Stratman v. Watt, 79-4480

• Citation: 656 F.2d 1321
• Decision Date: 27 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-4480,79-4480
• Parties: Omar STRATMAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James G. WATT, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 1321

656 F.2d 1321

Omar STRATMAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James G. WATT, Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-4480.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 11, 1980.

Decided Sept. 8, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 27, 1981.

Roger E. Henderson, Anchorage, Alaska; Frederick L. Miller, Duncan, Weinberg & Miller, Washington, D. C., argued, for plaintiffs-appellants; Roger E. Henderson, Houston & Henderson, Anchorage, Alaska, on brief.

Peter Steenland, Washington, D. C., argued, for defendants-appellees; Dan A. Hensley, Anchorage, Alaska, on brief.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.

Before WALLACE, HUG and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

This is an action by various individuals to enjoin the granting of land patents to a Native corporation pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. Plaintiffs seek to demonstrate that the village corporation, Leisnoi, Inc. (Leisnoi), comprising the village of Woody Island, was not qualified as a Native village under the requirements of 43 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(3). ¹ Defendants include the Secretary of the Interior and Leisnoi. A series of district court rulings resulted in the dismissal of all the plaintiffs' claims, and we partially remand.

At the time suit was filed, these plaintiffs could have been grouped into two categories. The first group of plaintiffs were individuals who occasionally used the land subject to patent for recreational purposes. The other plaintiffs, Stratman and Burton, held long-term federal grazing leases on land within the area subject to patent, and were also recreational users. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims of the first category of plaintiffs, and reverse and remand the dismissal of the remaining recreational claims of Stratman and Burton.

The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), enacted in 1971, is intended to settle all aboriginal land claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska. 43 U.S.C. § 1601; Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954, 99 S.Ct. 352, 58 L.Ed.2d 345 (1978). ANCSA provides for accomplishment of that settlement through distribution of 40 million acres of land and payment of $962,500,000 to Native villages and regional corporations established pursuant to the Act's provisions. The Act lists many Native villages which are eligible for benefits, provided the Secretary determines they meet specified qualifications. 43 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1) & (2). ANCSA also provides that villages other than villages specifically enumerated in the Act can qualify as recipient Native villages under certain conditions. 43 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(3). ² Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Interior provide for particular kinds of notice and a hearing to determine the validity of each unlisted village's application. 43 C.F.R. § 2651.2(a)(8)-(10).

Woody Island is not listed in the Act as an eligible Native village. Application was made, however, for Woody Island to be declared an eligible village. After an investigation in 1973, Woody Island was found eligible to form a village corporation and determination of that eligibility was published in the Federal Register and several Alaska newspapers in accordance with Department of Interior regulations. None of the plaintiffs received actual notice of the Woody Island village application, however, and none filed objections or participated in any hearings held on the application, which was approved by the Secretary of Interior on March 18, 1975.

After learning of Woody Island's certification and the subsequent incorporation of Leisnoi to select lands for patent, plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in July 1976, claiming that the government's investigation of the application, as required by 43 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(3) and 43 C.F.R. §§ 2651.2(a)(8) & 2651.2(b), had been insufficient and that the village did not qualify as a Native village. In a published opinion, the district court initially dismissed the claims of the recreational users, other than Stratman and Burton, for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However it permitted Stratman and Burton, because they had property interests in the land, to amend their complaint and to proceed, notwithstanding their failure to participate in any administrative proceedings. The court determined Stratman's and Burton's record interests entitled them to actual, rather than constructive notice of the certification application when administrative proceedings were pending. Kodiak-Aleutian Chapter of Alaska Conservation Soc'y v. Kleppe, 423 F.Supp. 544 (D.Alaska 1976).

At that point, faced with a full-scale trial of the Stratman-Burton claims, Leisnoi quitclaimed any interest in all land subject to Stratman's and Burton's leaseholds, thus mooting any claims based upon economic injury. Upon application of the defendants, the district court withdrew its prior ruling in favor of Stratman and Burton and dismissed their claims on the ground that there no longer existed any "case or controversy" within the meaning of article III of the United States Constitution. ³ The district court, significantly in our view, did not expressly consider the claims of Stratman and Burton as recreational users, apparently agreeing with the defendants that the quitclaim deed eliminated Stratman's and Burton's standing to challenge the certification.

Plaintiffs in this appeal ask us to review both the dismissal of the Stratman-Burton claims for lack of a case or controversy and the dismissal of the recreational users' claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

With respect to Stratman and Burton, the issue is whether their claims were properly dismissed following the relinquishment by Leisnoi of any claim to the land in which they had economic interests. Its ruling was based upon the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue any claim of damage other than damage to economic interests, and thus could not pursue any remaining claim based on recreational interests.

A threshold question for all the plaintiffs is therefore one of standing. In determining standing, we must consider both constitutional and prudential concerns. To satisfy the constitutional requirement that a "case or controversy" has been made out, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered injury resulting from the defendant's allegedly illegal action. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204-05, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). We have concluded that to satisfy this requirement "the plaintiffs must have alleged (a) a particularized injury (b) concretely and demonstrably resulting from defendants' action (c) which injury will be redressed by the remedy sought." Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted). See also Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581, 592 (9th Cir. 1979).

In dealing with standing to assert recreational interests, the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1366, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) rejected the argument that only economic interests could provide standing, pointing out that "(a)esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society ...." The plaintiffs allege they use the land subject to patent for a multitude of recreational purposes, including hunting, camping, picnicking and photography. This injury is sufficiently particularized; it is clear that the injury results from the defendants' action in removing the land from the public domain; the injury will be redressed by the enjoining of the defendants' removal of the land from the public domain. Thus, we conclude that the plaintiffs have satisfied the constitutional requirements of standing.

Plaintiffs have also satisfied our prudential standing concerns. Plaintiffs' claims are not merely claims of generalized import, but seek to vindicate individual rights. In addition, plaintiffs are raising their own legal interests, rather than the interests of third parties. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607-08, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979).

Finally, we are satisfied that plaintiffs' claim is within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute pursuant to which the claim arises. Id. at 100 n.6, 99 S.Ct. 1607-08 n.6, citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1969). In considering whether that claim is within this zone of interests, we look to both the statute and the regulations promulgated under it. See B. Mezines, J. Stein & J. Gruff, 5 Administrative Law § 50.03 at 50-29 & 30 (1981) (look to statute to determine purpose and class to be protected); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 153 at 455 (1976). The regulations do not restrict the nature of protests which may be filed but rather provide that "any interested party" may protest the village certification. 43 C.F.R. § 2651.2(a)(9). The Act itself indicates that Congress was well aware of the recreational interests of users of public land, and specifically provided for retention of public access easements in the lands selected by Native villages in order to preserve and protect recreational interests in the remaining federal lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b). We are thus persuaded that recreational interests are within the zone protected by the statute and we reject the defendants' argument that the recreational claims should have been dismissed for lack of standing.

We now turn to the district court's original determination that those plaintiffs (other than Stratman and Burton) whose interests were never more than recreational should have exhausted administrative remedies. The plaintiffs argue against imposition of such a requirement on the...