Strevel v. Fresh Encounter, Inc.
| Citation | 2015 Ohio 5004 |
| Decision Date | 24 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15CA5 |
| Parties | ICY STREVEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRESH ENCOUNTER, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Conrad A. Curren, Greenfield, Ohio, for Appellant.
Thomas J. Gruber and Michael P. Cussen, McCaslin, Imbus & McCaslin, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
McFarland, A.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Icy Strevel, appeals the February 20, 2015 entry of the Highland County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment to Appellee Fresh Encounters, Inc. Having reviewed the record and the pertinent law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
{¶2} This lawsuit arises subsequent to an incident which occurred on July 22, 2012 on the premises of the Community Market in Greenfield, Ohio. Community Market is a local food market owned by Fresh Encounters, Inc. On that date, Strevel stepped into a pothole and fell to the ground. She subsequently claimed personal injuries and medical expenses.
{¶3} On June 18, 2014, Appellant filed suit against Fresh Encounters, Inc. dba Community Market. Appellee filed a timely answer. Appellant's deposition was taken on October 30, 2014. On December 10, 2014, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellant filed a memorandum contra defendant's motion for summary judgment on December 29, 2014. Appellee also filed a reply on January 7, 2015.
{¶4} On February 20, 2015, the trial court filed a decision granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment and final judgment entry. This timely appeal followed. Where relevant, portions of Appellant's deposition testimony will be cited below.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANT WHEN GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS EXISTED."
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶5} Initially, we note that appellate courts conduct a de novo review of trial court summary judgment decisions. See, Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Accordingly, an appellate court must independently review the record to determine if summary judgment is appropriate and need not defer to the trial court's decision. See, Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist. 1993); Morehead v. Conley, 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-12, 599 N.E.2d 786 (4th Dist. 1991). Thus, to determine whether a trial court properly granted a summary judgment motion, an appellate court must review the Civ.R. 56 summary judgment standard, as well as the applicable law.
Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
* * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.
{¶6} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, a trial court may not award summary judgment unless the evidence demonstrates that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and after viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. See, Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429-30, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997).
B. LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Negligence
{¶7} Before we address the specific arguments raised by Appellant's assignment of error, we note that Appellant's action is based on a claim of negligence. The trial court's decision found that Appellant was a business invitee of Appellee, who as owner of the premises had the duty to maintain its business premises in a reasonably safe condition. We begin by reviewing the general Ohio law on negligence and premises liability.
{¶8} A successful negligence action requires a plaintiff to establish that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached the duty of care, and (3) as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's breach, the plaintiff suffered injury. See, Texler v. D.O. Summers Cleaners, 81 Ohio St.3d 677, 680, 693 N.E.2d 217 (1998); Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 142, 539 N.E.2d 614 (1989); Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984). If a defendant points to evidence to illustrate that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any one of the foregoing elements, and if the plaintiff fails to respond as Civ.R. 56 provides, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 4th Dist. Jackson No. 06CA18, 2007-Ohio-3898, at ¶ 19, affirmed, 122 Ohio St.3d 120, 2009-Ohio-2495, 909 N.E.2d 120.
{¶9} The existence of a defendant's duty is a threshold question in a negligence case. See, Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, at ¶ 13. In a premises liability case, the relationship between the owner, or occupier, of the premises and the injured party determines the duty owed. See, Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996); Shump v. First Continental-Robinwood Assocs., 71 Ohio St.3d 414, 417, 644 N.E.2d 291 (1994). Ohio law recognizes three distinct classes: trespassers, licensees, and invitees. Geog v. Jeffers, 4th Dist. Athens No. 94CA1613, 1994 WL 704529, *2. {¶10} Id. Lampe v. Magoulakis, 159 Ohio St. 72, 111 N.E.2d 7 (1953). The economic or tangible benefit test has long been recognized by Ohio courts in order to distinguish the status of an invitee from that of a licensee. Id. Provencher v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 49 Ohio St.3d 265, 266, 551 N.E.2d 125 (1990).
{¶11} The trial court correctly determined that Appellant was a business invitee on the premises of the grocery store for the purposes of shopping, which is an advantage to Appellee. A premises owner possesses the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition, such that business invitees will not unreasonably or unnecessarily be exposed to danger. Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 203, 480 N.E.2d 474 (1985). As a business invitee, Appellant was owed the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.
2. The "Open and Obvious" Doctrine
{¶12} A premises owner or occupier is not, however, an insurer of its invitees' safety. Id. While the premises owner must warn its invitees of latent or concealed dangers if the owner knows or has reason to know of the hidden dangers, see, Jackson v. Kings Island, 58 Ohio St.2d 357, 358, 390 N.E.2d 810 (1979), invitees are expected to take reasonable precautions to avoid dangers that are patent or obvious. See, Brinkman v. Ross, 68 Ohio St.3d 82, 84, 623 N.E.2d 1175 (1993); Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St.2d 45, 233 N.E.2d 589, (1968) paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶13} Therefore, when a danger is open and obvious, a premises owner owes no duty of care to individuals lawfully on the premises. See, Armstrong, at ¶ 5; Sidle, paragraph one of the syllabus. By focusing on duty, "the rule properly considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as opposed to the nature of the plaintiff's conduct in encountering it." Armstrong at ¶ 13. The underlying rationale is that, Id. at ¶ 5. Id. at ¶ 13. Thus, the open and obvious doctrine obviates the duty to warn and acts as a complete bar to recovery. Id. at ¶ 5. Furthermore, the issue of whether a hazard is open and obvious may be decided as a matter of law when no factual issues are disputed. Nageotte v. Cafaro Co., 160 Ohio App.3d 702, 710, 2005-Ohio 2098, 828 N.E.2d 683 (6th Dist.) at ¶ 28, citing Armstrong.
{¶14} Here Appellant testified she had driven to the Community Market with a friend to pick up a pizza. She parked about 8 spaces away from the store's entrance. Appellant was aware that there were holes "all around" the parking lot, due to her prior experience shopping there. She and her friend shopped separately and proceeded to get into the car to leave. Appellant specifically testified as follows:
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