Streater v. State
Citation | 724 A.2d 111,352 Md. 800 |
Decision Date | 17 February 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 30,30 |
Parties | Roderick V. STREATER v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Daniel H. Weiss, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.
Gary Bair, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ.
This case presents the issue of whether factual findings contained in a protective order were properly received into evidence as part of the State's attempt to prove that Roderick V. Streater (Petitioner) committed the offenses of stalking, harassment, and telephone misuse. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court, holding that the protective order was admissible under the intent exception to Maryland Rule 5-404(b), which governs the admission into evidence of other crimes and bad acts.1 For the reasons stated below, we find that the trial court improperly applied Md. Rule 5-404(b) in admitting the evidence of other crimes contained in the protective order, and therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County convicted Mr. Streater of harassment, stalking, and telephone misuse. See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 121A (Harassment), § 121B (Stalking), § 555A ( ).2 At the time of trial Tawanda Bailey Streater (Ms. Streater) testified that she and Mr. Streater had been married for two years, although they were separated after only six months of marriage. In November 1995, Ms. Streater obtained a protective order under Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.), Family Law Art., § 4-506, ordering Mr. Streater not to contact her "in person, by telephone, in writing, or by any other means." The order was effective until June 13, 1996, and covered the time period in which the events occurred that lead to Mr. Streater's prosecution.
At trial, Ms. Streater testified that, in April 1996, she had moved from her home to her mother's house because Mr. Streater had been knocking on the door and calling her on the telephone after she had asked that he cease such behavior. She stated that Mr. Streater repeatedly called her at work from April 4, 1996 to May 9, 1996, that she spoke with him a few times, and that other times colleagues took his phone messages. She further testified to three in-person contacts with Mr. Streater over this period. She testified that some of these contacts related to a 1995 Mazda that was titled in both their names and that Mr. Streater wanted for transportation. She testified that, in one phone call, Mr. Streater said he saw "another man driving his car and he's gonna ... fuck me up." She stated that at one point they agreed to meet at a car dealership to transfer the Mazda title to Mr. Streater but that the meeting never occurred.
Mr. Streater did not testify on his own behalf and did not call any witnesses of his own. Mr. Streater's counsel contended in opening argument that "[t]he evidence will show that my client acted not out of malice, not out of any intent to intimidate or threaten anyone, but simply to address some legitimate issues." During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to show that Mr. Streater's contacts related to legitimate efforts to repossess the car. In his closing argument, Mr. Streater's counsel argued that Mr. Streater "wanted to ... try to resolve their property dispute and that is all this is" and that "there was no intent to place Ms. [Streater] at fear ... [or] to annoy ... [or] harass ... his estranged wife."
The protective order, which is the subject of this appeal, was first brought up during the direct examination of Ms. Streater:
The order was subsequently admitted over defense counsel's objection as substantive evidence for the prosecution's case-in-chief against Mr. Streater. The contents of the protective order are nowhere mentioned in the trial transcript. The order, however, was received into evidence and given to the jury, along with the prosecution's advice "to take this back with you ... and read that." Thus, the prosecutor may have achieved maximum unfair prejudice by having the jurors discover the other crimes evidence when during their deliberations they read the protective order that included Mr. Streater's breaking in "the house" and theft of Ms. Streater's money. These acts allegedly occurred at some time before there was a protective order hearing barring Mr. Streater from entering the marital home.
The order refers to three factual conclusions made by the District Court judge which apparently constitute the basis upon which Mr. Streater was ordered not to contact Ms. Streater. Specifically, the form order includes a box, which the District Court judge had checked, stating, "Act(s) which placed Person Eligible for Relief in fear of serious bodily harm." A handwritten note scrawled on blank lines underneath the above statement stated, "Respond. threatened to harm Pet., he broke into the house and took her money."3 The District Court judge also checked a box indicating that Mr. Streater had committed a "[b]attery or assault and battery." We hold that the fact that a protective order had been issued was properly made known to the jury in Ms. Streater's testimony but that Petitioner's objection to the written protective order should have been sustained because the protective order contained other crimes evidence and there was no threshold inquiry into the admissibility of that evidence.4
The admissibility of other crimes or bad acts evidence, other than for impeachment purposes, is governed by longstanding evidentiary principles that are currently embodied in Md. Rule 5-404(b):
See also Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 406, 697 A.2d 432, 440 (1997)
("Maryland Rule 5-404(b) embodies the common law rule of `other crimes evidence.'").
701 A.2d at 392 (quoting Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473, 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978)).
As Md. Rule 5-404(b) recognizes, however, situations arise in which prior criminal or wrongful acts can be admitted. Our cases set forth a three-prong test for admissibility:
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634-35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989). See also Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602, 632, 645 A.2d 22, 37 (1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130, 115 S.Ct. 942, 130 L.Ed.2d 886 (1995); Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329, 335, 631 A.2d 424, 427 (1993).
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