Street v. Maverick Tube Corp.
| Decision Date | 17 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-cv-02736 |
| Parties | ROBERT STREET, Plaintiff, v. MAVERICK TUBE CORPORATION d/b/a TENARIS BAY CITY, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
This matter was referred by United States District Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore, for full pre-trial management, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Docket Entry No. 11). Plaintiff Robert Street ["Street"] has sued his former employer, Defendant Tenaris Bay City, Inc. ["Tenaris"],1 alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ["Title VII"], 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ["Section 1981"], and the Americans with Disabilities Act ["ADA"], 42 U.S.C. § 12112, as well as wrongful discharge; fraud; slander; and tortious interference with a contract. (Plaintiff Robert Street's First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ["Complaint"], Docket Entry No. 9, at ¶¶ 43-76). Before the court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Defendant's Amended Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ["Motion"], Docket Entry No. 12). Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the motion, and Defendant has replied. (Plaintiff's Rule 10 Joinder and Supplemental Response toDefendant's Amended 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definitive Statement ["Response"], Docket Entry No. 13; Defendant's Reply in Support of its Amended Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ["Reply"], Docket Entry No. 16). After considering the pleadings, the evidence submitted, and the applicable law, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
Robert Street, a white male, worked for Tenaris as a Health Safety and Environment ["HSE"] Site Coordinator at its Bay City facility construction site, from April 21, 2014, until his termination on September 2, 2014. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, 26). The precise nature of Street's employment with Tenaris is unclear. Plaintiff alleges only that his position was "exempt," and that he received "a compensation package which included a base salary of $105,000.00 per year with a bi-weekly per Diem of $1,900.00, as well as a comprehensive benefits package." (Id. at ¶ 15).
Six weeks after Plaintiff was hired, Tecia Jackson, a black female, also began working as an HSE Site Coordinator at Defendant's Bay City location. (Id. at ¶ 16). According to the Amended Complaint, almost immediately after Jackson began working, she was subjected to "disparate treatment" and "harassment" by other Tenaris employees. (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff alleges, for instance, that his supervisor, Don Stuckey, began "monitoring [] Jackson's comings and goings," and that one of Defendant's independent contractors, Ruben Campian, "threatened [] Jackson's job simply because she crossed into a red barricaded area to avert injuries and possible loss of life." (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20). Plaintiff also complains that Campian "would purchase ice cream for the HSE group, but would not acknowledge [] Jackson or allow her to participate."(Id. at ¶ 20). In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Tenaris construction site supervisor, Brian Theros, told another employee that he should "not worry about" Jackson, because he would "take care of her." (Id. at ¶ 21). Plaintiff further alleges that Theros once referred to Jackson as a "jig-a-boo," and that one of his supervisors, Lou Baker, "constantly" referred to Jackson as "the black lady." (Id.). He also complains that another HSE site coordinator, Andres Moreno, intentionally "disrupted" a safety meeting that Jackson was leading. (Id.). In this lawsuit, Street alleges that he reported these incidents, as well as "numerous other examples of [] wrongful and discriminatory treatment of [] Jackson," to his supervisors, but to no avail. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-21).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on June 23, 2014, Stuckey asked him to contribute to a "list" of Jackson's alleged workplace violations. (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff claims that when he refused to do so, he was "targeted" by Tenaris senior management for "refus[ing] to play the[] game and provide false information to use against [] Jackson." (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 31).
According to the Amended Complaint, on an unspecified date "after these incidents," but before September 2, 2014, Jackson lodged a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ["EEOC"]. (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff claims that he "agreed to participate on [Jackson's] behalf with the proceedings and investigation," and that he served as a "known witness" for her. (Id.).
On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff reportedly told his supervisor, Don Elam, that he had fractured his foot, and would be unable to work "out in the field" for the next four to six weeks. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26). According to Plaintiff, Elam initially agreed to let him "work in the office" while his foot healed. (Id. at ¶ 26). A few hours later, however, Elam informed Street that his employment had been terminated, because he was "not a good fit." (Id.). Plaintiff alleges thathis employer-provided health insurance was immediately "discontinued." (Id. at ¶ 29). Jackson was also reportedly terminated, earlier that day, for "not getting along with others." (Id. at ¶ 26).
On an unspecified date after his termination, Street filed a complaint of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC. (Id. at ¶ 27). Tenaris responded to Street's EEOC complaint, on April 28, 2015. (Id.). Approximately four months later, on September 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit.2 (See Docket Entry No. 1). Plaintiff amended his complaint on December 6, 2015.
Liberally construed, the Amended Complaint lodges the following causes of action: (1) sex and race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981; (2) disability discrimination under the ADA; (3) retaliation under Title VII; (4) wrongful discharge under Texas law; (5) fraudulent misrepresentation; (6) slander; and (7) tortious interference with a contract. (Compl. ¶¶ 43-76).
Defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead claims on which relief can be granted. (Mot. 1-2). In the alternative, Defendant asks that Plaintiff be required to plead a more definite statement of his claims, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). (Id. at 18-19).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. CitgoPetroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 948 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008)). "To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alteration omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court typically may not look beyond the pleadings. Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 F. App'x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994)). "Pleadings," for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, include attachments to the complaint, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and information subject to judicial notice. Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011). Documents "attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be a part of the pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the plaintiff's] claims." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536(5th Cir. 2003); see Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 999 F. Supp. 2d 919, 926 (N.D. Tex. 2014) ().
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate or retaliate against an employee because of his "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also prohibits retaliation against an employee who has opposed discrimination or been involved in a discrimination claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The ADA likewise prohibits discrimination against an employee on the basis of physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under § 1981, employment discrimination based on race is...
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