Strawn v. State
| Decision Date | 21 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-2205,89-2205 |
| Parties | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 770 William John STRAWN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Belle B. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
William John Strawn, Jr., appeals the imposition of departure sentences in four cases, in each of which he was charged with robbery with a firearm and in which he pled nolo contendere. Although the state recommended a guidelines sentence with at least two minimum mandatory terms, the court departed and imposed four consecutive terms of twenty-five years each with four consecutive three-year mandatory terms followed by life probation. We vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.
The facts of this case are peculiar in that they show Strawn led an exemplary life prior to the commission of the crimes. He was fifty-four years of age, a twenty-year resident of Hillsborough County, and a twenty-year employee of the community college and director of student affairs. Married since 1955, he was the father of three grown children. He was active in community affairs, a member of the Gideons, and a volunteer marriage counselor. He attended church every Sunday and had never before been charged with a crime. Unfortunately, Strawn had a long history of illness due to seizure activity of the brain, in his case an illness that was physical and demonstrable. A court-appointed psychiatrist rendered an opinion that Strawn was not criminally responsible for his actions.
His life was changed on May 1, 1987, when he committed a bank robbery during which he wore a stocking mask, brandished a lever-action rifle, and ordered all present to lie on the floor. He committed two more bank robberies on September 7, 1987, and May 16, 1988. He made no death threats in the first two robberies, but in the third robbery he threatened to kill the teller if she included dye packs in the cash bag. On November 14, 1988, Strawn committed his fourth and final robbery using the same method and threat as in the third robbery, but now using a pistol. This time he was recognized through a BOLO description and was arrested.
Strawn moved for a continuance of his trial so that his medical condition could be evaluated. Following the evaluation, the court appointed experts to determine his competency for sentencing purposes. The experts found him competent but supported his assertion of a long-standing serious illness. One of the experts found that Strawn was not criminally responsible and that he was in a fugue-like dissociative state at the time of the robberies. Strawn stated to the psychiatrist that, following the first three robberies, he "woke up" in his car, discovered the money, and either burned it or threw it away. He did remember the last robbery but indicated he "was like a spectator." The expert found that Strawn's medical history was consistent with this description of a dissociative state.
The two issues presented for consideration are whether the trial court correctly departed from the guidelines and whether the lengthy sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court gave several reasons for the departure sentence:
1. Firearms were used in all the crimes.
2. More than $85,000 was taken in the robberies and remains unrecovered.
3.
4. The robberies were committed some distance from defendant's home, and each crime was carried out in a professional manner.
5. Workers and patrons were put at risk.
6. Death threats were made in several of the robberies.
7. Each crime involved the use of a mask.
The first four reasons are invalid. Reasons one and two are invalid because they are inherent components of armed robbery and cannot support departure. Reimel v. State, 532 So.2d 16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So.2d 989 (Fla.1989). Possession of a firearm is an inherent component of armed robbery. Burge v. State, 496 So.2d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Taking the property of another is also inherent in the crime of armed robbery. Mischler v. State, 458 So.2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), approved, 488 So.2d 523 (Fla.1986). Inadequacy of the guidelines, the third reason for departure, may never serve as a reason for departure. Scott v. State, 508 So.2d 335 (Fla.1987). The fourth reason, that the crimes were carried out in a professional manner, is not a valid departure reason in any case. Hernandez v. State, 575 So.2d 640 (Fla.1991).
Under the facts of this case, the fifth reason is also invalid. There are cases holding that the placement of bystanders at risk of harm during the commission of a robbery is a valid reason for departure. However, the facts surrounding those cases reveal that a defendant created a direct, substantial risk. See Dobson v. State, 566 So.2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (); Simpson v. State, 562 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (); Wareham v. State, 560 So.2d 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (); Miller v. State, 549 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (); Green v. State, 545 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (); Garcia v. State, 454 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (...
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Barr v. State, 94-1152
...it cannot be determined if this allegation was supported by the record. Indeed, as the fifth district stated in Strawn v. State, 576 So.2d 877, 879 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), while placement of a substantial number of bystanders at risk during the commission of a robbery constitutes a valid reaso......