Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-SC-0262-DG.,2001-SC-0262-DG. |
| Citation | 151 S.W.3d 781 |
| Parties | Virginia STRINGER, Reual E. Angel, Donnie H. Brummett, and Tina M. Sparks Appellants, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., and Anthony Whitaker Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
In June and July, 1995, Appellants, who were employees of a Monticello, Kentucky Wal-Mart, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") store, were terminated for "unauthorized removal of company property" and "violation of company policy" — specifically, for eating "claims candy," i.e., candy from open or torn bags removed from the store's shelves that had been taken to the store's "claims area" to be processed by a claims clerk and then either discarded or returned. Appellants filed suit against Wal-Mart and their supervisor, Appellee Anthony Whitaker ("Whitaker") contending that, before, during, and after their termination, Wal-Mart committed the tortious acts of (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)/outrage, by engaging in illegal surveillance of Appellants and conducting accusatory termination interviews; (2) defamation, through written and oral accusations to, and in the presence of, third parties to the effect that Appellants had been discharged for theft; and (3) an invasion of Appellant's privacy through violations of the provisions of KRS Chapter 526, which criminalizes conduct relating to eavesdropping.
A jury returned a verdict in Appellants' favor on each of their claims. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the Wayne Circuit Court entered judgment awarding each Appellant $2,000,000.00 in compensatory damages — $1,000,000.00 for "injury to reputation" and $1,000,000.00 for "embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish" — and $3,000,000.00 in punitive damages. Appellant Virginia Stringer ("Stringer") was awarded an additional $20,000.00 for her lost wages.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict in Appellees' favor as to each of Appellants' claims and reversed the trial court's judgment in its entirety. We granted discretionary review and now affirm the Court of Appeals's holding with respect to the IIED/outrage claim and the invasion-of-privacy/eavesdropping claim, but reverse its holding as to Appellants' claim for defamation because the evidence at trial was sufficient to submit that claim to the jury. Because the jury's compensatory and punitive damages verdicts do not segregate the damages awarded for each claim, we vacate the previous damage awards and remand the case for the trial court to conduct a retrial solely to determine appropriate damages for Appellants' defamation claim.
Appellate review of a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict is limited to a determination of whether the jury's verdict was palpably or flagrantly contrary to the evidence presented at trial:
Upon review of the evidence supporting a judgment entered upon a jury verdict, the role of an appellate court is limited to determining whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for directed verdict. All evidence which favors the prevailing party must be taken as true and the reviewing court is not at liberty to determine credibility or the weight which should be given to the evidence, these being functions reserved to the trier of fact. The prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Upon completion of such an evidentiary review, the appellate court must determine whether the verdict rendered is "`palpably or flagrantly' against the evidence so as `to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice.'" If the reviewing court concludes that such is the case, it is at liberty to reverse the judgment on the grounds that the trial court erred in failing to [grant] the motion for directed verdict. Otherwise, the judgment must be affirmed.1
Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to each of Appellant's three (3) claims under this standard.
Count I of Appellants' complaint stated a claim for IIED/outrage. Paragraphs 1-17 detailed Appellants'"conspiracy theory," i.e., Appellants' claim that store policy actually permitted the consumption of claims candy and that the store's manager, Whitaker, installed the video equipment in order to fabricate a pretense for terminating Appellants when his actual motive was to prevent his own demotion by reducing payroll expenses and demonstrating a "get tough on inventory shrinkage" stance. The remainder of Count I alleged:
18. That at the time of the discharge of the plaintiffs, they were told that they could not leave the store after having worked the entire night. The[y] were brought in one at a time and were abruptly told by Anthony Whitaker and Lee Scholenberger that they were being fired for "stealing" and that they had videotaped them. The plaintiff, Donnie H. Brummett, was told to make it easy on himself and admit to stealing stereos and electric razors. The plaintiff, Virginia Stringer, was questioned about missing items in the claims area such as fishing rods. The plaintiffs, during their discharge, were treated by the defendants and their representative as criminals (thieves). In fact, the plaintiff, Donnie H. Brummett, was told that if he did not sue them they would not press criminal charges.
19. That the actions of the defendant, Anthony Whitaker, with the acquiescence and approval of the defendant, Wal Mart, were malicious, outrageous, intentional, and/or such a wanton course of conduct such [sic] it was their intent to cause the plaintiffs sever[e] emotional distress, or that their conduct was such that the defendants, knew, or should have known, that their conduct would cause or be likely to cause severe emotional distress.
20. That each of the plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional distress, consisting of fright, shame, humiliation, apprehension, and anxiety, as the direct and proximate result of the defendant's aforementioned conduct and are entitled to recover from the defendants, jointly and severally, both compensatory and punitive damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court.
At trial, however, Appellants argued that Appellees' outrageous conduct consisted of more than the set-up, surveillance, and accusatory exit interviews. And, on appeal, Appellants advocate that the jury's verdict was supported by evidence demonstrating that Appellees: (1) escorted three of the four Appellants out of the store following their termination; (2) implied to other employees that Appellants were thieves (an assertion that is facially duplicative of Appellants' defamation claim); (3) attempted to deny Appellants their unemployment benefits; and (4) used the surveillance tape to train employees.
In Craft v. Rice,2 this Court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1), which provides:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.3
A prima facie case of IIED/outrage requires that:
1) the wrongdoer's conduct must be intentional or reckless;
2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality;
3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongdoer's conduct and the emotional distress; and
4) the emotional distress must be severe.4
In opinions interpreting the scope of this cause of action, which has been likened to a criminal action for harassment,5 Kentucky appellate courts have observed that "not every upset plaintiff can recover for emotional distress"6 and that "not every bad act gives rise to a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress[.]"7 Of course, it is "the conduct of the offender rather than the subject of the conduct [that] determines whether the conduct was outrageous."8 Because "[i]t is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery,"9 Kentucky courts have turned to the commentary to § 46 for guidance in assessing whether conduct is actionably extreme and outrageous:
Extreme and outrageous conduct. The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other...
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