Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Service Bd.
| Decision Date | 10 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 80-1033 and 80-1063,s. 80-1033 and 80-1063 |
| Parties | 24 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1019, 25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1761, 34 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1008, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 1149, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 1431, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,426, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,190, 90 Lab.Cas. P 33,964 Betty Lou STRECKER, Appellant, v. GRAND FORKS COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICE BOARD; Clarence Ohlsen in his official capacity as Director, Mrs. W. R. Hovell; Robert Kinney; Lloyd Leake; Donald B. Matteson; Charles N. Murphy; Earl Ronan; Henry Stromsodt and Mrs. Floyd Tucker, in their official capacity as Board members of the Grand Forks Social Service Board; and John or Jane Doe, real and true name unknown, who may be a Board member in his or her official capacity, Appellees. Betty Lou STRECKER, Appellee, v. GRAND FORKS COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICE BOARD; Clarence Ohlsen in his official capacity as Director, Mrs. W. R. Hovell; Robert Kinney; Lloyd Leake; Donald B. Matteson; Charles N. Murphy; Earl Ronan; Henry Stromsodt and Mrs. Floyd Tucker, in their official capacity as Board members of the Grand Forks Social Service Board; and John or Jane Doe, real and true name unknown, who may be a Board member in his or her official capacity, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Robert A. Feder, Fargo, N. D., for appellant.
Damon E. Anderson, Grand Forks, N. D., for appellees.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Circuit Judge, and PORTER, District Judge. *
This suit, brought by Betty Strecker, is based on allegations of sex discrimination and denial of equal pay against her employer, the Grand Forks County Social Service Board, its director in his official capacity and its individual members in their official Standard of Review.
capacity. The action was commenced under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), commonly known as the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mrs. Strecker began working for the Board in 1969 and since 1970 has held various positions relating to the administration of economic welfare to recipients in North Dakota. In 1977 she resigned her position to move to Bismarck, North Dakota with her husband where she assumed an administrative position with the state social services agency. Her basic claim relates to the fact that her successor, a male, David Braaten, was paid substantially more money than she received when employed by the Board. The district court, The Honorable Paul Benson, found that Mrs. Strecker had performed substantially equal work under similar working conditions but received less pay than her male successor. Nonetheless, the district court denied relief holding the Board had proven the disparity in pay was based on factors other than sex. She has appealed that ruling. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Mrs. Strecker fails to demonstrate that any of the factual findings of the district court are clearly erroneous. She challenges the ultimate finding by the district court that she was not unlawfully discriminated against. Although there may be some confusion from our prior opinions, the ultimate conclusion of discrimination vel non is not governed by the clearly erroneous rule. See Shultz v. American Can Co. Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356, 360 n.6 (8th Cir. 1970). As the Fifth Circuit has observed:
Although discrimination vel non is essentially a question of fact it is, at the same time, the ultimate issue for resolution in this case, being expressly proscribed by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a). As such, a finding of discrimination or nondiscrimination is a finding of ultimate fact.... In reviewing the district court's findings, therefore, we will proceed to make an independent determination of appellant's allegations of discrimination, though bound by findings of subsidiary fact which are themselves not clearly erroneous. Also, ... we must determine whether there are requisite subsidiary facts to undergird the ultimate facts.
Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted), quoted in Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 528 F.2d 508, 516 (5th Cir. 1976).
Applying this standard of review, we proceed to the merits of Mrs. Strecker's claim.
Equal Pay Act Violation.
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act must be construed in harmony. DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978). Although plaintiff has brought suit under the Equal Pay Act as well as title VII, our basic analysis is essentially the same under either theory. 1 To show a prima facie case, Mrs.
Strecker must prove she performed substantially equal work as her successor but was paid less for it.
Contrary to defendants' argument on appeal, we agree that plaintiff established a prima facie case. Plaintiff demonstrated that her wage rate, even during the last two years with the Board when she had assumed greater administrative responsibilities, was substantially less than that paid to her male successor. The record demonstrates she was performing work substantially equal to that performed by Braaten when he first assumed his duties. Under the statute, equal work means "jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). In determining whether work is equal, the court must look to the nature of the duties actually required and performed, not the official job description or title. Katz v. School District of Clayton, Missouri, 557 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1977).
Although defendants attempt to urge that Braaten was hired as assistant director, the district court recognized the equality of work is not determined by duties or responsibilities which were to be assumed in the future. See Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1976). The evidence showed Mr. Braaten performed work substantially identical to Mrs. Strecker for nearly the first year he was employed by the Board. The district court correctly concluded that they performed equal work.
Once Mrs. Strecker has proven a prima facie case, defendants have the burden of proving that the disparity in pay was based on some factor other than sex. We conclude that they have done so. An analysis of the record unequivocally sustains this conclusion.
Throughout her tenure with the agency, Mrs. Strecker's classification and thus her salary were determined by the Central Personnel Division, Social Service Board of North Dakota (Central Personnel). The Grand Forks County Board could only recommend changes in classifications Central Personnel had the final authority to determine classifications.
The structure of the classification system used by Central Personnel to evaluate positions and persons, and thus set salaries, is undisputed. Salaries are set by a dual classification system which classifies both positions and persons. Positions are classified by the responsibilities and duties they require. The qualifications or other characteristics of the person filling a position are irrelevant to the position's classification. Persons are classified according to their experience in areas related to their job responsibilities and their education. Compensation systems that determine salaries on the basis of job duties and responsibilities, educational attainments and experience, which are related to the responsibilities and duties that employees must perform in their jobs, are clearly permissible under the Equal Pay Act. See Horner v. Mary Institute, 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Aetna Insurance Co., 616 F.2d 719, 726 & n.10 (4th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Service, Inc., 542 F.2d 356, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1976); Herman v. Roosevelt Federal Savings & Loan Association, 432 F.Supp. 843, 851 (E.D.Mo.1977), aff'd, 569 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1978) ); Under Central Personnel's system, each classification is assigned a salary range. The job classification determines the minimum 3 and maximum salary which any person filling that position may receive. The personal classification determines the minimum and maximum salary which a person so classified may receive. Typically, a person's classification matches the position classification so that the minimum and maximum salaries coincide. However, the system allows mismatching of personal and position classifications. If a job filled by an incumbent person is reevaluated to a higher classification, the system allows that person to remain in the job. This is called "underfilling" the position. In an underfilling situation, the person's salary is determined by his or her personal classification not the classification of the position. As the person gains the requisite experience or education, the person's classification and salary are raised to equal the classification of his or her job.
Brennan v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 12 FEP Cases 490 (C.D.Calif.1975). Salary differentials that result from applying these objective criteria do not violate that act. 2
On July 1, 1975, after some difficulty, 4 Mrs. Strecker's position was reclassified as an Administrative Officer I. Central Personnel also found that at that time Mrs. Strecker, personally, had the experience to be classified as an Administrative Officer I, thus, her personal classification matched her job's classification.
Administrative Officer I classification required four years of college or...
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