Strenke v. Hogner

Citation279 Wis.2d 52,694 N.W.2d 296,2005 WI 25
Decision Date18 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-2527.,03-2527.
PartiesLeRoy M. STRENKE and Juanita M. Strenke, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Levi HOGNER and NAU Country Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants, AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

For the defendants-appellants there were briefs by Karen J. Kingsley and Kingsley Law Office, P.A., St. Paul, MN, and oral argument by Karen J. Kingsley.

For the plaintiffs-respondents there were briefs by Owen R. Williams and Owen R. Williams Trial Lawyers, Amery; and Lynn R. Laufenberg and Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Lynn R. Laufenberg.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Bruce R. Bachhuber and Hanaway Ross, S.C., Green Bay; and by William C. Gleisner, III, and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, III, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard G. Niess and Coyne, Niess, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, SC, Madison, on behalf of Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin.

¶ 1. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals.2 The defendants-appellants, Levi Hogner and NAU Country Insurance, assert that there was insufficient evidence to allow the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury. Additionally, they contend that the jury's award of punitive damages was excessive, thereby violating Hogner's constitutional right to due process.

¶ 2. In its certification, the court of appeals states the issues as follows:

(1) What proof is required for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages under the phrase "in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff' as provided in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) (2001-02)?3
i. If Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Am., Inc., 2003 WI App 202, ¶ 40, 267 Wis. 2d 638, 673 N.W.2d 303, review granted (Wis. April 20, 2004) (Nos. 01-0724, 01-1031 & 01-2486), is correct, are there sufficient facts from which a jury could conclude Levi Hogner was aware his acts were "practically certain" to cause injury?
(2) Must a defendant's conduct giving rise to punitive damages have been directed at the specific plaintiff seeking punitive damages?
(3) If there was sufficient evidence to submit a punitive damages question to the jury, is the jury's punitive damage award excessive or in violation of Hogner's due process rights?4

¶ 3. In response to the issues presented, we conclude that a person acts in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff if the person acts with a purpose to disregard the plaintiff's rights, or is aware that his or her acts are substantially certain to result in the plaintiff's rights being disregarded. Furthermore, we determine that a defendant's conduct giving rise to punitive damages need not be directed at the specific plaintiff seeking punitive damages in order to recover under the statute.

¶ 4. However, we are equally divided on the question of whether the jury's punitive damage award was excessive and therefore in violation of Hogner's due process rights.5 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part and remand to the court of appeals to decide this remaining issue consistent with the principles set forth in Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789.

I

¶ 5. This case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on October 16, 1998. At the time of the accident, LeRoy Strenke was traveling northbound on Highway 48 near Cumberland, Wisconsin. Levi Hogner was traveling southbound on the same road. As Strenke approached the intersection of Highway 48 and Golf Course Road, Hogner's vehicle turned left into the path of Strenke's car, injuring Strenke.

¶ 6. Hogner was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. His blood alcohol content was tested to be .269%. He pled no contest to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, fifth offense. Hogner was sentenced to a year in jail, alcohol assessment, revocation of his driver's license for 36 months, and paid $3,041 in fines.

¶ 7. LeRoy and Juanita Strenke sued Hogner for negligence, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Hogner and NAU (hereinafter collectively referred to as Hogner) stipulated to liability, but disputed the Strenkes' damages. The circuit court granted Hogner's motion to bifurcate the punitive damages claim from the compensatory damages claim. Subsequently, the jury awarded the Strenkes $2,000 in compensatory damages.

¶ 8. During the punitive damages trial, Hogner admitted that he had four prior convictions for driving while intoxicated. He further acknowledged that he consumed 16 to 18 twelve-ounce containers of beer within a five-hour span on the night of the accident.6 However, Hogner testified that he had never injured anyone when drinking and did not intend to injure anyone on the date in question.

¶ 9. At the close of the testimony, Hogner moved for a directed verdict, asserting that the plaintiffs had not presented a prima facie case that he acted maliciously toward Strenke or intentionally disregarded Strenke's rights. The circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that while Hogner did not act maliciously toward Strenke, the jury could conclude that Hogner intentionally disregarded Strenke's rights.

¶ 10. According to the circuit court, Strenke was a member of a class of motorists that had rights. It determined that a jury could find that Hogner's intentional acts of drinking 16-18 twelve-ounce containers of beer, and then driving while intoxicated, coupled with the fact that he had four prior OWI convictions, created a practical certainty that Strenke's rights would be disregarded.

¶ 11. The issue was submitted to the jury in two questions: (1) "Did Levi Hogner act maliciously toward LeRoy Strenke or in an intentional disregard of the rights of LeRoy Strenke?" and (2) "What sum, if any, do you assess against Levi Hogner as punitive damages?" The jury unanimously answered the first question "yes" and awarded the sum of $225,000, $200,000 more than the Strenkes had asked for in closing argument.

¶ 12. After the verdict, Hogner filed a motion for remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion, and Hogner appealed. The court of appeals certified the matter to this court.

II

[1, 2]

¶ 13. The focus of our inquiry is Wis. Stat. § 895.85, the punitive damages statute. Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law subject to independent appellate review. Vill. of Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, Inc., 2003 WI 150, ¶ 12, 267 Wis. 2d 158, 672 N.W.2d 275 (citing Meyer v. School Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999)). Likewise, whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury is also a question of law that is subject to independent appellate review. Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 344, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1990).

III

¶ 14. We begin our discussion with the statute at issue. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85 was created by 1995 Wis. Act 17 and became effective on May 17, 1995. Subsection (3) of the statute provides:

(3) STANDARD OF CONDUCT. The plaintiff may receive punitive damages if evidence is submitted showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.

¶ 15. Prior to the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), the common law established the standard of conduct governing the imposition of punitive damages. Under it, punitive damages could be awarded for "outrageous" conduct. Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 21, 595 N.W.2d 380 (1999). A person's conduct was "outrageous" if the person acted "either maliciously or in wanton, willful and in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights." Id. ¶ 16. The words of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) derive, in large part, from the common law. The major difference between the two is that the legislature replaced the common law language of "wanton, willful and reckless" with the term "intentional." We address the import of this change in answering the first certified question: what proof is required for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages under the phrase "in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff" as provided in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3)?

¶ 17. In Wischer, 267 Wis. 2d 638, ¶ 40, the court of appeals concluded that to intentionally disregard the rights of the plaintiff, a defendant was unambiguously required to have (1) a general intent to perform an act, and (2) either (i) a specific intent to cause injury by that act or (ii) knowledge that the act is practically certain to result in injury.

¶ 18. Relying on the Wischer decision, Hogner argues that the issue of punitive damages was improperly submitted to the jury in this case. He contends that no evidence exists that he knew that his acts were practically certain to result in Strenke being injured. As a result, he asserts that his intentional acts of drinking a large quantity of alcohol and then driving were not sufficient to prove that he intentionally disregarded Strenke's rights.

¶ 19. While we agree with Hogner's reading of Wischer, we disagree with the Wischer court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3). The legislature did not intend an "intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff" to require "intent to cause injury to the plaintiff." Rather, it reaffirmed the common-law principle that punitive damages can be premised on conduct that is a "disregard of rights." However, the legislature chose the word "intentional" to describe the heightened state of mind required of the defendant who disregards rights, instead of the common law's description of "wanton, willful and reckless." Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) is supported by the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the common law meaning...

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