Strickland v. Shotts
| Decision Date | 24 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:03cv0026 AS.,4:03cv0026 AS. |
| Citation | 408 F.Supp.2d 633 |
| Parties | Michael Wayne STRICKLAND, Plaintiff v. Jeremy SHOTTS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Michael L Parkinson, Lafayette, IN, for Plaintiff.
Michael F. Deboni, Goshen, IN, William W. Kurnik, Des Plaines, IL, E. Nelson Chipman, Jr., Elkhart, IN, for Defendant.
The complaint in this case was filed on or about April 4, 2003 by counsel for Michael Wayne Strickland purporting to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, alleging that Defendants were "persons acting under color of state law and that Defendants" actions constituted a willful and wanton infliction of harm on the Plaintiff and an excessive use of force involving an arrest in violation of Plaintiff's rights secured by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Where by Order of this Court, Elkhart City Police Department Officer Chris Snyder was dismissed as a defendant from this lawsuit on March 9, 2004, and subsequently Elkhart County Sheriff's Department Officers Scott Hashberger and Sean Holmes were also dismissed as defendants from this lawsuit on April 26, 2004. The only defendant remaining is Jeremy Shotts, an Elkhart County Sheriff's Department Deputy Sheriff. Presently, cross motions for summary judgment have been filed where Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on July 30, 2004, and Defendant's response and motion for summary judgment was filed on September 2, 2004. Oral argument was had by this Court on October 20, 2004.
The affidavit filed by the plaintiff, Michael Wayne Strickland on October 20, 2004 falls far short of laying the appropriate factual setting of the events in question. First, there is no question that this defendant, Jeremy Shotts and the other officers had probable cause under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States to effect an arrest and to take this plaintiff into custody. See Bovey v. City of Lafayette, 586 F.Supp. 1460 (N.D.Ind.1984) aff'd by unpublished order 774 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir.1985). The counter-affidavit of the defendant fills in some of the gaps. However, more revealing are the proceedings in the Elkhart Superior Court No. 4 in Elkhart County, Indiana on March 18, 2002 which includes the sworn testimony of this plaintiff, particularly under the questioning of the judge of that court, the Honorable Olga H. Stickel. At the very least, that proceeding constitutes a judicial admission by this plaintiff that is highly relevant.
The questioning there of Mr. Strickland by his own attorney, Philip L. Miller, beginning at the bottom of page eight of that transcript and concluding on page eleven reveal those judicial admissions:
Also of importance is Mr. Strickland's written plea agreement dated March 18, 2002 revealing the Defendant's voluntary act of entering into a plea of guilty to the crimes of Operating While Intoxicated, Resisting Law Enforcement, and Driving While Suspended. Furthermore, in the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, a number of items have been placed before the Court. The affidavit of Christopher Snyder explicates the setting of this event on April 7, 2001 in ten numbered paragraphs which are set out here:
1. On April 7, 2001, I was a police officer employed by the City of Elkhart Police Department. I am currently still a police officer with the City of Elkhart Police Department.
2. On April 7, 2001, I was involved in the pursuit and eventual arrest of Michael Wayne Strickland. I was engaged in the pursuit and eventual arrest of Mr. Strickland along with the officers of the County Sheriff's Department as well as other City of Elkhart Police Department officers.
3. During the pursuit of Mr. Strickland, myself as well as other individuals were put in danger. The pursuit was both a vehicular pursuit as well as a foot pursuit.
4. At one point in time Mr. Strickland attempted to evade the pursuing officers by running into a residence. There were several officers, including myself, who were involved in the pursuit of Mr. Strickland. Myself, as well as other police officers, followed Mr. Strickland into that residence.
5. Inside that residence Mr. Strickland was order to comply with the officers' commands. He refused to do so. At that point in time several officers attempted to restrain Mr. Strickland for the purposes of effecting an arrest.
6. In attempting to restrain Mr. Strickland I was positioned towards the left shoulder of Mr. Strickland, Officer Holms was on Mr. Strickland's right shoulder and Officer Hashberger was behind me. During this time the officers were instructing Mr. Strickland to show them his hands.
7. Eventually Mr. Strickland began to comply with the officers' commands. Mr. Strickland was then brought to his feet.
8. At no point did I order the K-9 known as Rexo to help subdue Mr. Strickland. At no point did I participate in any decision making regarding ordering the K-9 known as Rexo to help subdue Mr. Strickland.
9. At no point prior to the K-9 known as Rexo becoming involved and subduing Mr. Strickland did I know that Rexo was instructed to do so. At no time do I remember hearing any commands or any indication one way or another that the K-9 known as Rexo was about to bite Mr. Strickland.
10. After Mr. Strickland was brought to his feet he was taken and placed in the rear of a patrol car. Mr. Strickland was then transported to Elkhart Hospital for treatment.
The record reflects the additional undisputed facts: that on April 7, 2004, Officer Jeremy Shotts, while on duty with the Elkhart County Sheriff's Department, also responded to a request to assist other officers in a pursuit involving the fleeing suspect Strickland, where eventually while in the residence Shotts ordered or caused to have ordered, the K-9 to bite the lower left leg of Strickland during his apprehension. Based upon the use of the K-9, in his Complaint, Strickland claims that the Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force in seizing him.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 164 F.3d 373 (7th Cir.1998). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.
The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "`with or without supporting affidavits,'" the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56); Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497 (7th Cir.1998). A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party has met...
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