Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 04 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 60922,60922
• Citation: 340 N.E.2d 47,34 Ill.App.3d 551
• Parties: Edward and Denise STRIBLING, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, and Harry Schneider, Executive Director, CHA, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 47

340 N.E.2d 47

34 Ill.App.3d 551

Edward and Denise STRIBLING, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, and Harry Schneider, Executive Director, CHA Defendants-Appellees.

No. 60922.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Dec. 4, 1975.

James O. Latturner, Gary Johnson, Seymour Mansfield and Nelson Soltman, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert K. Hick, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

McGLOON, Presiding Justice:

Plaintiffs in the instant case are residents of a multi-family apartment building located at 4352 South State Street in Chicago, Illinois. This building is one of several buildings which comprise the Robert Taylor Homes Housing Project, a public housing project owned and operated by defendant, Chicago Housing Authority. Plaintiffs bring this action against the Chicago Housing Authority and its executive director, Harry Schneider, to recover damages for loss of property allegedly caused by defendants' negligence in failing to secure two vacant apartments adjacent to plaintiffs' apartment on the east and west side. Plaintiffs' loss of property, occurring in three separate breakins within a forty-seven day period, was effected by burglars who on each occasion entered plaintiffs' apartment by demolishing a portion of the wall separating plaintiffs' apartment and one of the vacant adjacent apartments. Pursuant to defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court ordered that the complaint be dismissed. Plaintiffs now appeal from that order.

The question that plaintiffs present for review in this appeal is whether the complaint states a cause of action.

We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

Plaintiffs' complaint was filed in four counts. In each of Counts I, II and III plaintiffs alleged that on January 7, 1974 and for several months prior thereto, plaintiffs were tenants of an apartment building located at 4352 South State Street in Chicago, Illinois and that defendant was the owner of said apartment building; that since October of 1973 and several months prior thereto, the two apartments adjacent to either side of plaintiffs' apartment have been vacant; that on numerous occasions plaintiffs observed persons entering and leaving these vacant apartments and heard sounds coming from inside these apartments; that based on the appearance and demeanor of said persons, it was plaintiffs' belief that said persons were not authorized to be on the premises and that said persons had free and unhindered access to the vacant apartments; that plaintiffs told defendants' agent about such unauthorized use of the vacant apartments and demanded that the apartments be made secure against such use; and that defendants did not respond to plaintiffs' complaints and demands and that the unauthorized use of the vacant apartments continued unabated.

Count I then went on to allege that as a result of defendants' failure to respond to the above complaints and requests of plaintiffs, plaintiffs' apartment was burglarized on January 7, 1974 by persons who broke a hole through the wall between plaintiffs' apartment and the vacant apartment to the west. In Count II plaintiffs further alleged that as a result of defendants' failure to respond to plaintiffs' complaints and after having been notified of the burglary on January 7, 1974 and after subsequent complaints of plaintiffs, plaintiffs were victims of a second burglary occurring on February 7, 1974. Count II alleged that this second burglary was effected by burglars who entered plaintiffs' apartment by breaking a hole through the wall separating plaintiffs' apartment from the vacant apartment to the east of plaintiffs' apartment. Count III further alleged that as a result of defendants' failure to respond to the aforementioned complaints and requests, and having been notified of the two previously mentioned burglaries of January 7, 1974 and February 7, 1974, plaintiffs were the victims of yet a third burglary. Plaintiffs alleged in Count III that this third burglary occurred on February 22, 1974 when burglars entered the vacant apartment to the west side of their apartment and broke a hole through the common wall separating plaintiffs' apartment and this vacant apartment.

Each of Counts I, II and III alleged that plaintiffs were in the exercise of due care for the security of their apartment and that as a result of defendants' negligence in failing to respond to plaintiffs' many complaints and requests plaintiffs were damaged in the amount of $1,000.

Count IV of the complaint realleges all of the allegations of Counts I, II and III, alleges that defendants are guilty of wilful, wanton and malicious conduct, and asks for $10,000 in punitive damages.

The question presented to this court is whether plaintiffs' complaint states a cause of action. In deciding this question, all facts properly pleaded as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from these facts must be accepted as true. (Miles Homes, Inc. v. Mintjal (1974)17 Ill.App.3d 642, 307 N.E.2d 724; Psyhogios v. Village of Skokie (1972) 4 Ill.App.3d 186, 280 N.E.2d 552.) Moreover, pleadings are to be liberally construed with the view that controversies shall be determined on their merits to do substantial justice, rather than on technicalities. (Coffey v. MacKay (1972) 2 Ill.App.3d 802, 277 N.E.2d 748.) As stated in Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 42(2): 'No pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to meet.' Nevertheless, plain...