Strickland on Behalf of Strickland v. Rankin County School District
| Decision Date | 30 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2019-CT-01669-SCT |
| Citation | 341 So.3d 941 |
| Parties | Christopher Shane STRICKLAND, Sr., ON BEHALF OF and as Next Friend of Christopher Shane STRICKLAND, Jr. v. RANKIN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JAMES MICHAEL PRIEST, JR., TIMOTHY D. MOORE, Jackson
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: WALKER REECE GIBSON, Ridgeland, FRED M HARRELL, JR., Brandon, REBECCA SUZANNE BLUNDEN, Ridgeland
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. As with many cases involving tort claims against government entities, that the government employee acted negligently is almost assumed, and the sole focus becomes whether the Legislature has conferred immunity on the activity in question. Such is the case here. Much legal analysis has been aimed at whether the actions of two cross-country coaches were discretionary policy decisions entitled to immunity from suit under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d) (Rev. 2019). But on certiorari review, we find this question to be moot.
¶2. The reason for this is simple—the alleged actions of the coaches do not establish any triable claim for negligence. In other words, we find there is no alleged tort claim upon which to apply the Mississippi Tort Claims Act's discretionary-function-immunity provision. For this reason, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Rankin County School District.
Background Facts & Procedural History
¶3. In September 2016, Christopher Shane Strickland, Jr., a sophomore at Northwest Rankin High School, was at Choctaw Trails in Clinton, Mississippi, preparing to run a cross-country meet. Before the race, a wasp stung Christopher on the top of his head. According to Christopher, a lump began to form and his head felt tight, like it was swelling.
¶4. Christopher told one of his coaches. According to affidavits submitted by the Rankin County School District (RCSD), two coaches and a registered nurse, who was there to watch her son race, examined Christopher's head and found no evidence of a sting or adverse reaction. And Christopher assured them he was fine and wanted to run the race. But Christopher recalled only one coach examining him. And this coach told him to "man up" and run the race.
¶5. Christopher did run the race. According to one of his coaches, she checked in on him at the mile marker. He responded that he was "okay, just hot." According to Christopher, after the mile marker he began to feel dizzy. Then he fell, hitting his head.
¶6. The same nurse attended to him. So did her husband, who is a neurologist. Christopher appeared to recover and rejoined his team after the race. But he later went to a doctor, who discovered injuries to his brain
and spine.
¶7. In January 2017, Christopher's father, Christopher Shane Strickland, Sr. (Strickland), sued RCSD on Christopher's behalf. He alleged various breaches of duties in how RCSD employees acted both (1) after the wasp sting but before the race and (2) after Christopher's fall. Specifically, Strickland alleged that, after the fall, RCSD employees failed to follow the district's concussion protocol.
¶8. RCSD is a governmental entity, so the actions of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment fall under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7 (Rev. 2019). While the MTCA generally waives sovereign immunity, it exempts from this waiver certain actions within the course and scope of government employment. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1) (Rev. 2019). So for the actions listed in Section 11-46-9(1), sovereign immunity is restored. RCSD relied on the specific immunity provision of Section 11-46-9(1)(d), known as discretionary-function immunity, to move for summary judgment. The trial court denied its motion.
¶9. But in the interim, this Court handed down the sovereign-immunity case Wilcher v. Lincoln County Board of Supervisors , 243 So. 3d 177 (Miss. 2018), which restored the two-part, public-policy function test for determining if an allegedly tortious activity involved the exercise of an discretionary function and thus was entitled to sovereign immunity. Relying on Wilcher , RCSD amended its motion for summary judgment, asserting its coaches’ decisions involved policy and thus were immune discretionary functions.
¶10. At the summary judgment hearing, Strickland's counsel abandoned any claim based on RCSD employees’ actions after Christopher's fall, acknowledging Strickland lacked medical evidence to establish any causal connection between RCSD's allegedly deficient response to Christopher's fall and his injuries. So the focus was on RCSD's employees’ allowing Christopher to run the race after being stung by a wasp. Citing Wilcher , Strickland's counsel insisted the coaches’ actions amounted to ordinary negligence.
¶11. The trial court granted RCSD's motion. The trial court determined that RCSD's employees acted "acted within [their] discretion under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d) while conducting the school sporting event and [their] treatment of [Christopher] relative to his insect sting claim." But even if discretionary-function immunity did not apply, the trial court found summary judgment would still be proper because the coaches’ "actions as to an alleged insect sting, any corresponding medical care, and any decision to allow [Christopher] to participate in the cross-country racing event exceeded the ordinary care standard." Specifically, the trial court found "no genuine issue of material fact exists for these claims or any other claim asserted by [Strickland] in this action."
¶12. Strickland appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. And by a five to five vote, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Strickland ex rel. Strickland v. Rankin Cnty. Sch. Dist. , No. 2019-01669-COA, ––– So.3d ––––, 2021 WL 2327700 (Miss. Ct. App. June 8, 2021). At issue between the equally divided appellate court was the precedential value of pre- Wilcher cases that applied the two-part, public-policy function test to athletic coaching decisions.1 Compare Strickland , ––– So.3d at –––– – ––––, 2021 WL 2327700, at **3-4, with id. at –––– – ––––, 2021 WL 2327700 at **4-5 (Barnes, C.J., writing separately).
¶13. Strickland petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. Just as the trial court and Court of Appeals did, we review the grant of summary judgment to RCSD de novo. Woodard v. Miller , 326 So. 3d 439, 446 (Miss. 2021) (citing Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., Inc. , 891 So. 2d 224, 228 (Miss. 2005) ). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Strickland, the nonmovant, id. , we must examine "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Discussion
¶14. The Court of Appeals spent much time debating, based on the allegations before it, the proper way to apply the two-part public-policy function test reestablished in Wilcher , 243 So. 3d 177. But as we clarified in Wilcher , the trial court's application of the public-policy function test to determine if a governmental entity enjoys discretionary-function immunity comes after an important pre-test step—namely, identifying "the allegedly tortious act giving rise to the claim." Id. at 187. And, here, Strickland has failed to allege a tort claim—let alone produce any evidence in support of his claim, as was his burden when faced with RCSD's motion for summary judgment. Karpinsky v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. , 109 So. 3d 84, 88-89 (Miss. 2013).
¶15. Both the separate Court of Appeals’ opinion authored by Judge Barnes and the separate opinions by this Court suggest we cannot consider Strickland's failure to produce evidence establishing a triable negligence claim against RCSD because RCSD moved for summary judgment based on discretionary-function immunity alone. Strickland , ––– So.3d at ––––, 2021 WL WL 2327700, at *6 (Barnes, C.J., writing separately). While MCTA immunity "is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability and, therefore, should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation," Mitchell v. City of Greenville , 846 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Miss. 2003), we first point out that RCSD's motion did not come at the first possible stage of litigation. Instead, RCSD filed its motion more than two years after Strickland filed suit, after both parties had completed discovery and gathered supporting affidavits and medical experts. In fact, when faced with RCSD's amended motion for summary judgment, Strickland abandoned his claims based on RCSD's response to Christopher's fall. The precise reason he did so was because Strickland conceded he lacked any medical evidence to support a causal connection between RCSD's allegedly negligent response and Christopher's injuries. And Strickland defended his remaining claims against RCSD's amended motion for summary judgment by asserting his submitted affidavits "establish the existence of disputes of material facts so that summary judgment is not appropriate." So the question of whether there was a genuine issue of material fact to be presented at trial was on the table at the summary judgment stage. And this Court's recognizing the lack of a triable negligence claim is certainly not fundamentally unfair based on our de novo standard of review.
¶16. But even if we were to follow the separate opinions’ reasoning, even the Court of Appeals judges who would have reversed specifically acknowledged that to apply the two-part, public-policy function test, a court must "look at the specific event or activity being challenged." Strickland , ––– So.3d at ––––, 2021 WL 2327700, at *5 (Barnes, C.J., writing separately) (citing Wilcher , 243 So. 3d at 188 ). And here, the specific activity being challenged is the RCSD's coaches...
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