Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co.
| Decision Date | 01 April 1903 |
| Docket Number | 19,802 |
| Parties | Street v. The Varney Electrical Supply Company |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Wayne Circuit Court; H. C. Fox, Judge.
Action by Frank L. Street against the Varney Electrical Supply Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
S. C Whitesell, for appellant.
R. T MacFall, M. W. Hopkins and Wilfred Jessup, for appellee.
The only question for decision on this appeal is the constitutionality of the act of March 9, 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 282, §§ 7055a, 7055b Burns 1901), commonly called the minimum wage law. It is raised by a demurrer to the complaint for want of facts, and the ruling of the court sustaining the same.
The material averments of the complaint are these: The appellee the Varney Electrical Supply Company is a private domestic corporation; the city of Richmond is a municipal corporation organized under the general laws of this State; between October 1, 1901, and January 16, 1902, the appellee was engaged in constructing, as one of the public works of said city, an electric light plant, to be used in lighting the public streets, highways, and other public places of said city; the said work was done under a contract between the Varney Electrical Supply Company and the said city of Richmond; the appellant during said period performed work and labor as an unskilled laborer at the request of the appellee the Varney Electrical Supply Company by digging holes in which to place the poles of the electric light plant, and in shaving poles; he so labored for 540 hours, and was entitled to receive twenty cents per hour for such labor; the Varney Electrical Supply Company refused to pay him twenty cents per hour, on the ground that the statute fixing the minimum wages for such labor at that rate was unconstitutional, and the appellant was paid fifteen cents an hour for his said labor; upon these facts the appellant demands judgment for $ 54, the penalty given by the statute, and $ 300 for his attorney's fees.
The statute upon which the action is founded is as follows: §§ 7055a, 7055b Burns 1901.
Some of the objections taken to the statute by the appellee are that it unlawfully abridges the privileges and immunities of the citizen; that it deprives persons of liberty and property without due process of law; that it denies to a large class of citizens the equal protection of the law; that it grants to a class of citizens privileges and immunities which, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to all citizens; and that it impairs the obligations of contracts. All these objections are founded upon the provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, and it is insisted by the appellee that the act is therefore unconstitutional and void. These propositions are denied by the appellant. He claims that the statute does not restrict the liberty of contract, and that its enactment was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State.
The provisions of the Constitution of the United States alleged to be violated by the statute are those contained in § 1 of the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits the State from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. The provisions of the state Constitution supposed to be involved here are found in § 1, article 1, which declares that all men are endowed with certain unalienable rights, and that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and in § 23, article 1, which forbids the granting by the General Assembly to any citizen or class of citizens of privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.
The act of March 9, 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 282), undertakes to fix the minimum rate of compensation to be paid to a particular and limited class of laborers employed upon any public work of the State, counties, cities, and towns, without regard to the actual value of such labor, or the rate paid by other persons, natural or artificial, for the same kind of labor in the same vicinity. It prohibits boards of commissioners and common councils of cities from making contracts with unskilled laborers by the week, or for any definite length of time, wherein a price is agreed upon at a rate less than the compensation fixed by the statute. Its restrictions reach beyond the State, counties, cities, and towns, and extend to any contractor or other person in charge of any public work whose duty it is to contract with, employ, and pay any unskilled laborer employed on such work. It not only imposes a penalty, but punishes by fine and imprisonment any contractor or other person in charge of public work of the State, counties, cities, or towns, whose duty it is to employ and pay unskilled labor on such public work, who contracts with any unskilled laborer for a rate of compensation for his services less than twenty cents per hour. It is not contended, and it could not be maintained, that the restrictions in this act upon the right of contract would be valid if the act applied to the work and affairs of private citizens. Even if no express provision of any constitution forbade such legislative interference with the right of contract, it would be void for the reason that the authority to fix by contract the prices to be paid for property, including human labor, is not ordinarily within the domain of legislation. But such enactments are also held to be in violation of § 1, article 1, of the state Constitution, securing to every citizen of the State the inalienable right to personal liberty and to the pursuit of happiness.
But it is argued in support of the validity of the act that no specific provision of the federal or state Constitution inhibits this species of legislation, and that counties, cities, and towns are mere political and municipal subdivisions of the State, through which the government is administered. It is said that the State has the power to fix the salaries of its officers, and the wages it will pay to its agents and employes; therefore it has the right to declare what rate of wages shall be paid to the agents and employes of a county, city, or town employed upon any public work.
While the counties, cities, and towns are political and municipal subdivisions of the State, they are not governmental agencies in such sense as to subject the management of their local affairs, involving the making of contracts for labor and materials to be used upon local improvements, and the payment for the same out of the revenues of the county, city or town to the arbitrary and unlimited control of the legislature. They are corporations as well as political and governmental subdivisions and agencies, and, as such corporations, they have the power to make contracts by which the rate of compensation for property sold to them is fixed. With regard to such contracts for the purchase of property or the employment of labor, counties, cities, and towns stand much upon the same footing as private corporations; and they can not be compelled by an act of the legislature to pay for any species of property more than it is worth, or more than its market value at the time and in the place where it is contracted for. The power to confiscate the property of the citizens and taxpayers of a county, city, or town, by forcing them to pay for any commodity, whether it be merchandise or labor, an arbitrary price, in excess of the market value, is not one of the powers of the legislature over municipal corporations, nor the legitimate use of such corporations as agencies of the State. If an act compelled counties, cities, and towns to pay to all stone masons not less than $ 2 per perch for stone to be used on any public work, when the market price of stone was but $ 1.50 per perch, or to the brick maker not less than $ 12 per thousand for brick, when brick of the same quality could be bought for $ 10 per thousand, or to the hardware merchant not less than six cents per pound for iron, when iron of the same quality could be had for four cents per pound, such legislation would shock every reasonable mind, and would be universally condemned as unwarranted and unconstitutional. For the same reasons, an act fixing the price of unskilled labor on all public works at...
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