Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co., No. 37562

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Writing for the Court: MATSON
• Citation: 255 Minn. 201,96 N.W.2d 195
• Parties: John J. STROBEL, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, and Merle R. Heilman, Respondents.
• Docket Number: No. 37562
• Decision Date: 17 April 1959

Page 195

96 N.W.2d 195 255 Minn. 201 John J. STROBEL, Appellant,
v.
CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, and Merle
R. Heilman, Respondents. No. 37562. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 17, 1959.

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Syllabus by the Court

[255 MINN 201] 1. Where a jury returns for an additional instruction on a principle of law covered by the court's original charge, such additional instruction, when challenged for alleged error, is not, as a general rule, to be considered separately but as an integral part of the original charge Unless the additional instruction was given in such a manner or under such circumstances as would reasonably lead the jury to infer that it wholly supplanted the corresponding portion of the original charge.

2. The definition of proximate cause as the 'dominant' or 'predominant' cause is erroneous not only in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act but also as applied to other negligence actions.

3. Prior decisions of this court, in so far as any of them give approval to the 'dominant' or 'predominant' test of negligence as a definition of proximate cause, are expressly overruled.

4. In the absence of a request, where the trial court's attention is not seasonably directed thereto, the failure of the trial court to define proximate cause in its charge is merely an inadvertent error by way of omission, but, in contrast thereto, where the trial court commits an affirmative error by erroneously defining proximate cause as the dominant cause, the error is one of fundamental law or controlling principle.

5. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act contributory negligence is not a bar to the recovery of damages Resulting in whole, or in part, from defendant's negligence and operates only for the limited purpose of effecting a proportionate diminution in the amount of damages.

[255 MINN 202] 6. Only when there might be a reasonable difference of opinion regarding the foreseeability of the intervening act should the question of intervening cause be submitted to the jury.

Eugene A. Rerat, Harry H. Peterson, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Sullivan, Stringer, Donnelly & Sharood, for respondent railroad. Harry S. Stearns, Jr., Stearns & Kampmeyer, St. Paul, for respondent Heilman.

Stuart W. Rider, Jr., Minneapolis, amicus curiae.

MATSON, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for both defendants.

[255 MINN 203] This personal injury action by plaintiff, a railroad employee, is brought against defendant Heilman, a motorist, on the theory of common-law negligence and against defendant railroad, Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.).

Defendant railroad, herein called the Rock Island, is engaged in interstate commerce

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and owns and maintains a doubledeck drawbridge spanning the Mississippi River near Inver Grove, Minnesota. Plaintiff, an employee of the Rock Island, while standing on a ladder repairing railroad signals located on the bottom side of the upper deck of the bridge, was injured when knocked from the ladder by a delivery truck driven by defendant Heilman.

The bridge has two decks, the upper deck being occupied by a single set of railroad tracks and the lower deck being leased to the Minnesota Highway Department for vehicular traffic. The bridge is about 1600 feet in length and has a clearance of approximately 12 feet between the upper and lower decks. The roadway on the lower deck is 18 feet wide.

The drawspan of the bridge is about 440 feet in length and, instead of being raised upward for the passage of river craft, swings on a center pivot. Located immediately underneath each of the four rail ends of the stationary part of the bridge is a signal control box which assures proper horizontal and vertical alignment of the rails. Each control operates in such a way that if the rail on the drawspan is out of vertical alignment with the rail on the stationary part of the bridge more than the maximum tolerance allowed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the railroad signals automatically flash 'stop' prohibiting any trains from crossing the bridge. Since the control boxes are located directly beneath the bridge's upper deck, any repairs necessary must be made from a ladder standing on the lower or motor vehicle deck of the bridge.

For 7 years plaintiff had been employed by Rock Island as a signal maintainer. On July 20, 1956, a bright and clear day, plaintiff was sent to the Inver Grove bridge to repair a defective control box. Using a 14-foot ladder, owned by the railroad and kept on the bridge for repair purposes, plaintiff placed the ladder in the westbound traffic lane 4 feet from the edge of the roadway. No flags, barricades, or other warning devices were placed around the ladder. While plaintiff was on the [255 MINN 204] ladder, defendant Heilman entered the bridge, driving west in a sedan delivery truck. At the time Heilman entered the bridge from the east, another vehicle was entering from the west and according to his testimony occupied most of Heilman's attention. Heilman hit plaintiff's ladder at a speed of approximately 15 miles per hour, knocking plaintiff to the roadway below whereby he injured both feet.

Upon special interrogatories which required special findings on the issues of negligence and proximate cause as to each defendant and as to contributory negligence and proximate cause as to the plaintiff, the jury returned a special verdict whereby it found that Rock Island was negligent but that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident; that defendant Heilman was not negligent; and that plaintiff was contributorily negligent.

The issues on this appeal are: (1) Whether, upon request of the jury for additional instructions, the court erroneously defined proximate cause in terms of the 'dominant cause'; (2) whether the issue of intervening cause was properly submitted to the jury; and (3) whether defendant Heilman was negligent as a matter of law.

1. In its initial charge to the jury the trial court correctly defined proximate cause. Subsequently, the jury informed the court that in passing on the issue of whether Rock Island's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, they differed as to the meaning of the word 'proximate.' The trial judge reminded the jurors that he had already given them the requisite definition. The foreman replied that they must have forgotten it. The court, after agreeing that they must have forgotten his initial definition, again defined proximate cause in the usual manner but amplified such definition by adding thereto the following sentence:

'It is the efficient cause, The dominate (sic) Cause, the One that necessarily

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sets in operation the factors to accomplish the injuries.' (Italics supplied.)

(It may be assumed that the word Dominate is an erroneous recording of the word 'dominant.') This amplified definition was reread to the jury and was given under circumstances which must reasonably have led the jurors to understand that it entirely supplanted any recollection they had of the definition in the court's initial charge. ¹ Where a jury [255 MINN 205] returns for an additional instruction on a principle of law covered by the court's original charge, such additional instruction, when challenged for alleged error, is not, as a general rule, to be considered separately but as an integral part of the original charge Unless the additional instruction was given in such a manner or under such circumstances as would reasonably lead the jury to infer that it wholly supplanted the corresponding portion of the original charge. ²

2--3. The instruction that a proximate cause is the Dominant cause was clearly erroneous since a cause is dominant only if it excludes and overshadows all other causes. Manifestly only one of two or more causes of an injury can be dominant. In view of the unmistakable meaning of the word dominant, the jury must reasonably have assumed that it was compelled to find that the actions of one actor and one actor only--whether a plaintiff or a defendant--could be the proximate cause of the accident. The instruction clearly contravened § 51 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act which establishes liability for injury resulting, In whole or in part, from the negligence of a common carrier. ³...