Stringer v. Jones
| Decision Date | 27 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:13cv645/LAC/EMT |
| Parties | RAYMONE STRINGER, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This cause is before the court on Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1). Respondent filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (doc. 24). Petitioner filed a reply (doc. 27).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by Petitioner, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a). It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see doc. 24).1 Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County, Florida, Case No. 2008-CF-1469, with one count of trafficking in phenethylamines, specifically, Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA") (10 grams or more, less than 200 grams) (Count 1), one count of trafficking in amphetamine or methamphetamine (200 grams or more) (Count 2), and one countof felony failure to appear (Count 3) (Ex. B). The State filed a nolle prosequi on the failure to appear charge (see Ex. G). A jury found Petitioner guilty of both drug trafficking charges as charged in an amended information (Exs. B, F). The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years in prison on Count 2, and a concurrent mandatory minimum term of three years in prison on Count 1, with presentence jail credit of 263 days (Ex. G). Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA"), Case No. 1D09-6574 (Exs. H, I). On February 15, 2011, the First DCA affirmed the judgment per curiam without written opinion (Ex. K). Stringer v. State, 53 So. 3d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Table). The mandate issued March 3, 2011 (Ex. L).
On November 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. M). The state circuit court struck the motion as facially insufficient with leave to amend (Ex. N). Petitioner filed an amended motion (Ex. O). The court held a limited evidentiary hearing on one of Petitioner's claims (Ex. S). Petitioner was represented by counsel at the hearing (see id.). The court denied the amended Rule 3.850 motion in an order rendered November 29, 2012 (Ex. T). Petitioner, proceeding pro se, appealed the decision to the First DCA, Case No. 1D13-0037 (Ex. U). The First DCA affirmed the decision per curiam without written opinion on December 3, 2013, with the mandate issuing December 31, 2013 (Exs. W, X). Stringer v. State, 127 So. 3d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Table).
On April 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First DCA, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Case No. 1D13-1614 (Ex. Y). The court denied the petition as untimely on May 1, 2013 (Ex. AA). Stringer v. State, 112 So. 3d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Mem).
Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action on December 23, 2013 (doc. 1).
Section 2254(a) of Title 28 provides that "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" upon a showing that his custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. As the instant petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is subject to the more deferential standard for habeas review of state court decisions under § 2254 as brought about by the Anti-Terrorism and EffectiveDeath Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub.L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. In relevant part, section 2254(d) now provides:
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (2002).
The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).2 The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied—the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2119-20, 147 L. Ed. 2d 125 (2000). In employing this test, the Supreme Court has instructedthat on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a formal State court proceeding, the federal court should first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" if Supreme Court precedent at the time "would have compelled a particular result in the case." Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 923 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 813, 835 (11th Cir. 2001).
Next, the court must determine whether the State court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law, either because "'the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or because 'the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] [Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). The Supreme Court has clarified that "[a]voiding these pitfalls does not require citation to our cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 365, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). If the State court decision is found in either respect to be contrary, the district court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. Moreover, where there is no Supreme Court precedent on point, the state court's conclusion cannot be contrary to clearly established federal law. See Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 890 n. 15 (11th Cir. 2003).
If on the other hand, the State court applied the correct Supreme Court precedent and the facts of the Supreme Court cases and the petitioner's case are not materially indistinguishable, the court must go to the third step and determine whether the State court "unreasonably applied" the governing legal principles set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The standard for an unreasonable application inquiry is "whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. Whether a State court's decision was an unreasonable application of a legal principle must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 2737-38, 159 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2004) (per curiam); cf.Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 n.4, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 n.4, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002) (). An objectively unreasonable application of federal law occurs when the State court "identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case" or "unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). ...
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