Strickland v. Temple
Decision Date | 01 September 2021 |
Docket Number | 2021-UP-311,Appellate Case 2015-002048 |
Parties | Charles E. Strickland, III, Latisha D. Strickland and Justin R. Dillon, Appellants, v. Marjorie E. Temple, Respondent. |
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted September 12, 2019
Appeal From Lexington County James O. Spence, Master-in-Equity
Frederick Ivey Hall, III, of The Rick Hall Law Firm, LLC, of Lexington, for Appellants.
Rolland E. Greenburg, III, of Rolland E. Greenburg, III, PA and Spencer Andrew Syrett, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
Charles E. Strickland, Latisha D. Strickland and Justin R. Dillon (collectively, Appellants) appeal the master-in-equity's denial of their requests for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) and attorney's fees as provided for in an installment land contract (the Contract) with Marjorie Temple. We reverse and remand.
1. Temple argues Appellants' Rule 11 motion was not timely. We disagree. See Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Est. of Thompson, 424 S.C. 520, 531-33, 818 S.E.2d 758, 764-65 (2018) ( ). Here after the circuit court granted summary judgment on the counterclaims, the case was referred to the master, who then had jurisdiction over remaining matters, which included the Rule 11 motion. Although Appellants waited almost a year after the circuit court ruled on their motion for summary judgment to file the Rule 11 motion, the action was still being decided on the merits. Accordingly, we hold the master correctly ruled that Appellants' motion was timely.
2. Appellants argue the master erred in denying their motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. We agree. "Under Rule 11(a), SCRCP, a party and/or the party's attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments." Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50; see Rule 11(a), SCRCP ( ). "A trial court may impose sanctions . . . for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper to cause delay or when no good grounds exist to support the filing." Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc., 393 S.C. 590, 597, 713 S.E.2d 624, 627-28 (2011) (emphasis added). "While Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety." Id. at 598, 713 S.E.2d at 628 (footnote omitted).
We find the master erred in focusing on whether there were any unreasonable delays in the case rather than whether sufficient grounds existed to support Temple's filing. We hold Temple's assertion of defenses and counterclaims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act[1] (SCUTPA) were frivolous.[2] The elements of fraud are as follows:
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the hearer's consequent and proximate injury.
Ardis v. Cox, 314 S.C. 512, 515, 431 S.E.2d 267, 269 (Ct. App. 1993).
The elements of negligent misrepresentation are as follows:
(1) the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant had a pecuniary interest in making the statement; (3) the defendant owed a duty of care to see that he communicated truthful information to the plaintiff; (4) the defendant breached that duty by failing to exercise due care; (5) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (6) the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss as the proximate result of his reliance on the representation.
Quail Hill, LLC v. County of Richland, 387 S.C. 223, 240, 692 S.E.2d 499, 508 (2010) (quoting West v. Gladney, 341 S.C. 127, 134, 533 S.E.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 2000)).
Finally, the elements for an action for violation of the SCUTPA are as follows: "(1) the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce; (2) the unfair or deceptive act affected public interest; and (3) the plaintiff suffered monetary or property loss as a result of the defendant's unfair or deceptive act(s)." Turner v. Kellett, 426 S.C. 42, 48, 824 S.E.2d 466, 469 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 23, 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006)).
In support of these claims, Temple alleged Appellants failed to disclose that (1) a dam was on the property, (2) the association that was supposed to maintain the dam was defunct, and (3) a significant portion of the property was in a flood zone or protected wetlands. Although Appellants stated the property was not in the flood zone in the Residential Property Condition Disclosure, they provided Temple with documents disclosing the true condition of the property. The Contract mentioned the pond and the dam on the property. The plat of the property referred to in the Contract also showed the pond, the dam, and the 100-year flood line. Temple acknowledged she had read the Contract, received a copy of the plat, and provided the plat to her attorneys. In addition, Temple viewed the property herself. Therefore, any reasonable attorney should have known that Temple's claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the SCUTPA lacked merit because she had the means to discern the truth of the matter. See Quail Hill, 387 S.C. at 240, 692 S.E.2d at 508 ; see also Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc., 393 S.C. at 598, 713 S.E.2d at 628 ( ).
We find the master erred in accepting Temple's argument that her attorneys' failure to raise possible defenses and counterclaims could constitute legal malpractice. In an action for legal malpractice, "the plaintiff must show he or she 'most probably would have been successful in the underlying suit if the attorney had not committed the alleged malpractice.'" Doe v. Howe, 367 S.C. 432, 442, 626 S.E.2d 25, 30 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36, 42, 492 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1997)). A failure by Temple's attorneys to raise these claims could not have supported a legal malpractice action because Temple would not have been able to prove she would have been successful in the underlying suit as the claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the SCUTPA were without merit. Temple's attorneys could have represented her zealously without asserting completely meritless claims. Therefore, fear of malpractice does not justify such frivolous filings. In addition, Temple's success at procuring a settlement from her realtors does not justify her assertion of meritless claims against Appellants as the duties owed are different.
Accordingly, we reverse the master's denial of sanctions and remand the issue for a determination of the amount of sanctions.
3. We agree with Appellants' argument that the trial court erred in failing to award them attorney's fees pursuant to the Contract. An "installment land contract is 'frequently called a "poor man's mortgage."'" Lewis v. Premium Inv Corp., 351 S.C. 167, 171, 568 S.E.2d 361, 363 (2002) (quoting Ellis v. Butterfield, 570 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Idaho 1977)). As with a mortgage, the vendor in an installment land contract "finances the purchaser's acquisition of the property by accepting installment payments on the purchase price over a period of years, but the purchaser does not receive the benefit of those remedial statutes protecting the rights of mortgagors." Id. "Contrary to existing mortgage protections, a seller may typically avoid foreclosure procedures by including a forfeiture remedy in the installment land contract." Id. "When enforced, these clauses enable the vendor to terminate the contract, recover the property, and retain all installments paid when the purchaser defaults." Id. However, "a provision in an installment land contract declaring forfeiture in...
To continue reading
Request your trial