Stratton v. St Louis Southwestern Ry Co

• Decision Date: 24 November 1930
• Docket Number: No. 6,6
• Citation: 75 L.Ed. 135,51 S.Ct. 8,282 U.S. 10
• Parties: STRATTON, Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, v. ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. Re
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

282 U.S. 10

51 S.Ct. 8

75 L.Ed. 135

STRATTON, Secretary of State of the State of Illinois,

v ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO.

No. 6.

Reargued Oct. 28, 1930.

Decided Nov. 24, 1930.

[Syllabus from pages 10-12 intentionally omitted] Messrs. B. L. Catron, of Springfield, Ill., and Oscar E. Carlstrom, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Messrs. Josiah Whitnel, of East St. Louis, Ill., and J. R. Turney, of St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was brought on July 21, 1927, by St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company to restrain the enforcement of a statute of the state of Illinois (General Corporation Act, § 107 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 32)), providing for the payment of a minimum franchise tax, upon the ground that the statute as applied to the complainant violated the commerce clause (article 1, § 8, cl. 3), and the due process and equal protection clauses, of the Federal Constitution. (Amendment 14, § 1). The bill of complaint prayed for both a preliminary and a permanent injunction against the defendant, Secretary of State of Illinois, from instituting any proceedings to assess the tax or to enforce any of the prohibitions or penalties prescribed in case of refusal to pay.

On July 22, 1927, the complainant made a motion for a temporary restraining order in accordance with the prayer of the bill. On the same day, District Judge FitzHenry entered an order enjoining the defendant from re- voking the complainant's certificate of authority, from hindering the complainant in transacting its business in the state of Illinois, and from taking any steps for the enforcement of penalties, pending the determination of the application for an interlocutory injunction. While this order was in force, the defendant, on November 4, 1927, moved to dismiss the bill for want of equity. This motion was heard and granted by District Judge FitzHenry, sitting alone, and on June 7, 1928, he entered a decree dismissing the bill and dissolving the restraining order. 27 F.(2d) 1005.

On an appeal by the complainant from this decree, the Circuit Court of Appeals, holding the statute, which laid the tax, to be invalid under the Federal Constitution, reversed the decree and remanded the cause with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the views expressed in its opinion. 30 F.(2d) 322. A petition for a rehearing was denied, and from the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals the present appeal is taken.

The question is thus necessarily presented, although not raised by the parties, with respect to the validity of the decree entered in the District Court, and the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal from that decree, in the light of section 266 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. Code, tit. 28, § 380 (28 USCA § 380)). The statute provides that no interlocutory injunction, restraining the action of any officer of a state in the enforcement of a statute of the state, or of an order made by an administrative board or commission pursuant to a state statute, shall be granted by any Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or by any District Court, or by any Judge thereof, or by any Circuit Judge acting as District Judge, upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute, unless the application for the injunction shall be heard and determined by three judges. When the application for such an injunction is presented to a justice or judge, he must immediately call to his assistance two other judges, as stated, but, if he is of opinion that irreparable loss may otherwise result to the complainant, he may grant a temporary restraining order which is to remain in force only until the hearing and determination of the application for an interlocutory injunction upon prescribed notice. An appeal may be taken to this Court from the order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory injunction in such case. By the amendment of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat. 938), the provision with respect to the presence of three judges was made to apply also to the final hearing in such suit in the District Court, and from the final decree, granting or denying a permanent injunction, a direct appeal lies to this Court.

The decisions of this Court require the following conclusions as to the purpose and effect of the statute:

First. By the statute in its original form, the Congress sought to make interference by interlocutory injunction with the enforcement of state legislation a matter for the adequate hearing and full deliberation which the presence of a court composed of three judges, as provided by the statute, was likely to secure. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Public Service Commission, 260 U. S. 212, 216, 43 S. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217. The gravity of this class of cases was recognized, and it was sought to minimize the delay incident to a review upon appeal from an order granting or denying an interlocutory injunction. Chicago Great Western Railway Company v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97, 45 S. Ct. 55, 69 L. Ed. 183; Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Company, 272 U. S. 317, 321, 47 S. Ct. 105, 71 L. Ed. 273; Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565, 567, 48 S. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990. These purposes were not altered by the amendment of the statute, which was designed to end the anomalous situation in which a single judge might reconsider and decide questions already passed upon by three judges on the application for an interlocutory injunction. Patterson v. Mobile Gas Com- pany, 271 U. S. 131, 136, 46 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 870; Smith v. Wilson, 273 U. S. 388, 390, 391, 47 S. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed. 699.

Second. The statute applies only where there is a substantial claim of invalidity under the Federal Constitution and where an application for an interlocutory injunction, for the purposes contemplated by the statute, is made and pressed. Ex parte Buder, 271 U. S. 461, 463, 467, 46 S. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036; Ex parte Hobbs, 280 U. S. 168, 172, 50 S. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed. 353. The complainant has an election. If an interlocutory injunction is not sought, a single judge may hear and determine the case, and an appeal from the final decree will lie to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Judicial Code, § 128 (U. S. Code, tit. 28, § 225 (28 USCA § 225)); Ex parte Buder, supra; Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Company, supra; Smith v. Wilson, supra.

Third. If an application for an interlocutory injunction is made and pressed to restrain the enforcement of a state statute, or of an administrative order made pursuant to a state statute, upon the ground that such enforcement would be in violation of the Federal Constitution, a single judge has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion to dismiss the bill on the merits. He is as much without power to dismiss the bill on the merits as he would be to grant either an interlocutory or a permanent injunction. His authority is strictly limited to granting, upon proper cause being shown, a temporary restraining order to be effective only pending the determination of the application for an interlocutory injunction. Upon making such an order, it is his duty immediately to call two other judges, as the statute directs, to assist him in hearing and determining that application. Ex parte Northern Pacific Railway Company, 280 U. S. 142, 144, 50 S. Ct. 70, 74 L. Ed. 233.

Fourth. If a single judge, thus acting without jurisdiction, undertakes to enter an interlocutory injunction or a final decree, either dismissing the bill on the merits or granting a permanent injunction, no appeal lies from such an order or decree to this Court, as the statute plainly contemplates such a direct appeal only in the case of an order or decree entered by a court composed of three judges in accordance with the statutory requirement. Nor does an appeal lie to the Circuit Court of Appeals from an order or decree thus entered by a District Judge without authority, for to sustain a review upon such an appeal would defeat the purpose of the statute by substituting a decree by a single judge and an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for a decree by three judges and a direct appeal to this Court.

Accordingly, where a court of three judges should have been convened, and was not, this Court may issue a writ of mandamus to vacate the order or decree entered by the District Judge and directing him, or such other judge as may entertain the proceeding, to call to his aid two other judges for the hearing and...