Strickland v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 30 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. A92A0367,A92A0367
• Citation: Strickland v. Wilson, 205 Ga.App. 91, 421 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. App. 1992)
• Parties: STRICKLAND et al. v. WILSON et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 94

421 S.E.2d 94

205 Ga.App. 91

STRICKLAND et al. v. WILSON et al.

No. A92A0367.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 30, 1992.

Reconsideration Denied July 22, 1992.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 2, 1992.

Moffett & Henderson, John W. Henderson, Jr., Henry B. Sams, D. Kevin Wheeler, for appellants.

Walter J. Gordon, Joannna B. Hannah, Joe B. Sartain, Jr., David L. Hudgins, for appellees.

Bobby H. Wilson, pro se.

Walker, Hulbert, Gray & Byrd, Charles W. Byrd, amicus curiae.

BEASLEY, Judge.

Plaintiffs Strickland instituted this wrongful death action as a result of the death of their two-year-old son Ryan. He was killed when a vehicle which his mother was driving collided with a vehicle driven in the opposite direction and into Strickland's lane by Bobby Wilson. Ryan was a passenger in his mother's car.

Wilson did not have a valid driver's license and was operating his vehicle while intoxicated. He had a history of such. Approximately 90 days before the collision, Wilson was arrested for DUI and driving with a suspended license, and his car was impounded. Vaughn, Sheriff of Hart County, who was responsible for sequestering the car, released it to Gaines, a City of Hartwell police officer. Gaines in turn allowed Wilson to reacquire its possession.

The Stricklands sued Wilson; Gaines, individually and in his capacity as a City of Hartwell police officer; Vaughn, individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Hart County; the City of Hartwell; and Hart County. They sought damages against the individual defendants, as well as against the city and county under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Plaintiffs allege that Gaines and Vaughn were acting within the scope of their employment; both Gaines and Vaughn were aware of Wilson's driving record; Gaines, who was Wilson's friend, confidant, and creditor, persuaded Vaughn to release the car to him without proof that Wilson had insurance or a valid driver's license; Vaughn knew Wilson would regain possession of the car; Vaughn's release of the car to Gaines was negligent, grossly negligent, and done with conscious indifference to the consequences. Vaughn maintains that Gaines represented to him that Gaines was taking the car in settlement of a debt owed him by Wilson.

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order dismissing defendant Sheriff Vaughn, who has been sued in his official capacity, because of the Stricklands' failure to give him notice of their claim within 12 months of its accrual, pursuant to OCGA § 36-11-1. The trial court considered Hayes v. Med. Dept. of DeKalb County Jail, 197 Ga.App. 563, 398 S.E.2d 837 (1990), to be controlling, but it is not so because it was viewed as only presenting claims against the county.

OCGA § 36-11-1 provides that "[a]ll claims against counties must be presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same are barred." This relates to suits against the county itself. Commissioners of Roads, etc., of Houston County v. Howard, 59 Ga.App. 451, 1 S.E.2d 222 (1939). As to such, the county, and not its agents in their representative capacities, is the proper defendant. Stelling v. Richmond County, 81 Ga.App. 571, 579(4), 59 S.E.2d 414 (1950). Under the statute, the county is entitled to ante litem notice.

"The purpose of the law requiring claims to be presented within a year of their accrual is to afford the county an opportunity to investigate the claim and ascertain the evidence and to avoid the incurrence of unnecessary litigation. Davis v. Cobb County, 65 Ga.App. 533, 15 S.E.2d 814. It further serves a purpose in that, at the beginning of the year, county authorities generally estimate their budget requirements as a basis for the levying of taxes; they thereafter make commitments and pay out funds, and some method is needed for controlling the presentation of delayed claims which might be brought in subsequent years, with the result that suits would be brought and judgments obtained that could only be paid by diverting tax money levied for other purposes." Stelling, supra, 81 Ga.App. at 575(1), 59 S.E.2d 414.

The statutory requirement, being in derogation of the common law, is strictly construed. Cf. Hicks v. City of Atlanta, 154 Ga.App. 809, 810, 270 S.E.2d 58 (1980). Its underlying purpose is to protect the county's purse. By its terms the statute provides this protection only to the governmental entity and does not extend it also to the county's agents or employees who are sought to be held personally liable.

Instead, this case is somewhat analogous to Acker v. City of Elberton, 176 Ga.App. 580, 336 S.E.2d 842 (198...