Straw v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 27 July 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 3:16-CV-276,3:16-CV-276
• Parties: ANDREW U.D. STRAW, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS M. DIXON, BRENDA SCONIERS, AND BRENDA F. RODEHEFFER, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

ANDREW U.D. STRAW, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS M. DIXON, BRENDA SCONIERS, AND BRENDA F. RODEHEFFER, Defendants.

NO. 3:16-CV-276

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

July 27, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the First Amended Complaint and Petition to Proceed without Pre-Payment of Fees and Costs, filed by Plaintiff, Andrew U.D. Straw, on May 28, 2016, and May 9, 2016, respectively. (DE #2 & DE #6.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court:

(1) DISMISSES the amended complaint (DE #6);

(2) DENIES Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (DE #2);

(3) GRANTS Plaintiff until August 29, 2016, to submit a second amended complaint along with payment of the filing fee; and

(4) CAUTIONS Plaintiff that if he does not do so by that deadline, this case will be dismissed without further notice.

Plaintiff filed a complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") on May 9, 2016. (DE #1 & DE #2.) He filed an amended complaint on May 28, 2016. (DE #6.) The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1915, allows an indigent plaintiff to commence a civil action without prepaying the administrative costs (e.g. filing fee) of the action. See 28 U.S.C. section 1915(a)(1); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992). When presented with an IFP application, the district court must make two determinations: (1) whether the suit has sufficient merit; and (2) whether the plaintiff's poverty level justifies IFP status. See 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2); Denton, 504 U.S. at 27; Smith-Bey v. Hosp. Adm'r, 841 F.2d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1988). If a court finds that the suit lacks sufficient merit or that an inadequate showing of poverty exists, the court must deny the IFP petition. See Smith-Bey, 841 F.2d at 757.

A court must dismiss a case at any time, notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid, if it determines that the suit is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim that "no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit" is considered frivolous. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000). To determine whether the suit states a claim under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court applies the same standard as it would to a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Luevano v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive dismissal, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff "must plead some facts that suggest a right to relief that is beyond the 'speculative level.'" Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). "This means that the complaint must contain allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) an entitlement to relief." Lavalais v. Village of Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In this case, as to the financial prong of the analysis, Plaintiff indicates that he is unemployed but has received a total of $25,944 from various "self-employment" sources¹ over the last twelve (12) months, including Social Security Disability Insurance in the amount of $13,344. (DE #2, p. 1.) He indicates that he has $579.76 in a checking account, and that he is not supporting any dependants. (Id. at 2.)

The federal poverty guideline for a household of one living in Indiana is $11, 880. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 4036 (Jan. 25, 2016). The annualized value of Plaintiff's social security disability benefit income alone is above the federal poverty guideline. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not financially eligible to proceed IFP in this case, and the motion must be DENIED on that basis.

Furthermore, as to the sufficiency prong of the analysis, in his amended complaint, Plaintiff has sued three parties, Thomas M. Dixon ("Dixon"), Brenda Sconiers ("Sconiers"), and Brenda F. Rodeheffer ("Rodeheffer") (collectively, "Defendants"). Although the complaint is thirty-three pages long with an additional three hundred and thirty-nine pages attached as exhibits, much of the factual detail does not apply to Defendants in the context of Plaintiff's current alleged cause of action, which he describes as a "diversity suit that the defendants violated [his] right to be free from embarrassment, annoyance, ridicule, and costs in the form of Abuse of Process under the tort law of the State of Indiana" and "violations of my disability civil rights by the ADA Coordinator of the Indiana Supreme Court." (DE #6, p. 1.) In the jurisdiction and venue section of the amended complaint, Plaintiff reiterates that this is a "diversity action with an amount over $75,000 at issue," and he describes Defendants as all being "Indiana residents" and himself as an "Illinois resident." (Id. at 32.) Amidst a plethora of irrelevant autobiographical and other background information, it appears that Plaintiff's amended complaint takes issue with the actions performed by Defendants surrounding a malpractice lawsuit that Dixon filed on behalf of Sconiers against Plaintiff in October of 2013. Judge Jon E. DeGuilio succinctly described the history of that malpractice case in a previous lawsuit Plaintiff filed against these same Defendants as follows:

[T]he legal malpractice action was filed by Sconiers, with the assistance of her attorney Thomas Dixon, after Sconiers missed the filing deadline for suing the St. Joseph County Public Library for alleged sexual harassment. This malpractice action was filed against Straw premised on his alleged failure to timely file Sconiers' complaint against the Library; however, Straw asserts that the action is frivolous because although he represented Sconiers in pre-suit settlement discussions with the Library, Straw did not agree to represent Sconiers beyond the attempted settlement. According to Straw, he did not agree to file a lawsuit against the Library on Sconiers' behalf because he does not engage in trial work-the means by which Straw accommodates his disability.

Straw v. Sconiers, No. 3:14-CV-1772-JD, 2014 WL 7404065, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2014).² While the malpractice action was pending in St. Joseph Superior Court, Case No. 71D07-1310-CT-000265, Plaintiff filed a "Petition for Redress of Grievances" with the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court on August 15, 2014, declaring that the Indiana Supreme Court had discriminated against him during his tenure as a State Court Administration employee in 2000-2002, during the bar application process in 2002, and for several years afterwards. (DE #6, pp. 15-16; DE #6-4.) On September 3, 2014, Rodeheffer, whom Plaintiff describes as the "ADA Coordinator of the Indiana Judicial Branch," filed a request for an investigation into Plaintiff's conduct with the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission. (DE #6, p. 16; DE #6-5.) In it, Rodeheffer states that Plaintiff's "mental health problems have become sufficiently severe that I believe he is not competent to practice law." (DE #6-5.) She describes numerous lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed as "nonsensical," and she references the Sconiers malpractice action. (Id.)³ That same day, Rodeheffer sent Dixon an email stating, "[a]s a courtesy, I just wanted to let you know that I filed a disciplinary charge against Mr. Straw today and included pleadings from the federal case he filed against you and your client." (DE #6, p. 17; DE #6-6.) Plaintiff alleges that Dixon entered the disciplinary complaint into the malpractice action even though it was "irrelevant to the contractual question and the tort question surrounding Sconiers' case" and that it was only done so to "'showcase' [his] mental disability in such a manner that was meant to 'embarrass, annoy, or ridicule' [him]." (DE #6, pp. 17-18.) According to Plaintiff, after the disciplinary action was placed into the malpractice case, his insurance company "wanted to settle the case rather than fight it." (DE #6, p. 18.) He indicates that the "case was settled and stipulation to that effect was entered and the ORDER of dismissal entered with prejudice on July 15, 2015." (Id. at 22.)

Plaintiff describes his claim against Dixon in Count I as "abuse of process" based on the fact that Dixon "put[] Rodeheffer's Indiana Supreme Court disciplinary complaint into the malpractice suit" in order to "'embarrass, annoy, and ridicule' [Plaintiff] and make it look to [Plaintiff's] insurance company that the appellate courts in Indiana are biased against [Plaintiff]." (Id. at 23-24.) The claim against Sconiers in Count II is also described as one for abuse of process in that, according to Plaintiff, she is "responsible for her lawyer, who is her personal agent" who "used inappropriate, biased material and violated [Plaintiff's] civil rights in order to get money from [Plaintiff's] insurance company that she did not deserve." (Id. at 27.) Finally, the claim against Rodeheffer in Count III states that Rodeheffer discriminated against Plaintiff in "several different forms and helping Dixon to achieve abuse of process was one. Rodeheffer is...