Stringfellow v. Cain

• Decision Date: 01 October 1878
• Citation: 25 L.Ed. 421,99 U.S. 610
• Parties: STRINGFELLOW v. CAIN
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

99 U.S. 610

25 L.Ed. 421

STRINGFELLOW v. CAIN.

October Term, 1878

ERROR to and appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. George W. Biddle and Mr. J. L. Rawlins for Stringfellow.

Mr. Robert N. Baskin, contra.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

By the act of Congress 'concerning the practice in territorial courts and appeals therefrom,' approved April 7, 1874 (18 Stat. pt. 3, p. 27), the appellate jurisdiction of this court over the judgments and decrees of the territorial courts in cases of trial by jury is to be exercised by a writ of error, and in all other cases by appeal. It follows that the appeal in this case was properly taken, and that the writ of error must be dismissed.

An important question arising under that part of the Civil Practice Act of Utah which relates to appeals in a civil action from the District Court to the Supreme Court of the Territory has been elaborately discussed in the argument, but in the view we take of the case it need not be decided. This is a special statutory proceeding, instituted in a Probate Court to settle disputes between claimants as to their respective rights under the trust created through the purchase, by the mayor of Salt Lake City, of the lands on which the city stands, pursuant to the authority for that purpose granted by the act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 541), 'for the relief of the inhabitants of cities and towns upon the public lands,' and the several acts amendatory thereof. The territorial statute under which this trust is to be carried into execution (Comp. Laws Utah, 1876, 379) requires parties interested to sign a statement in writing containing the particulars of their claim, and deliver it to the clerk of the Probate Court of the county. If there are conflicting claimants, it is made the duty of the probate judge to call them before him, 'and proceed to hear the proof adduced and the allegations of the parties, and decide according to the justice of the case.' The statements filed stand in the place of pleadings. The court is required to cause full minutes of the testimony to be kept, which must be preserved with the papers, and entered on the record with the decision at length. If either party is aggrieved by the decision, he may appeal to the District Court, as in other cases, and upon the perfection of an appeal the Probate Court must 'cause the testimony and written proofs adduced, together with the statements of the parties and the judgment of the court, to be certified to the District Court, to be there tried anew, without pleadings, except as above provided.'

This case was heard in the District Court on the record certified up in accordance with these requirements, and in giving its decision the court stated its findings of fact and conclusions of law separately. In this it followed the rule prescribed by the Civil Practice Act of Utah, on a trial by the court of an issue of fact in a civil action. After the decision had been made, the present appellees moved for a new trial, on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to support the findings. This motion was denied, and appeals were thereupon taken to the territorial Supreme Court, both from the judgment and the order refusing a new trial. Such appeals are allowed by the Practice Act. When an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court of the Territory, the law requires a statement to be settled and signed by the judge who heard the cause, which shall set forth 'specifically the particular errors or grounds' relied on, 'and contain so much of the evidence as may be necessary to explain the particular errors or grounds specified, and no more.' This statement is annexed to the copy of the judgment roll or order appealed from and furnished to the Supreme Court. Comp. Laws Utah, 1876, 493, 494.

The statement settled and signed in this case, annexed to the copy of the order refusing a new trial appealed from, contained all the 'testimony, written proofs, and statements of the parties' certified up from the Probate Court, and upon which the trial was had; and it was stipulated that the statement on the appeal from this order might be used, so far as applicable, on the appeal from the judgment. Thus, the proceeding was made to conform to the regulations of the Practice Act in reference to appeals in civil actions, and the court was called upon to decide whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the findings of fact, and, if it was, whether the facts as found would support the judgment. In short, the Supreme Court of the Territory was called upon to determine whether, according to the justice of the case as shown by the record, the judgment of the District Court was right.

The act of April 7, 1874 (supra), provides that on appeals to this court from the territorial courts, in cases where there has been no trial by jury, instead of the evidence at large, a statement of the facts of the case in the nature of a special verdict, and also the rulings of the court on the admission or rejection of evidence when excepted to, shall be made and certified by the court below, and transmitted to this court with the transcript of the proceedings and judgment or decree. Under this act, if the findings of the District Court are sustained by the Supreme Court, and a general judgment of affirmance rendered, the findings of the District Court, thus approved by the Supreme Court, will furnish a sufficient 'statement of the facts of the case' for the purposes of an appeal to this court. The same will be true if there is a reversal, for the reason that the facts as found are not sufficient to support the judgment. But if, as in this case, the judgment is reversed because the evidence does not sustain the findings, other findings must be made before the case can be put in a condition for hearing in this court on appeal. Without undertaking to decide what would be the proper practice in an ordinary civil action when a judgment is reversed because a new trial was refused in the District Court, we are clearly of the opinion that in a suit like this, where all the evidence is before the Supreme Court that could be considered by the District Court if the case should be sent back, it is proper for the Supreme Court itself to state the facts established by the evidence and render the judgment which ought to have been rendered by the District Court. To remand the case for a new trial would be in substance only to direct the District Court to state the facts as found by the Supreme Court and adjudge accordingly. This would make another appeal to the Supreme Court necessary in order to put the case in a situation for a review in this court, the probabilities being that on such an appeal the Supreme Court would be called upon to do no more than affirm its former judgment. There is no statute of the Territory which in express terms creates the necessity for such a circuity of action, and we do not think the Practice Act, when fairly interpreted, requires it. Upon a new trial no new testimony could be introduced. The District Court could do no more than find the facts which, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, should have been found before, and the judgment which should follow from those facts may just as well be settled by the Supreme Court on the first appeal as on a second. We conclude, therefore, that the case is properly here for decision upon the facts stated by the Supreme Court, and this brings us to the inquiry whether, upon these facts, the judgment appealed from was right.

The act of March 2, 1867 (supra), provides that the 'land so settled and occupied' for a town site may be entered at the land-office, 'in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof according to their respective interests,' and...