Strawn v. Caffee

• Decision Date: 13 January 1938
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 204
• Citation: 235 Ala. 218,178 So. 430
• Parties: STRAWN v. CAFFEE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

178 So. 430

235 Ala. 218

STRAWN v. CAFFEE.

6 Div. 204

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 13, 1938

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Wm. L. Hogue, Special Judge.

Bill in equity by Samuel Strawn Caffee against Janie E. Strawn individually and as trustee under the will of J.H. Ellison deceased, and another. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, the named respondent appeals.

Affirmed.

Ralph W. Quinn and Wm. F. Spencer, both of Birmingham, for appellant.

A. Leo Oberdorfer and C.H. Peay, both of Birmingham, for appellee.

BOULDIN Justice.

Broadly speaking, the bill invokes the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce a testamentary trust in favor of complainant, beneficiary. The appeal is to review a decree overruling demurrers to the bill, interposed by respondent, trustee.

The material averments of the bill are these:

In 1932 J.H. Ellison, a collateral relative, resident in South Carolina, died, leaving his last will and testament.

The will named the Peoples National Bank of Greenville, S.C., as executor. It was duly probated in South Carolina.

By the will the residuary estate was bequeathed: "One-third thereof to my niece, Janie E. Strawn in trust never-the-less to keep the same safely invested in good interest bearing securities for the use and benefit of Samuel Caffee and Margaret Caffee, children of my deceased niece, Margaret Caffee, share and share alike, or to the survivor of them. The said Janie E. Strawn shall give a good and sufficient bond as Trustee for the faithful performance of her duties. Said Trustee may expend the income or any part of the principal sum for the benefit of said children as in her judgment from time to time, should be done. All of this is left to her wise discretion in determining their needs. When, however, Margaret Caffee shall have arrived at the age of twenty-five years, then if my said Trustee has not delivered to Samuel Caffee and Margaret Caffee the whole amount due them, then my said Trustee shall do so and be discharged upon her making a full accounting as such Trustee."

The bill proceeds:

"That said Janie E. Strawn as such Trustee accepted said trust in to-wit the year 1932 and received at said time and has since the acceptance of said trust held and now holds in money or liquid marketable and income-bearing securities, totaling in value to-wit $14,000.00, for the sole use and benefit of this complainant and the respondent Margaret Caffee, share and share alike, as provided in the language in said will creating said express trust.

"3. That complainant is and has been, continuously since the creation of said trust in the Trustee, a cripple and a paralytic, unable to work and unemployed and has no income, property or means of maintaining himself except his said trust estate; and that complainant is now and has continuously since the creation of said trust resided with his father, S.H. Caffee, and his step-mother Mrs. S.H. Caffee; that complainant's father, S.H. Caffee, has been and is physically unable to work since to-wit November 1936 and said Mr. and Mrs. S.H. Caffee are unable to support and maintain your complainant; that Mr. and Mrs. S.H. Caffee since the date of the creation of said trust have denied themselves many of the comforts and necessities of life in supporting your complainant and have advanced and used moneys which they could ill afford to spend for the same; that respondent Margaret Caffee resides with Mr. and Mrs. S.H. Caffee and earns a small salary, and Mrs. S.H. Caffee earns some $8.00 or $9.00 per week from sewing and mending work, and that this is the only income which said family and household has with which to maintain itself, and that Margaret Caffee has contributed and advanced to the support of your complainant moneys which she could ill afford to spare.

"4. That said Janie E. Strawn accepted said trust in to-wit the year 1932 and since said date your complainant has only received from said trust, clothing of the value of to-wit $150.00; and that complainant since the date said Janie E. Strawn became said Trustee has been continuously in dire need of moneys for his maintenance, to-wit $75.00 a month, and is now and will be in the future in dire and pressing need of to-wit $75.00 a month, and is now and will be in the future in dire and pressing need of to-wit said sum monthly and the accumulations due him for his support and maintenance since the creation of said trust of to-wit said sum; that complainant has made demand on said Trustee for his just share of said trust and said Trustee has failed and refused to answer or supply or grant his demands.

"5. That said Trustee has perverted and violated said trust and has failed to exercise in good faith her discretion in the execution and management thereof, in that she has failed to answer and provide to your complainant out of said trust the needs, necessities and comforts of life, in violation of her duty and contrary to the express provisions of said trust; or, if it can be said that she has exercised her discretion, she has exercised it arbitrarily, capriciously and unjustly and contrary to the spirit, intent and express mandates of said trust."

The bill avers the status of the trust, accounts, and properties are wholly within the knowledge of the trustee who has refused information to complainant touching same.

The bill prays: "That it be decreed that said trustee in the administration of said trust has failed to exercise good faith and has failed to exercise her discretion in accordance with the mandates of the instrument creating said trust, and has failed to justly administer said trust according to its meaning and spirit, but that said trust has been perverted and its objects and purposes thwarted by the failure of said Trustee in good faith to exercise said discretion according to the plain and express purposes of the creator of said trust"; and that the court ascertain and decree what monthly allowance shall be paid for complainant's support and maintenance, and what accumulation, if any, should be paid over.

It is not sought to invoke equity jurisdiction for the construction of an ambiguous will. It is averred the will is clear and unambiguous.

Nor is jurisdiction to enforce the trust incidental to other relief, as where the court acquires jurisdiction of the estates of minors on other equitable grounds, and, because the infant becomes the ward of the court, his interests are safeguarded as the court shall deem wise.

The bill very clearly shows the ground upon which relief is sought is such an abuse of discretion on the part of the trustee as calls for the intervention of a court of equity to the end that the trust shall not fail of its purpose.

The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the bill in that no fraud or bad faith is charged. Appellant cites and relies solely on the authority of Hoglan et al. v. Moore et al., 219 Ala. 497, 503, 122 So. 824, 829, where it is said: "It is settled in this jurisdiction that if trustees exercise discretionary power in good faith, without fraud or collusion, in a case within this jurisdiction, our courts will not review or control their discretion, nor will a bill be entertained to compel execution of a mere discretionary power," etc.

This is the statement of the law as found in Perry on Trusts, § 511.

The execution of discretionary powers is not here involved. The trustee accepted a continuing trust with active duties and obligations. "Good Faith" in the exercise of such discretion is italicized in Perry on Trusts, supra.

In further statement of the rule, the case of McDonald v. McDonald, 92 Ala. 537, 9 So. 195, 197, is cited to the effect that a court of equity would interfere if discretion be "mischievously or ruinously" exercised.

McDonald v. McDonald, supra, involved a discretion in the management and disposition of the income from a trust estate of like import to that before us and for like purposes. The court reviewed our cases and authorities elsewhere, and said, among other things:

"The discretion which, by the terms of the will in this case, was vested in W.J. McDonald would not be interfered with or controlled by the court so long as it is honestly and reasonably exercised by him. But the will does not confer an arbitrary or capricious authority. ***

"And if the discretion vested in the trustee *** so far as concerns the comfort and support of the children, is practically not exercised at all, the court may provide for the administration of the trust under its own orders, ascertain the extent of the children's share of the rents, income, and profits, and secure the proper appropriation thereof. Davey v. Ward, 7 Ch.Div. 754; Thorp

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