Strauss v. Parshall

• Decision Date: 06 May 1892
• Citation: 51 N.W. 1117,91 Mich. 475
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: STRAUSS et al. v. PARSHALL et al.

51 N.W. 1117

91 Mich. 475

STRAUSS et al. v. PARSHALL et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 6, 1892

Appeal from circuit court, Branch county, in chancery; NOAH P LOVERIDGE, Judge.

Bill in aid of execution by Ferdinand Strauss and another against Leroy L. Parshall and another. Defendants had decree, and complainants appeal. Affirmed.

John S. Evans, for appellants.

A T. Lamphere, for defendants.

GRANT J.

Complainants recovered a judgment against defendant Leroy L. Parshall June 22, 1889, for the sum of $349.10. Execution was issued returned unsatisfied for want of goods or chattels, lands or tenements, on which to levy. Complainants, on August 4, 1890, filed a bill in this cause to set aside a deed and bill of sale executed August 1, 1888, by defendant Leroy to his wife, Elizabeth, alleging that these conveyances were made in fraud of his creditors. The cause was heard upon proofs taken in open court, and decree entered dismissing the bill. The judge filed a written finding, holding that defendant Elizabeth did not take the conveyances with a fraudulent intent of aiding her husband in defrauding his creditors; that he was then owing his wife a bona fide debt; that he had the right to prefer his wife; and that, after deducting from the fair valuation of the real estate the incumbrances and homestead exemption, and taking into account the personal property, the consideration moving from the wife was not so inadequate as to justify setting aside the conveyances in whole or in part, and directing a satisfaction of the execution out of the property conveyed. Defendant Parshall was a saloon keeper, and at the time of the conveyances had become sadly addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, and was fast becoming an habitual drunkard, if, indeed, he had not already become one. The desire of his wife to protect herself from want, and to secure the money she had let him have, was entirely justifiable, and will not be disturbed, in the absence of an intent upon her part to assist him in defrauding his creditors, unless the consideration paid was so out of proportion to the value of the property as to render the conveyances a fraud in law. While the testimony is not so satisfactory on her part as to the amount of money advanced to her husband as it might be, still it must be remembered that she was not accustomed to business, and kept no books of account. The learned circuit judge heard the testimony, saw the witnesses upon the stand, and was therefore better able than are we to judge of the credibility of the...