Strathmore Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO and U

• Decision Date: 06 December 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-1584,AFL-CIO and U,89-1584
• Citation: 900 F.2d 423
• Parties: 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2012, 114 Lab.Cas. P 12,043 STRATHMORE PAPER COMPANY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,nited Paperworkers International Union, Local 197, Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 423

900 F.2d 423

134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2012, 114 Lab.Cas. P 12,043

STRATHMORE PAPER COMPANY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO and United Paperworkers International Union, Local 197 Defendants, Appellees.

No. 89-1584.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Dec. 6, 1989.

Decided April 3, 1990.

Richard D. Hayes with whom Jo-Ann W. Davis, Springfield, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

J. William Gagne, Jr. with whom Harry B. Elliott, Jr., Hartford, Conn., was on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before TORRUELLA and SELYA, Circuit Judges, and COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

On appeal this Court has been requested to review the refusal of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to vacate a labor arbitration award rendered in favor of defendant Union. The issue presented by this appeal, the scope of an arbitrator's authority, continues to reappear before us, see Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, 864 F.2d 940 (1st Cir.1988); Warren v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 845 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.1988); International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. WNEV-TV, 778 F.2d 46 (1st Cir.1985), notwithstanding the narrow scope of our appellate authority.

Appellant Strathmore Paper Co. ("Employer/Company") challenges the district court's decision on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by rendering an opinion which was not based on the collective bargaining agreement ("contract" or "agreement"). 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. The facts in this case are undisputed and are as follows.

FACTS

In December of 1982, a dispute arose between an employee and the Company concerning the Company's use of a dump truck. The employee, a member of the Union, objected to the Company's assignment of a millwright to drive the dump truck. As a result of the dispute the employee filed a grievance pursuant to the agreement.

In March of 1983, the Company's employee relations manager agreed to conciliate the matter with the employee, and wrote on the grievance form, "unless the classified truckdriver is on another 'on the road' assignment the Company will use him for any pickups outside the Company." This response satisfied the Union and the matter was not pursued any further. After this conciliation, two successive labor agreements were negotiated. Although other side agreements were incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement, the 1983 settlement was not.

In January of 1987, the subject of controversy settled in March of 1983, arose again between the same parties and a grievance was again filed. The Union claimed that the union member was entitled to operate the dump truck and that the Company had violated the contract by not assigning him to drive the truck, pursuant to the 1983 settlement. This time no agreement was reached and the grievance proceeded to arbitration. At issue was both whether the grievance was arbitrable and whether the 1983 settlement was binding.

The arbitrator found that the second grievance filed in January 1987, was arbitrable under the terms of the agreement, and held for the Union. The arbitrator based his award on the conclusion that there existed a long term Employer's recognition of the driver's entitlement to drive the truck.

Not content with the arbitrator's decision, the Employer filed a complaint with the district court seeking to vacate it. In January 1989, the United States magistrate issued his Report and Recommendation which determined that although the dispute was arbitrable the arbitrator had exceeded his powers under the agreement and recommended that the Court vacate the arbitrator's decision. The Union objected to this conclusion and the district court sustained this objection and declined to vacate the arbitration decision.

DISCUSSION

It is beyond cavil that in reviewing the decision of an arbitrator, our role is limited. United Paperworkers v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). Our review must be guided by the precedent established in the Steelworkers Our review in the instant case hinges upon the resolution of three issues. We will first examine the scope and standard of our review. Second, we will analyze the language of the contract and the extent of the arbitrator's authority. Finally, we will determine whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority.

                trilogy 1 and its progeny.  Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that "[a]s long as the arbitrator's award 'draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,' and is not merely 'his own brand of industrial justice,' the award is legitimate."    Misco, 484 U.S. at 36, 108 S.Ct. at 370 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 at 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358 at 1360, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424).    In Misco the Court added that in interpreting the language of the contract to identify the authority to arbitrate and the propriety of this determination, the arbitrator must have, at the very least, arguably construed or applied the contract.  Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 108 S.Ct. at 371. 2
                

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court in discussing the restraint required in judicial review of arbitration decisions has made its position clear.

The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract....

The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960).

The reasons for the insulation of arbitral decisions from judicial review are grounded in various factors: labor management relations; the preference for private settlement of labor disputes without the intervention of government; and the greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, all in furtherance of the national labor policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes in accord with the parties' objectives. See Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 371-372, 104 S.Ct. 1844, 1848-1849, 80 L.Ed.2d 366 (1984); Misco, 484 U.S. at 37, 108 S.Ct. at 370; AT & T Technologies Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649-650, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418-1419, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986).

This limited standard of review has led to the presumption that any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues "require[s] that the matter be decided by an arbitrator in the first instance". As such "this result is in keeping with the 'strong presumption favoring arbitrability.' " International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. WNEV-TV, 778 F.2d at 48. After all, an arbitrator:

... is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by a superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-government created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure only to administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 999, 1016 (1955): United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581 ; Having established the limited scope of our review the next task of a court asked to compel arbitration or to determine its propriety, is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 n. 16 [94 S.Ct. 1011, 1022 n. 16, 39 L.Ed.2d 147] (1974).

II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACT

The extent of an arbitrator's authority lies within the language of the contract. An arbitrator does not have unfettered discretion, and may not impose a remedy which directly contradicts the express language of the agreement. Nor can he or she interpret a clause or provision when its language is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous. Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, 864 F.2d at 945.

The dispute and the subsequent arbitration at issue in the present appeal arose out of a grievance filed by the employee and the Union under Section 3 of the contract. In pertinent part, the clause reads as follows:

Should differences arise between the Company and the Union and its members employed by the Company as to the meaning and application of this Agreement, or should any local trouble of any kind arise in the plant, there shall be no suspension of operation on account of such differences.... (emphasis added).

After providing for a series of steps to be followed, the contract states:

[The] authority of the arbitrator shall be limited to construing and interpreting rights of the parties under terms of the Agreement. The arbitrator has no power to amend, delete, or add to its terms.

In the instant case, the arbitrator was presented with a question of job classification. Consequently, since job classification is a matter not specifically discussed by the agreement, this Court must initially determine whether the instant dispute is arbitrable, albeit that it is "a local trouble of any kind" arising in the plant as per the language of the agreement. Our task requires that we examine the arbitration clause itself.

A. The Arbitration Clause

The Supreme Court has determined that a presumption of arbitrability exists when a contract contains an arbitration clause. AT & T Technologies Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. at 650, 106 S.Ct. at 1419. In AT & T, the Supreme Court, in a framework analogous to this case, addressed the effect of a broad clause in a labor...