filed an application to vacate the [second award] pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4). ² The town argued that the arbitrators in no. 91-03 had incorrectly decided the award by failing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the interpretation of the agreement. The town argued that the decision of the panel in no. 91-04 controlled the contractual interpretation issue regarding the applicability of article XXII, § 1. A hearing was held on August 19, 1996, and on August 27, 1996, the Superior Court vacated the [second award]. The union filed [an] appeal challenging the trial court's decision to vacate the [second award]." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 48 Conn. App. 849, 850-53, 713 A.2d 269 (1998).

In the Appellate Court, the union claimed that "the trial court improperly vacated the [second award] on two grounds. ³ The union contend[ed] that because the submission of the parties pertaining to grievance no. 91-03 was unrestricted, the award in that case was final and binding and [could not] be reviewed for errors of law or fact. The union contend[ed], moreover, that even if the submission of an unrestricted arbitration award is reviewable for errors of law or fact, arbitrators in general are not bound by the decisions of other arbitrators. In this respect, the union argue[d] that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to vacate the [second award]. The town claim[ed] that the trial court correctly vacated the arbitration award because the arbitrators exceeded their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4) and because the award violate[d] clear public policy in that the arbitration board did not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Id., 853-54.

The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that: (1) the arbitrators had not exceeded their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4); id., 858; and (2) "the trial court improperly [had] interpreted the public policy exception as a basis for vacating the arbitration award as to [the second award]." Id., 860.

We granted the town's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) "Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court improperly [had] vacated the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel [had] failed to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect to a prior arbitration award on the same issue?"; (2) "Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court improperly [had] interpreted the public policy exception as a basis for vacating the arbitration award as to the grievance no. 91-03?"; and (3) "Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers under General Statutes § 52-418 (a)." Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 245 Conn. 918, 717 A.2d 236 (1998). This appeal followed.

As to the first issue, we hold that arbitrators are not required to give preclusive effect to the decisions of prior arbitrators. We resolve the second issue in favor of the union, concluding that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court improperly had interpreted the public policy exception to arbitral authority. Finally, as to the third issue, we conclude that the arbitrators did not exceed their authority under § 52-418 (a) (4).

I.

Our analysis of this issue begins with a restatement of familiar principles. Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined. "When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties'...