Stringham v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 17101.

Decision Date15 April 1949
Docket NumberDocket No. 17101.
Citation12 T.C. 580
PartiesL. KEEVER STRINGHAM, PETITIONER, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
CourtU.S. Tax Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Petitioner's five-year-old daughter, who had experienced various respiratory ailments throughout her infancy, early in November 1944 suffered an attack of bronchitis, bordering on pneumonia. Petitioner immediately sent his daughter, accompanied by her mother, to Arizona, where the child was enrolled in a private boarding school. One month later the mother returned home, leaving the child at the school, where she remained until the close of school the following May. Held, that the expense incurred in connection with the transportation to, and the maintenance of petitioner's infant daughter at, a boarding school in Arizona, exclusive of expenses attributable to her education, is deductible as expense for ‘medical care‘ under section 23(x) of the Internal Revenue Code, and that portion of the total expense representing medical expense is determined. K. V. Nicola, Esq., for the petitioner.

William R. Bagby, Esq., for the respondent.

This proceeding involves a deficiency of $731.23 in petitioner's income tax for the calendar year 1944.

The sole question involved is whether the Commissioner was correct in disallowing as a deduction for medical expenses under section 23(x) of the Internal Revenue Code amounts expended by the petitioner for the transportation to and the cost of maintaining his infant daughter at a private boarding school in Arizona.

Petitioner concedes the correctness of the respondent's disallowance of a claim for taxes in the amount of $86.36 and concedes that he erred in claiming surtax exemption for his wife, who filed a separate return for the year 1944.

FINDINGS OF FACT.

The petitioner, L. Keever Stringham, is an individual, residing in Shaker Heights, Ohio. His individual income tax return for the calendar year 1944 was filed with the collector of internal revenue for the eighteenth district of Ohio.

Petitioner is the father of three children, John, Genevieve, and Susan, who were 7, 5, and 2 years of age, respectively, in 1944.

Genevieve contracted her first cold at the age of 2 months. At the age of 1 year she was hospitalized for 10 days with lobar pneumonia. It was also necessary to remove her adenoids at an early age. Throughout the first few years of her life she was regularly afflicted with colds and her general physical condition became steadily worse.

On January 19, 1944, she was again hospitalized for a period of 3 days for the purpose of making various tests to determine the cause of her poor health. As a result of this examination, her condition was diagnosed as chronic bronchitis and sinusitis, and the tests showed a positive tuberculin reaction. She also suffered from asthma and anemia.

Genevieve was immediately withdrawn from a nursery school in which she was enrolled, and for the rest of the winter efforts were made to build her up physically.

In the fall of 1944 her parents entered Genevieve in the kindergarten class of the Hathaway Brown School in Cleveland, Ohio. On or about November 2, 1944, her tuition for the entire first term was paid, which amounted to the sum of $137.50. A few days thereafter Genevieve again fell ill and her ailment was diagnosed as deep bronchitis bordering on pneumonia.

The possibility of putting the child in a better climate for the winter was discussed by the parents with the physician. Immediately thereafter the mother set out to determine a suitable climate to which the child could be sent. After considerable difficulty, in view of Genevieve's age and the fact that she was not tubercular, and after careful investigation, the parents decided to send her to the Arizona Sunshine School at Tucson, Arizona. Although the school ordinarily enrolled no children under the age of six, it agreed to enter Genevieve, as one other child her age who suffered from asthma had been entered and they felt they could thus provide a companion for the other child.

Due to wartime traveling conditions, only one lower berth could be obtained for the accommodation of the child and her mother. Upon their arrival in Chicago en route to Arizona, railroad officials, in view of the child's illness, arranged to secure a compartment for the remainder of the trip to Tucson. From Chicago to Tucson neither the child nor the mother left the compartment, due to the child's condition.

Genevieve and her mother arrived in Tucson, Arizona, on November 17, 1944. Her mother remained in Tucson for a month to assure herself that the child would make a satisfactory adjustment and be happy at school. No member of the family thereafter visited Genevieve during the remainder of that school year.

Genevieve remained at the Arizona Sunshine School until the end of the school year, and on May 30, 1945, she returned to Cleveland, where she spent the summer with her parents. In the fall of 1945 she returned to Arizona and attended the same school in the academic year 1945-1946.

Petitioner is an electrical engineer, and during 1944 he was employed by the Lincoln Electric Co., a Cleveland concern engaged in war work. Because of his position he was granted a deferment by his draft board. In 1944 he was 31 years of age and had been employed by the Lincoln Co. for approximately 15 years. Petitioner's wife is not and has never been employed outside of her own home.

The Arizona Sunshine School describes itself as ‘A Practical Outdoor School for Children of Particular Parents.‘ Its catalog states that ‘Since, of course, no child with any communicable disease can be accepted, in each case a health certificate from a physician is requested.‘ However, many of the boarding school children at this institution suffered from complaints similar to those of Genevieve.

Petitioner in his 1944 income tax return claimed a deduction for total medical expenses of $1,996.05. Of this amount, $1,381 was for tuition paid to the Arizona Sunshine School and $138.82 for the transportation of his daughter from Cleveland, Ohio, to Tucson, Arizona. These expenses were paid by petitioner in 1944.

In the deficiency notice respondent held that $1,519.82 of the total medical expenses incurred by petitioner in connection with sending his daughter to school in Arizona did not meet the requirements of section 23(x) of the Internal Revenue Code. Of this $1,519.82 which was disallowed by respondent, the amount of $988.82 constitutes expense incurred by petitioner for ‘medical care‘ within the meaning of section 23(x).

OPINION.

ARUNDELL, Judge:

The sole question raised by petitioner is whether he is entitled to deduct as expenses for medical care, under section 23(x) of the Internal Revenue Code, amounts expended by him in 1944 incident to the transportation of his infant daughter to, and the cost of her maintenance at, a private boarding school in Tucson, Arizona.

Section 23(x) permits the deduction from gross income of expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for the medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent to the extent that such expenses exceed 5 per cent of the adjusted gross income.

The maximum amount which may be deducted by a taxpayer is limited to $2,500 1 in the case of the head of a family or a husband and wife filing a joint return, and in all other cases the maximum is fixed at $1,250.

‘Medical care‘ is defined by section 23(x) as follows:

* * * The term ‘medical care,‘ as used in this subsection, shall include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance).

As the broad and comprehensive language of this section is susceptible to a variety of conflicting interpretations, we feel impelled, in order to determine the limits of its construction, to inquire into the Congressional intent which lay behind the enactment of this legislation.

Section 23(x) was originally introduced into the Internal Revenue Code as section 127(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942. Prior to that time Congress had never seen fit to extend the benefits of such a deduction and had long regarded such expenditures as ‘personal, living, or family expenses,‘ which were expressly not deductible by virtue of section 24(a).

The report of the Senate Finance Committee (S. Rept. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 6) expresses the fundamental purpose of section 23(x) as follows:

This allowance is recommended in consideration of the heavy tax burden that must be borne by individuals during the existing emergency and of the desirability of maintaining the present high level of public health and morale.

This statement, construed in conjunction with the broad definition of ‘medical care‘ included in section 23(x), would appear at first to seriously undercut the provisions of section 24(a). However, such a result was clearly not contemplated by Congress.

In its Report No. 1631, supra, p. 96, the Senate Finance Committee limited its definition of ‘medical care‘ by the following statement:

* * * It is not intended, however, that a deduction should be allowed for any expense that is not incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.

To show the relationship of section 23(x) to 24(a), section 127(b) of the Revenue Act of 1942 amended section 24(a) to read as follows:

(b) ITEMS NOT DEDUCTIBLE.— Section 24(a) (relating to items not deductible) is amended by striking paragraph 1 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

(1) Personal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary medical expenses deductible under section 23(x);.

Thus, Congress made it very clear that the benefit of the deduction it was creating for ‘medical expenses‘ was in no way to encompass items which were primarily personal living expenses....

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