Street v. Watts

• Decision Date: 10 April 1919
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 995
• Citation: Street v. Watts, 202 Ala. 622, 81 So. 564 (Ala. 1919)
• Parties: STREET v. WATTS et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

81 So. 564

202 Ala. 622

STREET v. WATTS et al.

7 Div. 995

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 10, 1919

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; Hugh D. Merrill, Judge.

Bill by J.C. Street against Martha H. Watts and others.Decree for respondents, and complainant appeals.Affirmed.

Riddle & Riddle, of Talladega, for appellant.

W.M Lackey, of Ashland, for appellees.

MAYFIELD J.

The bill in this case is a hybrid.It is not easy to classify, or correctly name it.It seeks several different kinds of relief.It seeks a sale for distribution, but is defective or lacking as for this purpose, in that it alleges no tenancy in common.

If its allegations be true, complainant owns the entire reversion while one of the respondents owns only an estate for life that is, a dower interest in the land.There is no tenancy in common between them, one is a tenant for life only, while the other is a reversioner or remainderman of the whole.

The case is not brought within the rule announced in Fitts v Craddock,144 Ala. 437, 39 So. 506, 113 Am.St.Rep. 53, or Code, § 5231, because no tenancy in common is shown.The tenancies alleged are in severalty, not in common; each, of course, has an interest in the same land, but not in common; but in different estates, one for life, the other in remainder.In Fitts v. Craddock, supra, complainant was a tenant in common with Craddock, both as to the remainder, and owned all the life estate.The relation of tenants in common was there shown to exist.This distinction was pointed out by this court in the case of Fies v. Rosser,162 Ala. 504, 50 So. 287, 136 Am.St.Rep. 57;Hollis v. Watkins,181 Ala. 248, 61 So. 893;Shannon v. Ogletree,76 So. 865;Cobb v. Frink,75 So. 939;Jordan v. Walker,77 So. 838.

The bill also seeks to quiet and determine title.It is fatally defective in this aspect, because it does not allege possession in complainant.It also seeks to review and reform a decree of the chancery court rendered more than 20 years ago, and is fatally defective as a bill of review, or a bill in the nature thereof, for many reasons.As to this, the bill shows affirmatively on its face that it is barred by laches and by the rule of prescription.

Appellant claims that it is a bill to sell land for partition and distribution among tenants in common, and seeks the other relief as incidental to the main equity.We have shown that it has no main equity as for partition, and hence no relief could be had...