Strickland v. State
Decision Date | 25 January 2019 |
Docket Number | A18A1829 |
Citation | 349 Ga.App. 673,824 S.E.2d 555 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | STRICKLAND v. The STATE. |
The Patterson Firm, Jackie G. Patterson, Atlanta; Brandon D. Dixon, for appellant.
Tasha M. Mosley, Solicitor-General, for appellee.
Antonio Strickland was charged by uniform traffic citation with following too closely in violation of OCGA § 40-6-49. At the close of evidence during his bench trial, Strickland made an oral motion to quash the charge, which the trial court denied. Strickland now appeals his conviction of following too closely, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the charge because the citation fails to allege the essential elements of the offense. For the reasons explained below, we agree and reverse.
1. General or special demurrer. At the outset, we address whether Strickland's motion was in the nature of an untimely special demurrer, as argued by the State.1
A special demurrer is waived if not raised before pleading to the merits of the indictment. On the other hand, because a general demurrer attacks the legality of an indictment, it is permissible to raise this ground after verdict by a motion in arrest of judgment even if there was no earlier objection. A motion in arrest asserts that the indictment contains a defect on its face affecting the substance and real merits of the offense charged and voiding the indictment, such as failure to charge a necessary element of a crime. Likewise, an oral objection or motion to quash based upon the same grounds as a general demurrer can be asserted anytime during the trial.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) McKay v. State , 234 Ga. App. 556, 559 (2), 507 S.E.2d 484 (1998). As previously stated, Strickland orally moved to quash the citation at the close of evidence during his trial. Thus, if Strickland's motion to quash was in the nature of a special demurrer, it was untimely. See OCGA § 17-7-110 (). And the failure to file a timely special demurrer seeking additional information constitutes a waiver of the right to be tried on a perfect indictment. See Carter v. State , 155 Ga. App. 49, 50 (1), 270 S.E.2d 233 (1980).
Here, Strickland argues that the citation is deficient because it fails to set out all of the essential elements of the crime, and that he could admit all of the allegations in the citation and not be guilty of a crime. And as the State explains in its brief, a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment because it fails to set forth all of the essential elements of the charged crime is properly considered a general demurrer. See Coleman v. State , 318 Ga. App. 478, 479 (1), 735 S.E.2d 788 (2012) (); Newsome v. State , 296 Ga. App. 490, 491, 492-493 (1), 675 S.E.2d 229 (2009) ( )(punctuation omitted); McKay , 234 Ga. App. at 559 (2), 507 S.E.2d 484 ( ). Accordingly, Strickland has not waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the citation by not filing a timely special demurrer.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thomason v. State , 196 Ga. App. 447, 448 (2), 396 S.E.2d 79 (1990). "This presents a question of law that we review de novo." (Citation omitted.) State v. Wright , 333 Ga. App. 124, 125, 775 S.E.2d 567 (2015).
In Jackson v. State , 301 Ga. 137, (800 S.E.2d 356) (2017), the Supreme Court of Georgia emphasized that withstanding a general demurrer or motion to quash "requires more than simply alleging the accused violated a certain statute." Id. at 140 (1), 800 S.E.2d 356. Thus, a legally sufficient indictment must either "(1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute." Id. at 141 (1), 800 S.E.2d 356. "[I]f the accused can admit all the indictment or accusation or citation charges and still be innocent of having committed any offense, the indictment or accusation or citation is defective." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomason , 196 Ga. App. at 448 (2), 396 S.E.2d 79. Finally, "[a]n indictment is to be strictly construed against the [S]tate when a demurrer has been filed against it." (Punctuation omitted.) Wright , 333 Ga. App. at 126, 775 S.E.2d 567, quoting Jack Goger, Daniel's Ga. Criminal Trial Practice, § 13-4 (2014-2015 ed.).
The uniform traffic citation is composed of five sections: Violator, Violation, Location, Summons, and Officer Certification. Within the Violation section, there are three subsections. Subsection one seems to apply when the cited violation is speeding, and includes blanks for the speed at which the car was traveling, the applicable speed limit, whether the speed was clocked by a patrol vehicle, and how the speed was detected. Subsection two clearly applies to citations for driving under the influence, asking the officer to check which type of test was administered, who administered the test, and what the test results were. The last subsection is titled "OFFENSE (other than above)" and asks the officer to specify the name of the offense and the violated Code section. Additionally, a portion of this subsection is titled "REMARKS" and offers two blank lines where an officer can include additional information. Below the REMARKS section, a table sets forth a number of options to check under the headings Weather, Road, Traffic, Lighting, and Commercial Vehicle Information. Thus, the officer is able to specify the conditions at the time of the citation.
Here, both the speeding and DUI subsections of the citation are left blank. In the third subsection, the "OFFENSE" is specified as "Following to[o] closely" and the Code section specified is "[ OCGA §] 40-6-49." The "REMARKS" section is blank. Checkmarks in the table indicate "clear weather," "dry, concrete" road, "medium traffic," and "daylight." Within the Violator section, it is indicated by checkmark that an accident occurred.
The cited Code section, OCGA § 40-6-49, provides:
As stated above, in order to survive a general demurrer, or motion to quash, the citation must either (1) recite the language of OCGA § 40-6-49 that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish a violation of OCGA § 40-6-49. Jackson , 301 Ga. at 141 (1), 800 S.E.2d 356.
(a) Whether the citation sets out the elements of the offense charged. We find it clear that the citation fails to recite the language of OCGA § 40-6-49 setting out all the elements of the offense. In fact, the citation does not recite...
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