Strickland v. Strickland
Decision Date | 16 November 2021 |
Docket Number | M2020-01070-COA-R3-CV |
Citation | 644 S.W.3d 620 |
Parties | Rachel Ransom STRICKLAND v. Patrick Dustin STRICKLAND |
Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Adrian H. Altshuler and Caroline Beth Altshuler, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rachel Ransom Strickland Living.
Philip Edward Schell, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Patrick Dustin Strickland.
In this post-divorce action, a former husband filed a motion to modify his alimony obligation after his former wife began living with a romantic partner. The wife contended that she and her romantic partner equally divided their living expenses and that she still needed the previously awarded alimony despite her new living arrangement. The trial court disagreed and suspended the husband's alimony obligation retroactively to the filing of his petition to modify. In addition to the alimony issue, the trial court determined that wife successfully proved two civil contempt claims against the husband, awarded her the reasonable attorney fees she incurred to prosecute those claims, and dismissed a civil contempt claim she raised regarding his late payment of the value of the wife's interest in two certificates of deposit ("CD") awarded to her in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. The wife appealed, challenging the suspension of the husband's alimony obligation, the dismissal of her civil contempt claim, and the award of attorney fees. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in suspending the husband's alimony obligation, we reverse that part of the court's decision and remand for a determination of her reasonable attorney fees relating to that issue. We affirm the part of the trial court's judgment dismissing the civil contempt claim.
Rachel Ransom Strickland Living1 ("Wife") and Patrick Dustin Strickland ("Husband") were divorced by order of the court on December 20, 2018, based on the ground of irreconcilable differences. In the final divorce decree, the court incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement ("MDA") which contains the following pertinent provisions:
At the time of the divorce, Wife and the parties’ minor child lived in an apartment located on Boxwood Drive in Franklin, Tennessee. Wife entered into a lease for this apartment in 2017 when the parties separated, and she was the only tenant initially listed on the lease. As such, she was solely responsible for the rent, utilities, and all costs of living for herself and the child, aside from the monthly child support payments she received from Husband. Wife was unemployed at that time and paid these living expenses with the $6,740 per month in distributions she received from Strickland and Shue, LLC due to her 25% interest in the business. She continued receiving these monthly distributions from the time of the divorce in December 2018 through June 2019, but she ceased receiving them after Husband paid her the value of her 25% interest on June 18, 2019. Shortly thereafter, on July 1, 2019, Wife began receiving transitional alimony payments in the amount of $2,000 per month.
Approximately two weeks after Wife received her first alimony payment, her romantic partner, Dr. Jeremy Pinyard, began living with her and the child at the apartment on Boxwood Drive. Wife added Dr. Pinyard's name to the lease as a co-tenant equally responsible for paying the rent. The apartment's utilities remained solely in Wife's name, but Dr. Pinyard equally contributed to paying them each month.
Husband soon learned of Wife's cohabitation and, on July 12, 2019, he commenced the instant action by filing a petition to modify alimony pursuant to the cohabitation provision located in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C). Wife filed an answer asserting that she continued to need transitional alimony and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C) did not apply because the MDA expressly provides that the alimony award is non-modifiable. She also filed a petition for civil contempt alleging four counts of contempt against Husband. As relevant to this appeal, Wife alleged that she was entitled to civil contempt damages because Husband violated paragraph six of the MDA when he paid her for the value of her interest in the two CDs six months after paying her for the 25% interest in Strickland and Shue, LLC rather than paying both concurrently.
After hearing the matter, the trial court entered a memorandum and order suspending Wife's transitional alimony retroactively to the date Husband filed the petition to modify. The court based its decision on the following findings: (1) the MDA did allow the alimony award to be modified pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2) upon Wife's cohabitation with a romantic partner and (2) Wife failed to rebut the presumption that she was not receiving support from or supporting Dr. Pinyard and that she continued to need the alimony despite the cohabitation. The trial court then concluded that Wife's claim for civil contempt damages related to Husband's late payment of the value of her interest in the CDs should be dismissed because she failed to prove she suffered damages as a result of the late payment. Finally, because Wife prevailed on two of her civil contempt claims, the trial court awarded her attorney fees in the amount of $3,100.
Wife timely appealed and presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the parties agreed in the MDA that the alimony award would be modifiable, (2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that Wife failed to rebut the presumption in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C) that she received support from or provided support to Dr. Pinyard and that she no longer needed the amount of alimony previously awarded, (3) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the contempt charge against Husband for his failure to pay her the value of her interest in the CDs as provided in the MDA, and (4) whether the trial court erred in not awarding her a greater portion of her attorney fees incurred at trial. Both parties seek an award of their attorney fees incurred on appeal.
In non-jury cases, we review the trial court's findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P . 13(d) ; Turner v. Turner , 473 S.W.3d 257, 269 (Tenn. 2015). We review a trial court's conclusions on issues of law de novo without a presumption of correctness. First Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A. , 489 S.W.3d 369, 382 (Tenn. 2015).
Most of the issues Wife raises concern the trial court's decision to suspend the transitional alimony awarded to her in the MDA. Because modification decisions are " ‘factually driven and call[ ] for a careful balancing of numerous factors,’ " trial courts are given " ‘wide latitude’ " when deciding to increase or decrease spousal support. Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Cranford v. Cranford , 772 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) ); see also Winne v. Winne , No. E2018-01050-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 5606928, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2019). When reviewing a trial court's modification decision, we are disinclined to second-guess the trial court or to substitute the trial court's judgment with our own. Winne , 2019 WL 5606928, at *2 (citing Gonsewski v. Gonsewski , 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011) ). Indeed, "[w]e presume that the trial court's decision is correct and review the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision." Id. (citing Gonsewski , 350 S.W.3d at 105-06 ). We will not reverse the trial court's modification decision absent an abuse of discretion. Wiser v. Wiser , 339 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court "applie[s] incorrect legal standards, reache[s] an illogical conclusion, base[s] its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party." Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp....
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