Street, In re

• Decision Date: 20 October 1982
• Citation: 451 A.2d 427,499 Pa. 26
• Parties: In re Nomination Certificate of T. Milton STREET as Republican Candidate for the Office of Representative in Congress from the Second Congressional District. Appeal of William DUNHAM, et al.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 427

451 A.2d 427

499 Pa. 26

In re Nomination Certificate of T. Milton STREET as

Republican Candidate for the Office of

Representative in Congress from the

Second Congressional District.

Appeal of William DUNHAM, et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 20, 1982.

Decided Oct. 20, 1982.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

Appellant T. Milton Street is an independent candidate in this year's general election for the office of Representative in Congress from the Second Congressional District of Pennsylvania, having been nominated by nomination papers filed on May 25, 1982, by the "Milton Street Party," a political body. ¹ Subsequent to appellant's nomination, the candidate of the Republican Party who had been nominated in the May 18th primary election withdrew his candidacy. On June 10, 1982, a formal notice of withdrawal was filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and a substituted nomination certificate was filed by the Republican Party naming appellant Street as the Republican Party's substitute nominee. ^{2 2} Appellee William H. Gray, III, who is the incumbent and nominee of the Democratic Party, filed a petition with the Commonwealth Court challenging the validity of the substituted nomination certificate and requesting that the certificate be set aside. After a hearing, the Commonwealth Court (MacPhail, J.) entered an order granting the requested relief. ³ This appeal followed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 723(a).

I

Throughout these proceedings appellants ⁴ have conceded that the Republican Party's substituted nomination certificate, which names appellant Street as the party's nominee notwithstanding his separate nomination for the same office as a candidate of a political body, is in violation of the Pennsylvania Election Code, Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, § 979, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2939. Section 979, which governs the filling of vacancies created by the withdrawal of a party's candidate in a general election, provides in pertinent part:

"Any vacancy happening or existing after the date of the primary in any party nomination, by reason of the death or withdrawal of any candidate after nomination, or by reason of the death before or on the day of the primary election of a candidate for nomination who had received a plurality of votes of his party electors cast for the office for which he sought nomination, may be filled by a substituted nomination made by such committee as is authorized by the rules of the party to make nominations in the event of vacancies on the party ticket: Provided, however, That no substitute nomination certificate shall nominate any person who has already been nominated by any political party or by any other political body for the same office."

Emphasis added.

On this appeal, as in the Commonwealth Court, appellants seek to avoid the prohibition of the governing statute on two constitutional grounds. First, appellants argue that, notwithstanding the admitted constitutionality of the statutory prohibition against a party's substitute nomination of "any person who has already been nominated by any political party ... for the same office," the Legislature may not constitutionally bar a party's substitute nomination of "any person who has already been nominated ... by any other political body for the same office." According to appellants, "[b]y treating political parties and political bodies identically, the prohibitions of Section 979 are 'over-inclusive' and hence violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Second, appellants argue that application of the challenged provision of the statute to the Republican Party in the Second Congressional District unconstitutionally burdens the First Amendment associational rights of the Republican Party and its members to nominate the candidate of their choice. In appellants' view, because a substantial majority of the voters in the Second Congressional District are enrolled in the Democratic Party, the statutory prohibition has "the impermissible effect of fostering the domination of [the Democratic] party" by "prevent[ing] any fusion of an independent candidate and [the Republican] party." As we agree with the Commonwealth Court that appellants' claims do not establish a violation of appellants' First or Fourteenth Amendment rights, we affirm. ⁵

II

In National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980), this Court stated:

"It is fundamental to our jurisprudence that enactments of the Legislature are clothed with a presumption of constitutional validity, and that appellants, by claiming that an act is unconstitutional, carry a heavy burden of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70, 91 S.Ct. 1294, 1298, 28 L.Ed.2d 601 (1971); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 329, 383 A.2d 1228, 1231 (1978); Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, [460 Pa. 1, 16, 331 A.2d 198, 205 (1975) ], quoting Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963) ('Courts may not declare a statute unconstitutional "unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution." ')."

Id., 489 Pa. at 234, 414 A.2d at 44. See also Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3). With regard to the constitutionality of state election laws, the Supreme Court of the United States has observed:

"[T]he States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates.

It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases .... Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a 'matter of degree,' Dunn v. Blumstein, [405 U.S. 330, 348, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1006, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) ], very much a matter of 'consider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.' Williams v. Rhodes, [393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) ]; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at 335, 92 S.Ct. at 999."

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). We turn to an examination of appellants' arguments with these considerations in mind.

A.

In support of their equal protection challenge, appellants rely upon the truism that "[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike ...." Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). In their view, although Section 979's prohibition against a party's substitute nomination of a candidate who has already been nominated for the same office by a political party promotes the legitimate state interest of preventing "party raiding," the prohibition against a party's substitute nomination of a candidate who has already been nominated by a political body fails to further this or any other legitimate objective. ⁶

Appellants' concentration on the evils of "party raiding" ignores the fact that Section 979 is part of a broad electoral plan set forth in Article IX of the Election Code ("Nomination of Candidates") which is designed to assure that, with certain limited exceptions, no candidate's name shall appear on a general election ballot more than once. ⁷ The prohibition of Section 979 applies with equal force to substitute nominations by political bodies. Section 980, 25 P.S. § 2940. Under Section 976 of the Code, similar restrictions apply in the regular nomination process:

"No nomination petition, nomination paper or nomination certificate shall be permitted to be filed if--... (d) in the case of nomination petitions, if nomination petitions have been filed for printing the name of the same person for the same office, except the office of judge of a court of record, or the office of school director in districts where that office is elective or the office of justice of the peace upon the official ballot of more than one political party; or (e) in the case of nomination papers, if the candidate named therein has filed a nomination petition for any public office for the ensuing primary, or has been nominated for any such office by nomination papers previously filed ...."

25 P.S. § 2936. Thus, no candidate may appear on the official primary ballot of more than one party, nor may a candidate be nominated by more than one political body. In addition, no candidate may seek the nominations of both a political party and a political body. See also Section 910, 25 P.S. § 2870 (affidavits accompanying nomination petitions) and Section 951, 25 P.S. § 2911(e) (affidavits accompanying nomination papers).

The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly recognized that the State has a legitimate interest in regulating the ballot to "avoid voter confusion." Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145, 92 S.Ct. 849, 857, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). ⁸ This is precisely the object of Article IX of the Code, including Section 979. In addressing Section 976, the companion of Section 979, this Court has stated:

"The real purpose of this part of the so-called 'party raiding' provisions is to prevent the election ballot from being cluttered by candidates who are seeking to multiply the number of times their name appears on the ballot under various inviting labels. See Thompson v. Morrison, 352 Pa. 616, 625, 44 A.2d 55, 59 (1945) (dissenting opinion by former Chief Justice JONES). The legislative remedy was to limit each person to being a candidate of one political group, a choice which could be made any time before the close of the nomination period."

Packrall v. Quail, 411 Pa. 555, 557, 192 A.2d 704, 706 (1963) (footnote omitted). Thus,...