Strickland v. Strickland, 85-1895

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: STONE
• Citation: Strickland v. Strickland, 494 So.2d 514, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1986 (Fla. App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 17 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1895,85-1895
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1986 Kathleen W. STRICKLAND, Appellant, v. Aubrey Eugene STRICKLAND, Appellee.

Page 514

494 So.2d 514

11 Fla. L. Weekly 1986

Kathleen W. STRICKLAND, Appellant, v. Aubrey Eugene STRICKLAND, Appellee.

No. 85-1895.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Sept. 17, 1986.

Philip M. Berman, Pompano Beach, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

STONE, Judge.

The wife appeals an award of a special equity in each of two properties to the husband. There are two issues:

1. As to the first property: May the husband acquire a special equity in jointly-owned property simply by virtue of the physical labor he contributed in the construction of their home?

2. As to the second property: May the husband acquire a special equity in jointly-owned property by virtue of an apparent finding (although not specified in the judgment) that his two brothers each contributed one-third toward the purchase price, although title was taken solely in the name of appellant and appellee?

The parties were married for fourteen years. Both were employed throughout the marriage. There are no children or other assets. The parties are persons of modest means. Each has been responsible at various times during the marriage for lump sum payments into their joint account. On one occasion the husband deposited in the account a $10,000 termination payment from his employer. The wife inherited $20,000, which was paid into the joint account, as were the proceeds from the sale of an earlier house which had been purchased with a $10,000 loan from her father (which was forgiven at his death).

A portion of the funds from their joint account went into the purchase and financing of the lot in Loxahatchee, (the first property), upon which their home was ultimately constructed over a period of many years. The husband contributed a substantial amount of physical labor to the construction of that home.

Joint funds, or funds earned during the marriage, constituted at least part of the down payment on the St. Cloud parcel--the second property. The husband alleged that the wife's name was on the St. Cloud property only for convenience and financing purposes, and that the property was in fact purchased for the benefit of himself and his two brothers. The husband claimed that the mortgage payments on that property had been made by his brothers, who are not parties to this action.

There is no equitable distribution or alimony involved in this judgment, and none was sought. There are no significant findings of fact as to the marital home other than that the husband had proved his claim for a $20,000 special equity, and none at all with respect to the St. Cloud property. The trial court simply found and ordered that the husband had a special equity in the jointly owned Loxahatchee home, which was to be sold, and the court further directed that the wife convey all of her right, title and interest in and to the St. Cloud property to the husband.

The husband's special equity claim to the home is not based on any financial contribution from separate funds. His claim to a special equity in the St. Cloud property is apparently based on the premise that his brothers' contributions are the equivalent of his separate funds.

With respect to the first property, we have considered the following cases and conclude that there is no reason to distinguish labor from income when determining whether a special equity exists in property held as a tenancy by the entirety. Physical labor performed by one spouse on jointly owned property should not be considered to be from a source unconnected with the marriage.

In Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla.1976), the basic principle was recognized that a spouse has a special equity in marital property when he or she provides the funding for its acquisition from a source unconnected with the marriage.

In Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla.1980), the trial court found that the husband had a special equity by virtue of his participation in the construction of a residence. The supreme court denied any special equity to the husband, saying:

[W]e must reject the finding that the efforts of the husband in constructing the improvements on the Alabama property constituted a "special equity".

Id. at 951.

In Duncan, the supreme court treated that property as any other property accumulated with marital assets and said:

A special equity in property held as tenants by the entirety will not arise when the property is acquired from funds generated by a working spouse while the other spouse performed normal...