Strauch v. Comput. Scis. Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:14-cv-956 (JBA) |
| Parties | JOSEPH STRAUCH, TIMOTHY COLBY, CHARLES TURNER, and VERNON CARRE individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Plaintiffs and their counsel bring two post-trial motions for attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards.
The four law firms (collectively, "Class Counsel") representing Plaintiffs move for fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Connecticut law, and California law. Specifically, Outten & Golden LLP; Feinberg, Jackson, Wortham & Wasow, LLP; Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP; and Susman, Duffy & Segaloff, P.C., request a multiplied fee award of $13,616,063,17 and $584,560.54 in costs. (See Pls.' Notice of Updated Costs [Doc. # 537] at 2-3.) Defendant Computer Sciences Corporation ("CSC") opposes the motion, arguing for a reduced lodestar.
The named plaintiffs in this action—Timothy Colby, Joseph Strauch, Charles Turner, and Vernon Carre ("Class Representatives")—separately move for service awards in the amount of $10,000 each, for a total of $40,000. CSC again opposes this motion.
For the reasons that follow, Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and costs is granted with modification, and Class Representatives' motion for service awards is granted.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and history of this case. In brief, Class Representatives Joseph Strauch, Timothy Colby, Charles Turner, and Vernon Carre brought this overtime misclassification suit on behalf of Associate Professional and Professional System Administrators (collectively, "SAs") that had been employed by CSC. Plaintiffs brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the state laws of Connecticut, California and North Carolina, claiming that Defendant CSC unlawfully classified the SAs as overtime-exempt computer employees.
On June 9, 2015, the Court conditionally certified an FLSA collective composed of all SAs who had the titles "Associate Professional System Administrator," "Professional System Administrator," or "Senior Professional System Administrator" and whose yearly earnings were less than $100,000. (See [Doc. # 168].) On June 30, 2017, the Court certified Connecticut and California Rule 23 subclasses of Professional and Associate Professional System Administrators. (Class Certification Ruling [Doc. # 327].)
On July 14, 2017, Defendant petitioned the Second Circuit to appeal this class certification. .) The Second Circuit denied this petition on November 21, 2017, finding that "an immediate appeal is unwarranted." (Mandate Granting Mot. to File Reply and Denying Rule 23(f) Pet. [Doc. # 410].)
Separately, Defendant submitted to this Court a motion to decertify the California class of SAs, claiming that Mr. Strauch was an inadequate class representative. ([Doc. # 343].) The Court denied that motion on October 18, 2017. ([Doc. # 358].) Defendant then filed a Second Motion to Decertify, ([Doc. # 373]), on October 27, 2017, arguing that Plaintiffs' trial plan was deficient andthat both the California and Connecticut classes should thus be decertified. The Court denied that Motion on November 30, 2017. ([Doc. # 412].)
Trial commenced on December 7, 2017. At the close of Plaintiffs' evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, ([Doc. # 424]), which the Court denied, ([Doc. # 425]). Defendant renewed that motion at the close of all evidence. ([Doc. # 435].) Again, the Court denied that motion without prejudice. ([Doc. # 438].)
On December 20, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiffs' favor on liability on Plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA and Connecticut and California wage-and-hour law. The jury made a specific finding that Defendant acted willfully in classifying Plaintiffs as exempt. ([Doc. # 442].) However, the jury also found in Defendant's favor that Defendant had proved that it and the SAs had a clear, mutual understanding that their fixed salaries were intended as compensation (apart from overtime premiums) for the hours worked each workweek. ([Doc. # 442-1].)
On February 2, 2018, Defendant moved for a judgment as a matter of law, ([Doc. # 446]), and again moved to decertify the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 California and Connecticut classes, ([Doc. # 447]). The Court denied both motions. ([Doc. # 476].)
On November 9, 2018, the Court issued its ruling on remedies, ([Doc. # 479]), and then, on January 24, 2019, appointed a Special Master to address the calculation of damages, ([Doc. # 491]). On August 12, 2019, the Court adopted the Special Master's recommendation as to damages and entered an amended judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $18,755,016.46. ([Docs. ## 514, 515].)
On September 4, 2019, Defendant notified the Court that it was appealing the post-trial rulings, ([Docs. ## 477, 479, 514, 515]), to the Second Circuit. ([Doc. # 519].)
On September 18, 2019, Class Counsel brought these motions for attorneys' fees and costs, ([Doc. # 520]), and for service awards, ([Doc. # 523]).
In this action, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and so are eligible to recoup "reasonable" attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor Standard Act, Connecticut law, and California law. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-68 (); Cal. Lab. Code § 218.5 (same).
Accordingly, Class Counsel petition for fees under these statutes. In their Lodestar Summary Report, Class Counsel calculate their collective lodestar to be $10,369,189, based on the 20,607 hours billed on this matter. 1 After auditing their time entries, Class Counselpropose a "reduced lodestar" of $10,163,289, (see Pls.' Notice of Updated Costs and Errata [Doc. # 537] at 2), which "reduced all travel time by 50%" as is "consistent with Second Circuit practice," "eliminated all entries by timekeepers who billed fewer than 10 hours total," and "eliminated time spent on depositions of Senior Professional SAs, who are not members of the ultimately certified FLSA collective and state-law classes." (Pls.' Mot. Att'ys' Fees and Costs at 13.) Working from this proposed lodestar, Class Counsel ask the Court to "apply a 1.5x multiplier to the portion of their fees attributable to work performed for the benefit of the state law class members" and "request a 10% per-year enhancement based on federal law . . . [to] apply to the remaining portion" of the proposed lodestar. (Id. at 32.) In all, Class Counsel's total requested fee amounts to $13,616,063.17. (See Pls.' Notice of Updated Costs and Errata at 2.)
Defendant raises a number of objections to Class Counsel's claimed fees, which the Court will detail below.
"[T]he FLSA directs courts to award prevailing plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs." Barfield v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 151 (2d Cir. 2008). Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court "have held that the lodestar method — the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case — creates a presumptively reasonable fee.'" Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Arbor Hill II")).2 The Court should determine the "presumptively reasonable fee"by looking to "what a reasonable client would be willing to pay." Arbor Hill II, 522 F.3d at 183-84. Under this approach, district courts are directed to "step[] into the shoes of the reasonable, paying client, who wishes to pay the least amount necessary to litigate the case effectively" in considering "what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay." Id. at 184. In doing so, courts should utilize both the factors articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1989),3 as well as certain client-related factors:
[T]he district court, in exercising its considerable discretion, [should] bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that we and other courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney's fees in setting a reasonable hourly rate. The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay. In determining what rate a paying client would be willing to pay, the district court should consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively. The district court should also consider that such an individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the case. The district court should then use that reasonable hourly rate to calculate what can properly be termed the "presumptively reasonable fee."
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 493 F.3d 110, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Arbor Hill I"), amended on other grounds by Arbor Hill II, 522 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008).
In determining a reasonable hourly rate in connection with an application for attorneys'...
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