Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer

Decision Date28 August 1997
Docket NumberNo. 19605,19605
PartiesRichard J. STRATMEYER, Kathryn Lambert, Karla Stoakes, and John V. Engberg, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Gary J. STRATMEYER, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Rick Johnson of Johnson, Eklund, Nicholson, Peterson & Fox, Gregory, for Plaintiffs and Appellees.

Timothy J. Wilka and Rick L. Ramstad of Wilka Law Office, Sioux Falls, for Defendant and Appellant.

SABERS, Justice (on reassignment).

¶1 In this case, we reconsider whether the South Dakota Legislature intended SDCL 26-10-25 to apply to all acts of intentional sexual abuse or only to those acts of intentional sexual abuse which occurred after the effective date of the statute. Koenig v. Lambert, 527 N.W.2d 903 (S.D.1995), held that the Legislature did not intend for SDCL 26-10-25 to be retroactive. We now overrule Koenig and hold that the South Dakota Legislature intended the statute to apply to all acts of intentional sexual abuse of children. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, although for a different reason. 1

¶2 On July 5, 1995, Richard Stratmeyer, Kathryn Lambert, Karla Stoakes and John Engberg (Plaintiffs) commenced an action against their uncle, Gary Stratmeyer (Defendant), claiming that when they were children, they suffered sexual abuse at his hands, causing each to suffer extreme emotional distress and permanent emotional and psychological damage. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based on the three-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims. The trial court denied his motion. After a two-day trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Richard and John, but found the statute of limitation barred the claims of Kathryn and Karla. 2 The jury awarded damages of $30,416 to Richard and $20,000 to John. Punitive damages in the amount of $91,250 were awarded, to be equally divided between the prevailing Plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

¶3 As children, Plaintiffs spent time on their grandparents' farm near Hartford, South Dakota, particularly during the summer. Defendant (the youngest son of their grandparents and brother of their parents) 3 lived on the farm during the time period relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. 4

¶4 On December 6, 1994, Richard called his mother to tell her good-bye, as he planned to commit suicide. During that conversation he revealed that, as a child, he was sexually molested by Defendant. He recalls Defendant repeatedly fondling him and forcing him to perform oral sex during Richard's visits to the farm. The molestation occurred from approximately 1974 to 1985, when Richard was between the ages of six and seventeen. 5 He recalls the abuse taking place at various locations on the farm, including a barn, chicken coop, tractor cab, vehicle, the guest bedroom, and the basement of the house. He also remembers Defendant threatening him not to tell anyone about the abuse, but does not recall specifics of the threats.

¶5 Following Richard's revelation, Kathryn, Karla, and John revealed that they, too, were molested by Defendant. Kathryn recalls being molested by Defendant while visiting the farm during the summer of 1974, when she was nine. She remembered Defendant taking her and her sister Karla, then seven, to an old car in a grove of trees, where he made Kathryn get in the back seat and remove her clothes. He attempted to penetrate her with his penis but failed. He then made Karla get in the back seat and remove her clothes. His attempts to penetrate her also failed. Following that incident, Defendant threatened the girls that they would not be allowed to ride the snowmobile if they told anyone what happened. Karla does not recall this incident.

¶6 Karla recalls Defendant sexually molesting her and her sister on a different occasion during the same summer. She remembers Defendant molesting them after he caught them looking at his pornographic magazines. On this occasion, he attempted to penetrate Karla with his penis while Kathryn was in the room. Kathryn does not recall this incident.

¶7 John remembers Defendant molesting him on several occasions during his summer visits in 1978 and 1979. The first time it happened, Defendant pointed a .38 caliber pistol at John's head while he forced him to perform oral sex. Other times, Defendant fondled him and forced him to perform oral sex by restraining him with wrestling holds and squeezing or "smacking" his testicles until he complied. John was between thirteen and fourteen when these incidents occurred.

¶8 There was testimony of other incidents of abuse and threats. Except for the memories of abuse which Kathryn and Karla do not share, all the Plaintiffs testified that they never forgot being sexually molested by Defendant.

¶9 On July 5, 1995, Plaintiffs commenced an action against Defendant, alleging permanent emotional and psychological damage as a result of the childhood sexual abuse. 6 They claimed that Defendant accomplished the abuse by taking advantage of the confidential relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant and that he fraudulently concealed the molestation through threats and intimidation.

¶10 Defendant denied Plaintiffs' allegations and asserted the statute of limitation as an affirmative defense. He moved for summary judgment, claiming that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitation provided in SDCL 15-2-14. 7 The trial court denied his motion, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a confidential relationship existed between the parties and whether Defendant fraudulently concealed "the significance of the acts by way of threats and menacing conduct," so as to toll the statute of limitation. As noted above, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Richard and John. Defendant appeals. Although the tolling effect of "fraudulent concealment" is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case, we affirm on the basis that SDCL 26-10-25 governs this action; that statute applies retroactively to all acts of intentional sexual abuse.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Statute of limitation questions are normally left for the jury. However, the construction of a statute and its application to particular facts present a question of law, reviewed de novo. Bosse v. Quam, 537 N.W.2d 8, 10 (S.D.1995) (citing Schoenrock v. Tappe, 419 N.W.2d 197, 201 (S.D.1988); Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Ass'n, 514 N.W.2d 693, 695 (S.D.1994)). We give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law under a de novo review. City of Colton v. Schwebach, 1997 SD 4, p 8, 557 N.W.2d 769, 771. Therefore, "[t]hat the trial court reached its conclusion for a different reason does not prevent this court from affirming based upon the correct reason." Anderson v. Somers, 455 N.W.2d 219, 222 (S.D.1990) (citing Gilbert v. United Nat'l Bank, 436 N.W.2d 23 (S.D.1989); Owens v. City of Beresford, 87 S.D. 8, 201 N.W.2d 890 (1972)).

¶12. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATION.

¶13 This case is best explained by Justice Konenkamp's early writing in this case as follows:

Imagine being pricked on the arm with a pin. At first, such an intrusion would be disturbing, but with time might seem uneventful. Now imagine the pin carried a dreaded affliction, only discoverable after years of incubation. Such is often the nature of childhood sexual abuse. Many children only realize years later the true significance of the abuse they endured, especially in cases where the molestation occurred at the hands of family members or other trusted individuals. For some children, sexual violation is so traumatic it becomes psychologically self-concealing, if only to preserve sanity. For this reason, our Legislature enacted SDCL 26-10-25 creating a discovery rule for adult survivors of child sex abuse. This statute was intended to be retroactive. See Koenig v. Lambert, 527 N.W.2d 903, 907 (S.D.1995) (Sabers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I agree ... that fraudulent concealment is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case and thus cannot toll an otherwise expired limitations period, plaintiffs nonetheless have a viable cause of action; SDCL 26-10-25 extended their time for filing because the jury found they "discovered," within the enlarged period, the injuries they suffered.

¶14 The question is simply whether the Legislature intended SDCL 26-10-25 to apply to all acts of intentional conduct or only to those acts of intentional conduct occurring after the effective date of the statute. SDCL 26-10-25 provides:

Any civil action based on intentional conduct brought by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within three years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by the act, whichever period expires later.

Also relevant to our analysis is SDCL 26-10-29:

As used in §§ 26-10-25 to 26-10-29, inclusive, childhood sexual abuse is any act committed by the defendant against the complainant who was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the act and which act would have been a violation of chapter 22-22 or prior laws of similar effect at the time the act was committed which act would have constituted a felony.

¶15 It is obvious from a plain reading of SDCL 26-10-25 and 26-10-29 that the Legislature intended SDCL 26-10-25 to apply to all acts of intentional childhood sexual abuse conduct. This is so because SDCL 26-10-29 defines childhood sexual abuse as "any act" committed by a defendant which act would have been a violation of SDCL ch. 22-22 (sex offenses) or prior laws of similar effect at the time the act was committed which act would have constituted a felony.

¶16 SDCL 26-10-25...

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