Stringer v. Board of County Com'rs of Big Horn County, No. F-54

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
• Writing for the Court: PARKER
• Citation: 347 P.2d 197
• Docket Number: No. 2879,No. F-54
• Decision Date: 08 December 1959
• Parties: E. M. STRINGER and E. G. Markley, in the Matter of Their Claim for Damages Sustained by Reason of Establishment of a Highway, Known as Project(3), Big Horn County, Wyoming, Appellants (Petitioners below), v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BIG HORN COUNTY, Wyoming, Appellee (Respondent below).

Page 197

347 P.2d 197 E. M. STRINGER and E. G. Markley, in the Matter of Their Claim for Damages Sustained by Reason of Establishment of a Highway, Known as Project No. F-54(3), Big Horn County, Wyoming, Appellants (Petitioners below),
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BIG HORN COUNTY, Wyoming, Appellee (Respondent below). No. 2879. Supreme Court of Wyoming. Dec. 8, 1959.

Page 198

Walter B. Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellants.

John O. Callahan, County and Prosecuting Atty., Big Horn County, Basin, and Robert L. Duncan, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNSBERGER, JJ.

Page 199

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the court.

In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Stringer, 77 Wyo. 198, 310 P.2d 730, 734, we held that Stringer and Markley, who had certain oil rights in property taken by eminent domain for a highway right of way, had not received 'Notice of Location of Road' as provided by law and were therefore entitled to file claim for damages and for a determination of same. In accordance therewith, Stringer and Markley ¹ filed a claim under § 48-315, W.C.S.1945, now § 24-53, W.S.1957, and related sections. The appraisers appointed to view the premises disallowed the claim. The board of county commissioners ² approved the report of the appraisers, and plaintiffs appealed to the district court where the matter was tried to a jury under a stipulation that the sole issue was that of the damage, if any, sustained by the plaintiffs. It was also stipulated that a temporary (later permanent) injunction had prohibited the use by plaintiffs of tools on Krueger No. 2 well; that the instruments of plaintiffs' title be admitted, viz., a lease of the oil and gas rights on the Krueger land, for as long as the same were produced, and a sale of the oil wells located thereon; and that plaintiffs' oil well, Krueger No. 2, was located not less than 1.2 and not more than 1.33 feet within the defendant's right of way. ³ The jury returned a verdict generally in favor of defendant and against plaintiffs, and the court entered a judgment decreeing that plaintiffs take nothing.

Plaintiffs have based their appeal on the alleged error in:

(1) The court's refusing to give Instruction 5A and in giving Instructions 7 and 14.

(2) The court's rejecting plaintiffs' offer of proof with reference to erection of a refinery to consume oil produced in the area of the lease.

(3) The court's refusal of the offer to prove the replacement cost of the well.

(4) The jury's manifest failure to follow the court's instructions.

(5) The jury's rendering of a verdict contrary to and unsupported by the law or the evidence.

I

The crucial part of Instruction 5A proffered by plaintiffs was the statement:

'* * * the measure of damages to be awarded * * * if any, is the market value of their property, namely the oil well * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

No authority is cited to justify the singling out of a portion of the property, the oil well, without reference to plaintiffs' entire property, the leasehold and wells. Defendant insists that the damage, if any, suffered by plaintiffs was the difference in the market value of their entire property before and after the taking. It relies upon Gillespie v. Board of Com'rs of Albany County, 47 Wyo. 1, 30 P.2d 797, 803, which, in passing upon the measure of damages to a person whose property was taken for a highway under the statute in question, said:

'* * * The jury were correctly instructed that the measure of damage, if any, was the difference between the market value of the ranch immediately prior to the establishment of the road and the value thereof immediately after such establishment. * * *'

Generally speaking, this rule is in accord with many of the leading authorities on eminent domain. 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3d ed., § 12.2; 1 Orgel on Valuation under Eminent Domain, 2d ed., § 17; 18 Am.Jur. Eminent Domain § 242; 29 C.J.S.

Page 200

Eminent Domain § 136. We think, however, that no more weight should be given to the statement in the Gillespie case than the facts therein warranted. There the amount of damages for the lands actually taken had already been determined prior to the trial in the district court, and thus the only issue was the dispute as to the damage to the lands not taken. Accordingly, the defendant here has sought to unduly enlarge the holding in that case. Moreover, we must bear in mind all statutes which the legislature has enacted to accomplish the taking of private property for highway purposes. Section 48-303, W.C.S.1945, now § 24-3, W.S.1957, and related statutes, under which the present action is brought, allow the county to take the property for the highway department and establish procedures governing same, while § 48-105, W.C.S.1945, now § 24-37, W.S.1957, allows the highway department to take the property under the procedure applicable to that permitting eminent domain by railroads (§ 3-6101 ff., W.C.S.1945, now § 1-754 ff., W.S.1957). Section 3-6123, W.C.S.1945, now § 1-776, W.S.1957, specifically requires that the certificate of the commissioners or the verdict of the jury, as the case may be, contain the following items:

'First--An accurate description of the land taken;

'Second--The value of the land or property actually taken;

'Third--The damages, if any, to the land affected, but not taken, after deducting therefrom the value of the real benefits or advantages which may accrue to such land from the construction of said railroad.'

It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a given law all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose shall be read in connection with it as constituting one law. They must be construed in...