Stratton v. City of Boston, Civ. A. No. 89-1929-K.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-1929-K.
• Citation: 731 F. Supp. 42
• Parties: Michael STRATTON and Joseph Van De Mark, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF BOSTON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

731 F. Supp. 42

Michael STRATTON and Joseph Van De Mark, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF BOSTON, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 89-1929-K.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 28, 1989.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael Stratton, Joseph Van de Mark, Allston, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Susan M. Weise, Asst. Corp. Counsel, City of Boston Law Dept., Boston, Mass., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KEETON, District Judge.

The caption of this case as it appeared in the complaint identified the defendants as follows: "Boston City Police Department, Francis Roache, Commissioner, and Certain Unknown Officers."

Before the court is an unopposed Motion to Dismiss on behalf of the Boston City Police Department and Francis Roache, Commissioner, the only defendants upon whom service was made. Docket No. 3, dated September 8, 1989, and filed September 11, 1989. This Memorandum addresses that motion and related issues bearing upon the status of this case once this motion is decided.

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be granted if the plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The defendants contend that the claims against the Boston City Police Department should be dismissed because the Boston City Police Department is not a legal entity. The defendants' motion also asks the court to dismiss the claims against Commissioner Roache because the allegations in the complaint are conclusions and are not supported by material facts.

I. Facts and Claims Alleged

Plaintiffs' complaint makes the following allegations: On July 15, 1989 the plaintiffs were walking along the street returning to their homes when they were stopped by police officers. After briefly questioning the plaintiffs, the police officers pushed the plaintiffs against a wall, handcuffed them and took them to the local police station. The police officers told the plaintiffs that they were under protective custody. The plaintiffs requested breathalyzer tests. However, the officers allegedly refused to give the tests and explained to the plaintiffs that if they availed themselves of their right to take breathalyzer tests, they would spend a longer period of time in protective custody.

The plaintiffs state that they were placed in one small cell that had little ventilation, a broken toilet and no running water. The cell was infested with cockroaches. They were held there for approximately five hours.

On July 26, 1989 the plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint in the Massachusetts state court. The action was subsequently removed to federal court. The complaint alleges violations of the plaintiffs' civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The complaint also alleges state-law claims for violations of Mass. Gen.L. ch. 111B, §§ 8 and 13 and for assault and battery, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The pro se complaint presents the facts in a separate facts section and then states the claims in eight separate counts. Each claim is alleged against all of the defendants.

II. Claims Against Certain Unknown Officers

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the title of the action in the complaint must include the names of all the parties. Although the Federal Rules do not explicitly prohibit the use of fictitious names for defendants, an action may be dismissed if the defendant is not sufficiently identified to permit service of process. 2A J. Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 10.02 (2d ed. 1989). Moreover, "the use of a fictitious name for a defendant will not be permitted if ignorance of the defendant's identity is the result of ... lack of reasonable inquiry." Id. at ¶ 10.02. See also Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1975) (plaintiff permitted to name "John Doe" defendants until he had opportunity to determine identity of defendants). In this case, the facts presented in all submissions now before the court make it appear that the plaintiffs could have inquired and obtained the names of the police officers on duty on the night of July 15, 1989. Accordingly, this case will not be allowed to proceed against defendants designated as "Certain Unknown Officers." However, in accordance with the Order below, plaintiffs will be allowed leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days.

III. Claims Against City Agencies and Officials in Their Official Capacity

A. Claims Against Commissioner Roache

The plaintiffs brought claims against Francis Roache, Commissioner of the Boston Police Department. The defendants seek to dismiss these claims on the grounds that Commissioner Roache has official immunity and that the complaint fails to state specific facts in support of the allegations.

An allegation stating that a claim is made against a defendant identified both by name and by official title (in this case, against "Francis Roache, Commissioner") is ambiguous. It does not specify whether a claim is being alleged against the defendant individually, or instead against the defendant in his official capacity, or both. It is important to draw a distinction because the applicable law and the collection of damages vary depending on how the official is sued. For example, the Motion to Dismiss filed in this case asserts, on behalf of defendant "Francis Roache, Commissioner," that he is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This defense is available as to a claim against this defendant individually, and is not available as to a claim against this defendant in his official capacity. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980).

Moreover, with respect to claims for damages, as distinguished from claims for declaratory or equitable relief, the distinction is critical because a judgment against the defendant individually would be collectible out of the assets of the individual, and, in contrast, a judgment against the defendant in his official capacity would be collectible only out of the assets of the official governmental entity or agency for which he was acting officially. That is, the public entity must pay any damages that are awarded in an action brought against the official in his official capacity. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 662, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2021, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Thus, although the official is the defendant named in the complaint, if the plaintiffs win, it is the public entity that will be held liable and required to pay damages.

In Monell the court held that an action against a public official in his or her official capacity is "only another way of pleading" an action against the public entity that the official represents. Id. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. at 2035 n. 55. Thus, in such an action, "a judgment against a public servant `in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents" if the entity received notice and had an opportunity to respond. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877-78, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985).

Although a suit against a public official in his or her official capacity is actually a suit against the entity that he or she represents, courts typically allow the case to proceed without formal designation of the entity by its own name. A court's allowing a case to proceed in that way is especially likely when the failure to designate the entity defendant by its own name is first observed on appeal, or very late in proceedings before a trial court. That way of proceeding is less appropriate when the failure to designate the entity defendant by its own name is noted early and requiring an explicit designation of the entity is likely to reduce risks of confusion and misunderstanding.

In this case, allowing the suit to proceed against "Francis Roache, Commissioner," would be confusing with regard to the satisfaction of any judgment. Should plaintiffs prevail on any of their claims against "Francis Roache, Commissioner" there would be no legal entity having the designated name that also would have assets, held under that name, that could be reached to collect a judgment. The designation "Commissioner" raises this problem in this case because the legal entity that Francis Roache represents is officially the "City of Boston." Because this misleading designation has been observed at a very early stage of proceedings, the court will not allow the case to proceed with this designation. Instead, to avoid misunderstandings that may flow from ambiguity, the court will direct that, in the caption of this case and in any future pleadings, any claim against a governmental entity based on the actions of Commissioner Roache will be designated as a claim against the City of Boston.

Any claim against defendant Roache individually will be designated as a claim against him individually. Also, if plaintiffs seek in an amended pleading to allege a claim against defendant Roache individually, he shall be designated in the caption as "Francis Roache, individually."

Although, as discussed in Part V, infra, the claims against Commissioner Roache individually may be barred by qualified immunity, such immunity does not bar those claims made against Commissioner Roache in his official capacity. In other words, the City of Boston does not have immunity. Nevertheless, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss the claims against Commissioner Roache in his official capacity must be allowed as to federal-law claims (Counts Five, Six, Seven, and part of Count Eight) for the reasons stated in Part IV below.

For the purpose of avoiding any misunderstanding as to any claims that remain against Commissioner Roache in his official capacity, the clerk and the parties will be directed to delete "Francis Roache Commissioner" from the caption of the case on the docket of this court and to substitute...