Stratford v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 30 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 18306,18306 |
| Parties | Charles H. STRATFORD and Robert L. Harris, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Earl P. MORGAN, Earl D. Morgan, Gloria M. Broadbent, Evelyn M. Neveille and Alice M. Timmerman, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
David E. West, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Thomas A. Duffin, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their action to quiet title to two small parcels of property on the basis of boundary by acquiescence. We affirm.
On March 10, 1951, plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, L.H. and Ella Stratford (hereinafter "the Stratfords"), purchased a 4.77-acre tract of land in Salt Lake County. This property was conveyed to plaintiffs as trustees for the Stratford grandchildren by Ella Stratford after her husband's death.
The property was purchased by the Stratfords for the purpose of operating a hobby farm, where they could raise livestock (horses, cows, sheep, etc.) and other farm animals. In order to make the property suitable for such use, the Stratfords mended already-existing fences and constructed a new one along the south bank of Big Cottonwood Creek.
Shortly after the Stratfords constructed the fence alongside the creek, they put their livestock and other farm animals on the property. They later built a fish pond and a track for exercising their horses. Both the pond and the track partially extend into the disputed parcel denominated Parcel # 2 in the diagram. The plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest treated the property up to the northern fence line as their own and used it in the manner so described without interruption or dispute from the defendants or their predecessors until 1979, a period of nearly 30 years.
In 1979, plaintiff Charles Stratford had the property surveyed. (See diagram.) The survey indicated that the location of the fence constructed by the Stratfords between the parties' properties was not compatible with the metes and bounds description of the boundary line between the properties. The portion of the fence at issue here had been built for the most part inside the legal boundaries of defendants' property.
After the plaintiffs received the survey, they prepared and presented to defendants for their signatures a quitclaim deed conveying the area put in issue as a result of the discrepancy between the deed survey and the fence line. Defendants refused to sign the quitclaim deed.
As a result, plaintiffs initiated this quiet title action, claiming that under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence they own fee simple title to the parcels designated on the accompanying diagram as Parcels # 1 and # 2. At trial, after plaintiffs had presented their evidence and rested their case, defendants moved for a dismissal, which the court granted.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in four aspects: (1) in ruling that plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to establish "prima facie" a boundary by acquiescence; (2) in excluding certain evidence proffered by plaintiffs; (3) in the form of judgment entered against plaintiffs; and (4) in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend the pleadings to conform with the evidence.
The trial court found, relying on Madsen v. Clegg, 2 that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence showing that there was dispute or uncertainty as to the true boundary and thus had failed to prove all of the necessary elements of boundary by acquiescence. Plaintiffs contend that a showing of dispute or uncertainty is not a necessary element of boundary by acquiescence. Case law does not support that contention.
In Madsen, the parties' predecessors in interest had acquired adjoining tracts of land from a common grantor on the same day in 1904. The metes and bounds descriptions of their respective deeds were compatible insofar as they described the boundary between the two tracts. Although a fence existed along the boundary, plaintiff's predecessor, owner of the southern parcel, constructed a new fence upon his own property approximately 25 feet south of the boundary line. He used the small lane between the fences to drive his cattle from a corral that had been constructed in the northeast corner of his parcel. Some years later (between 1936 and 1942), the original fence on the boundary line and the corral were torn down, and defendant's predecessor in interest began to farm the land up to the fence constructed by plaintiff's predecessor. In 1979, plaintiff put a new fence along the boundary line, which defendant removed. Plaintiff then filed an action to quiet title to the small parcel between the two fences.
The trial court in Madsen found that inasmuch as defendant and his predecessors had farmed the land in question since the 1930s without obtaining plaintiff's permission and inasmuch as plaintiff had failed to notify defendant of his claim upon the land until 1979, the fence constructed by plaintiff's predecessor in 1904 (25 feet south of the metes and bounds boundary line) had been established by mutual acquiescence as the boundary between the two properties.
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court, saying that "when the location of the true boundary between adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may [establish a boundary by acquiescence]." 3 This Court found, however, that:
[P]laintiff showed that no uncertainty or dispute existed concerning the location of the boundary line at the time the 1904 fence was constructed. The 1904 deeds to plaintiff's and defendant's predecessors unmistakenly define a boundary which takes a substantial jog northward at its eastern end. Defendant has raised no question concerning the validity of these deeds; nor has he shown any subsequent conveyance by plaintiff or his father which might cast doubt on plaintiff's present title. The trial court did not include in its findings any indication that the boundary was disputed when plaintiff's father built the fence or that the fence was intended originally as a boundary line. In the absence of any initial uncertainty concerning the ownership of the property in question, the doctrine of boundary by aquiescence has no application.[ 4
Ringwood v. Bradford, 5 which involved a fence not erected to settle any uncertainty or dispute, also supports the findings of the trial court. In Ringwood, the Court cited Glenn v. Whitney 6 with approval and quoted therefrom as follows:
The theory under which a boundary line is established by long acquiescence along an existing fence line is founded on the doctrine that the parties erect the fence to settle some doubt or uncertainty which they may have as to the location of the true boundary, and the [sic] compromise their differences by agreeing to accept the fence line as the limiting line of their respective lands. The mere fact that a fence happens to be put up and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time will not establish it as the true boundary. [Citations omitted.] 7
In Halladay v. Cluff, 8 the Court declared that the showing of dispute or uncertainty necessary in order to establish boundary by acquiescence should be measured against an objective test of reasonableness:
Under the rule as we have defined it here, the property line shown on the record title cannot be displaced by another boundary unless it is shown that during the period of acquiescence there was some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably available survey information (or other technique by which record title information was located on the ground) that would have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, from being reasonably certain about the true location of the boundary. By the same token, a claimant cannot assert boundary by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in title had reason to know the true location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence.[ 9
Plaintiffs in this case failed to provide any objective or subjective evidence of dispute or uncertainty. The trial judge found, supported by the evidence, that the parties received valid deeds containing metes and bounds descriptions of their respective parcels, that said deed descriptions were compatible insofar as they described the boundary line between the properties, that no dispute ever arose with respect to plaintiffs' fence or the true boundary line until shortly before this litigation began, and that a survey prepared at plaintiffs' request based upon the parties' respective deed descriptions established the true location of their common boundary to be a significant distance south of plaintiffs' fence line. These facts do not show any dispute or uncertainty as measured by Halladay.
Therefore, plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of providing evidence of all of the elements of boundary by acquiescence.
The next claim asserted by plaintiffs is that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence offered by them. The excluded evidence consisted of a title opinion, correspondence between L.H. Stratford and Salt Lake County, and Ella Stratford's testimony as to what she believed the northern boundaries of the property to be when purchased. The title opinion and correspondence with Salt Lake County were excluded on the basis of hearsay, while the objection to Mrs. Stratford's testimony was sustained by the trial judge before counsel could finish his objection.
Plaintiffs contend that the contested evidence was offered by them to establish the state of mind of the Stratfords at the time they erected the objected fence.
Mental state of the Stratfords was not at issue in this case. No element of boundary by acquiescence could be proved by evidence as to state of mind. Therefore, since state of mind was not an issue, the...
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