Stringer v. Board of Trustees of Edward W. Sparrow Hospital

• Citation: 233 N.W.2d 698,62 Mich.App. 696
• Decision Date: 22 July 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 21478
• Parties: Christopher J. STRINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF EDWARD W. SPARROW HOSPITAL et al., Defendants-Appellees. 62 Mich.App. 696, 233 N.W.2d 698
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 698

233 N.W.2d 698

Christopher J. STRINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF EDWARD W. SPARROW HOSPITAL et al Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 21478.

62 Mich.App. 696, 233 N.W.2d 698

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

July 22, 1975.

Released for Publication Oct. 21, 1975.

[62 MICHAPP 697] Glassen, Rhead, McLean & Campbell by Roland F. Rhead, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard A. Kitch, Detroit, for Trustees.

Lester N. Turner, Lansing, for Smookler.

Lawrence L. Bullen, Jackson, for Silverman.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and J. H. GILLIS and MAHER, JJ.

MAHER, Judge.

Plaintiff, a medical doctor, had his staff privileges at Edward W. Sparrow Hospital revoked on February 5, 1964. During the summer of that year, upon plaintiff's demand, a hearing was held and the revocation affirmed. There is dispute between the parties as to whether it was a full and complete hearing. Almost 5 years later, on April 1, 1969, plaintiff filed his complaint against some of the present defendants seeking a return of hospital privileges and $500,000 in damages. By order on July 11, 1970, plaintiff was allowed to add others as party defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that members of the hospital's medical executive committee, acting out of personal ill will, conspired to bring about his suspension. The suspension, he claims, was unrelated to his competency as a practitioner, but instead was an arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory action [62 MICHAPP 698] by the committee. Plaintiff states in his complaint that this action was 'tantamount to revocation of his right to practice' and has resulted in damage to his reputation, earning capacity and family.

Defendant moved for accelerated judgment under GCR 1963, 116.1(5), asserting that plaintiff's action was barred under M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7), which sets the time limitations in which actions 'to recover damages for injuries to persons or property' may be brought. From the court's order granting the motion and dismissing his complaint, plaintiff appeals.

We must consider whether plaintiff's action is governed by the 3-year limitation of M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7), as the trial court ruled, or by the 6-year limitation of M.C.L.A. § 600.5813; M.S.A. § 27A.5813, as plaintiff contends. The respective provisions are:

'Sec. 5805. No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action within the periods of time prescribed by this section.

'(7) The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property.'

'Sec. 5813. All other personal actions shall be commenced within the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different period is stated in the statutes.'

Review of the statutes and the often conflicting case law on the limitation of actions in Michigan leads us to the conclusion that both the label [62 MICHAPP 699] placed upon the plaintiff's action and the type of interest that was allegedly injured are influential in determining the applicable period. For example, M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(1)--(6); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(1)--(6), governs enumerated torts, while M.C.L.A. § 600.5807(1)--(8); M.S.A. § 27A.5807(1)--(8), deals with various actions in contract. However, the cases evidence a willingness by our courts to look beyond procedural labels to see exactly what a party's complaint is before deciding whether it should be barred. See, State Mutual Cyclone Insurance Co. v. O & A Electric Coop., 381 Mich. 318, 324, 161 N.W.2d 573, 576 (1968), ('it makes no difference what form of action the plaintiff institutes in seeking recovery for damages to property or person * * *'), Baatz v. Smith, 361 Mich. 68, 104 N.W.2d 787 (1960). As this Court stated in Fries v. Holland Hitch Co., 12 Mich.App. 178, 183, 162 N.W.2d 672, 675 (1968):

'Although the above-quoted statutory provisions (M.C.L.A. § 600.5805; M.S.A. § 27A.5805 and M.C.L.A. § 600.5807; M.S.A. § 27A.5807) are generally thought of as 'tort' and 'contract' provisions respectively, the provisions are not applied through any sence of magical language found in the pleadings.'

Plaintiff would have us read M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7) to limit to 3 years from their accrual, only those actions that allege Physical injury to persons or property. Actions for injury to other interests, even if characterized as actions in tort, would be outside the scope of the provision. In support of this reading, he refers to language in Case v. Goren, 43 Mich.App. 673, 680, 204 N.W.2d 767, 770 (1972), where this Court implied that M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7), was limited to injuries involving 'visible, tangible, or physical damage[62 MICHAPP 700] in the classic tort sense'. In addition, plaintiff cites the Tennessee case of Rheudasil v. Clower, 197 Tenn. 27, 270 N.W.2d 345 (1954), where the phrase 'injuries to the person', contained in the Tennessee statute of limitations, was construed to mean only physical injuries.

We are unwilling to adopt such a limited interpretation of 'injuries to persons or property'. Case v. Goren, supra, involved a claim of fraud, and followed a long line of Michigan cases applying a 6-year limitation to injuries to future financial explectations brought about by fraud. Certainly it did not hold that only physical injuries come under the 3-year limitation. Furthermore, the Tennessee decision, upon which plaintiff relies, has been expressly repudiated insofar as it limited 'injuries to the person' to physical injuries. In Brown v. Dunstan, 219 Tenn. 291, 409 S.W.2d 365 (1966), the court found injuries not dissimilar to those plaintiff complains of to be 'injuries to the person'.

Since no reported Michigan decision has considered whether injuries of the type plaintiff alleges, caused by the conduct he claims occurred, come within the meaning of 'injuries to persons or property', we think it proper to turn to decisions of other jurisdictions for aid. Brown v. Dunstan, supra, indicates that plaintiff's injury is one 'to persons or property'. In Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 98 R.I. 14, 199 A.2d 606, 10 A.L.R.3d 525 (1964) the court devoted extensive discussion to defining 'injuries to the person' contained in the Rhode Island statute governing limitations of action. We find the following language to be most helpful:

'It is then our conclusion that the phrase 'injuries to the person' as used in the instant statute is to be [62 MICHAPP 701] construed comprehensively and as contemplating its application to actions involving injuries that are other than physical. Its purpose is to include within that period of limitation actions brought for injuries resulting from invasions of rights that inhere in man as a...