Streepy v. State, 25985.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1931
• Docket Number: No. 25985.,25985.
• Citation: 177 N.E. 897,202 Ind. 685
• Parties: STREEPY v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

202 Ind. 685

177 N.E. 897

STREEPY

v.STATE.

No. 25985.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 13, 1931.

Appeal from Henry Circuit Court; John H. Morris, Judge.

William Streepy was convicted for robbery, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Thomas McNulty, of Indianapolis, and Paul Brown, of New Castle, for appellant.

James M. Ogden, Atty. Gen., and E. Burke Walker, Second Dep. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MARTIN, C. J.

The appellant was indicted for robbing, on August 26, 1927, the Kennard State Bank, in Henry county. The indictment was returned September 12, 1930. A trial without a jury resulted in a finding of guilty, upon which a judgment was entered of imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison for a period of fifteen years. The errors assigned all raise, or attempt to raise, the single question of whether or not the statute of limitations barred the prosecution.

[1][2][3][4] The law concerning the limitation of actions in effect at the time of the commission of this crime was as follows: Section 20, c. 169, Acts 1905, section 2049, Burns' 1926, provided that “prosecutions for *** robbery *** may be commenced at any time within five years after the commission of the offense.” This section, and sections 19, 21, and 22 of the same act, sections 2048, 2050, 2051, Burns' 1926, stated the limitations of actions for certain offenses, and section 23, c. 169, Acts 1905, section 2052, Burns' 1926, provided that, “in all other cases, prosecutions for an offense must be commenced within two years after its commission. ***” On May 19, 1929, sections 1 and 2, c. 198, Acts 1929, became effective. Section 2 of the 1929 act repealed section 20 of the 1905 act, and section 1 of the 1929 act, section 2052, Burns' 1929 Supp., reads as follows: “In all other cases, prosecutions for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years, and prosecutions for a felony must be commenced within five years after its commission. ***”

The appellant contends that the crime of robbery referred to in section 20, c. 169, Acts 1905, is the forcible taking of an article of value from a person by violence or by putting in fear, as defined in section 357, c. 169, Acts 1905, section 2425, Burns' 1926, and that the crime of bank robbery, as defined by the statute under which he was convicted, section 1, c. 158, Acts 1927, section 2425. 1, Burns' 1029 Supp., is not robbery, but “is a separate crime from robbery and one may be convicted of bank robbery where he has never actually committed a robbery but may have burned a building or have taken nothing of value from a person or failed in the perpetration of larceny.” Continuing, appellant contends that the limitation for the prosecution of the crime of bank robbery is stated in section 23, c. 169, Acts 1905, and, the prosecution not having been commenced within two years after its commission, that it is barred.

We need not, and do not, decide the question as to whether the limitation of action for the crime of bank robbery (prior to the passage of the 1929 act was placed at five years by section 20 of the 1905 act or was placed at two years by section 23 of the 1905 act. If we assume that appellant's contention is correct concerning the character of the crime of bank robbery and assume that at the time it was committed the period of limitation therefor was two years, we must still hold that under the limitation as later fixed by section 1, c. 198, Acts 1929, the prosecution instituted on September 12, 1930, has not been barred. A crime committed on August 26, 1927, and governed by the two-year statute of limitations would not be barred until August 26, 1929. Before that date, to wit, on May 21, 1929,...