Strength v. Hubert, Civ. A. No. 86-D-0825

• Decision Date: 25 September 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 86-D-0825,86-D-0826-N.
• Citation: 670 F. Supp. 322
• Parties: Martha S. STRENGTH, Plaintiff, v. W.L. HUBERT, et al., Defendants. William L. STRENGTH, Jr., Plaintiff, v. W.L. HUBERT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

670 F. Supp. 322

Martha S. STRENGTH, Plaintiff, v. W.L. HUBERT, et al., Defendants.

William L. STRENGTH, Jr., Plaintiff, v. W.L. HUBERT, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 86-D-0825, 86-D-0826-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

September 25, 1987.

Griffin Sikes, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., and J. Myron Smith, Prattville, Ala., for plaintiffs Martha S. Strength and William L. Strength, Jr.

Ronald G. Davenport, Montgomery, Ala., for defendant W.L. Hubert.

Richard N. Meadows, State Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., for defendant Carroll.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DUBINA, District Judge.

These causes are now before the Court on the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, alter, amend or vacate this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order filed herein on May 22, 1987, 660 F.Supp. 878. Pursuant to the terms and provisions of said Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants herein and, thereby, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints with prejudice. The plaintiffs now seek an order from this Court which reconsiders, alters, amends or vacates said Memorandum Opinion and Order, as well as reinstatement of their claims and causes of actions against the defendants.

Having fully and carefully considered the instant motion, as well as numerous briefs filed herein by the respective parties, and oral arguments of counsel heard in open court on June 12, 1987, this Court is of the opinion that the instant motion is due to be granted to the extent that the same seeks reconsideration of 660 F.Supp. 878. It is the further opinion of this Court that after having reconsidered said Memorandum Opinion and Order and for reasons expressed below, said Memorandum Opinion is due to be altered and/or modified, in part. As will be seen infra, however, such alteration and/or modification of the reasoning and analysis underlying said Memorandum Opinion does not affect the accompanying Order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing these causes with prejudice. Accordingly, 660 F.Supp. 878 shall remain in full force and effect.

I. BACKGROUND

Before examining the grounds proffered by the plaintiffs in support of their motion to reconsider, the Court deems it necessary to briefly review the rulings (and, of course, the reasons therefor) which the plaintiffs seek reconsideration of in their motion.

Concerning defendant Carroll, this Court held that Carroll was entitled to a summary judgment against the plaintiffs on grounds that (1) as a matter of law, defendant Carroll was entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly giving false or perjurious testimony before the state grand jury which returned an indictment against the plaintiffs for the crime of forgery; (2) as a matter of law, the plaintiffs had no § 1983 claims against defendant Carroll for his alleged pre-testimonial conspiratorial acts since such acts, assuming the same to have actually occurred, do not amount to a constitutional deprivation or proximately cause the same;¹ and (3) this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs pendent state law claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process and outrage.²

More specifically, this Court held concerning defendant Carroll that notwithstanding the fact that the Briscoe Court specifically reserved the question of whether a police officer/law enforcement witness testifying in his official capacity is entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for allegedly false and malicious testimony given at a probable cause hearing, the analysis and reasoning behind the Briscoe rule is equally applicable to § 1983 claims based upon allegedly false and malicious grand jury testimony given by a police officer/law enforcement witness testifying in his official capacity. See 660 F.Supp. at 884-886. Accordingly, this Court concluded that on grounds of absolute immunity, the plaintiffs had no § 1983 claim against defendant Carroll for his allegedly false and malicious grand jury testimony.³See 660 F.Supp. at 884-886. Moreover, concerning defendant Carroll, this Court held that the plaintiffs had no § 1983 claim for said defendant's alleged pre-testimonial conspiratorial acts since those acts standing alone (i.e., without the immunized grand jury testimony) did not arise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. As stated by this Court:

In other words, the question which begs itself is, that even if one were to assume that a conspiracy existed among the defendants herein, and the purpose of that conspiracy was to present false testimony to and withhold exculpatory evidence from a grand jury investigating the plaintiffs, and the conspiracy consisted of those numerous pre-testimony conspiratorial acts identified by the plaintiffs ..., of what federal or constitutional right have the plaintiffs been deprived of if the alleged conspiracy lacks the one act (i.e., defendant Carroll's testimony before the grand jury) which resulted in the grand jury's indicting the plaintiffs? In this Court's opinion, no federal or constitutional right arises under such circumstances.

660 F.Supp. at 887.⁴ Accordingly, this Court concluded that as a matter of law, the plaintiffs had no § 1983 claim against defendant Carroll based upon those alleged acts which occurred prior to the giving of his grand jury testimony.

Finally, concerning defendant Hubert, this Court held that defendant Hubert was entitled to a summary judgment against the plaintiffs on grounds that the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against him were due to be dismissed as a matter of law on grounds of lack of state action. In essence, this Court concluded that, given the Court's ruling dismissing the sole state actor (i.e., defendant Carroll) from these causes, it could not be said that defendant Hubert had deprived the plaintiffs of any constitutional right under color of state law.

II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Having reviewed the bases for 660 F.Supp. 878, the Court will now turn its attention to the grounds offered by the plaintiffs in support of their motion to reconsider said Order and Judgment.

In essence, the plaintiffs contend that this Court has erred in the following four respects:

First, ... the Court's application of the immunity for trial witnesses recognized in Briscoe v. Lahue to afford defendant Carroll immunity for his testimony before the Autauga County Grand Jury is without authority; and is an unauthorized extension of this immunity contrary to the policy considerations which underlie the immunity.

Second, even accepting arguendo that Briscoe affords Carroll immunity for giving false testimony to the Autauga County Grand Jury, the Court has erroneously interpreted the scope of that immunity to bar plaintiffs' claims arising out of other non-immune acts, i.e., the defendants' conspiracy to cause the indictments and prosecutions without probable cause.

Third, the Court erroneously dismissed sub silento the plaintiffs' claims that defendants, by their grossly negligent, incompetent and recklessly indifferent acts and omissions (as opposed to intentional acts), caused the plaintiffs' indictments and prosecutions.

Fourth, the Court errs in dismissing the plaintiffs' federal claims against defendant Hubert on the basis that absent any liability of Carroll, "Hubert cannot be said to have deprived the plaintiffs of any constitutional right under color of state law. (660 F.Supp. at 888.)"

Pages 1-2 of the plaintiffs' memorandum brief in support of motion to reconsider. Each of these grounds will be discussed separately below.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The "Existence" of Absolute Immunity in Favor of Defendant Carroll.

The plaintiffs contend here that in affording defendant Carroll absolute immunity for his alleged false and malicious grand jury testimony, this Court has created law that is unsupported by any authority from the United States Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Moreover, the plaintiffs contend that notwithstanding such a lack of controlling authority, this Court has failed to accurately balance the competing policy concerns which are relevant to a grant of absolute immunity. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that based upon the authority of Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), this Court has erred in its "functional analysis" in applying the absolute immunity doctrine to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.⁵ In other words, the plaintiffs contend that from a functional standpoint, the facts and circumstances of the instant case are indistinguishable from Malley, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer who, via a criminal complaint and supporting affidavit, gives false testimony to a magistrate for the purpose of obtaining an arrest warrant, is not entitled to absolute immunity in a subsequent § 1983 action based upon such false testimony. The Malley Court held, instead, that such a police officer is only entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. Accordingly, the plaintiffs contend that defendant Carroll is only entitled to qualified immunity herein. This Court does not agree.

First of all, the Court wishes to point out that outside of the plaintiffs' arguments based upon Malley v. Briggs, supra, the plaintiffs have presented nothing that this Court has not already considered in support of the plaintiffs' contention that defendant Carroll should not be afforded absolute immunity from § 1983 liability herein for his alleged false and malicious grand jury testimony. Though this Court recognizes that the United States Supreme Court specifically reserved this question in Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 328, n. 5, 103 S.Ct. at 1112 n. 5, this Court has not — contrary to the beliefs of plaintiffs' counsel — "created" law in holding that defendant Carroll is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability based upon his grand jury...