Strode v. Columbia Box Co.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1907
• Citation: 101 S.W. 1099,124 Mo. App. 511
• Parties: STRODE v. COLUMBIA BOX CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

101 S.W. 1099

124 Mo. A. 511

STRODE v. COLUMBIA BOX CO.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

April 16, 1907.

Rehearing Denied April 30, 1907.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT—GUARDING APPLIANCES.

Rev. St. 1899, § 6433 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 3215], providing that the belting, shafting, gearing, etc., in manufacturing establishments, when so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein, shall be guarded, when possible, requires a manufacturer to guard machinery, when there is reasonable ground to anticipate injury to employés from the machinery, but does not require him to guard such machinery so placed that no danger to employés would be expected by a prudent man.

2. SAME.

An employé was injured by the breaking of a belt running on a pulley a foot and a half above him and the same distance to one side. The pulley was partly between two joists on which the floor above was laid, and the belt was unconnected with machinery on the floor where the employé worked. Held, that the failure of the employer to guard the belt was not a violation of Rev. St. 1899, § 6433 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 1522], requiring a manufacturer to guard belting when so placed as to be dangerous to employés, etc.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Louis County; John W. McElhinney, Judge.

Action by Garrard Strode, public administrator, curator of John Findlay, against the Columbia Box Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Seddon & Holland, for appellant. A. R. Taylor, for respondent.

GOODE, J.

This action was begun in the name of John Findlay, a minor, by his curator, Garrard Strode, public administrator of the city of St. Louis. The relief sought was damages sustained from a personal injury to the minor in appellant's factory, an establishment for the manufacture of boxes. When the accident occurred, Findlay was working on a machine on the first floor of the building. A drum or pulley about a foot in diameter rotated on an axle overhead. This drum was from a foot to a foot and one-half higher than his head, and the same distance to the right of where he stood when at his ordinary work. The upper portion of the drum was between two of the joists on which the floor of the second story of the building was laid; there being no ceiling to the room. About half the diameter of the drum came below the joists, and the other half was between them and close to the floor above. A heavy beam of wood 10 inches square ran transversely under the joists and supported them. The drum was close to this beam, and hung down as far as the middle of it. Findlay's position while at work was a slight distance on the opposite side of the beam from the drum— far enough for the latter to be hidden from his sight. The drum was an iron cylinder carrying a belt 30 feet long, which ran upward through an opening in the floor above and turned the machinery on the second floor. Though the belt ran on the rotating drum or pulley among the joists, it was unconnected with the machinery on the first floor. While Findlay was at work in his usual place, the belt broke, and one end of it struck him, fracturing his skull. The testimony went to show the belt was manufactured by a concern of established reputation; that it was practically new, under constant inspection; and that it tore asunder across its fiber where there was nothing to indicate weakness. Negligence in regard to the condition of the belt is alleged in the petition, but no evidence was offered in support of the allegation, and the court withheld it from the jury's consideration. The only ground of recovery submitted was that the belt was not guarded as required by the statute, although it was practicable to do so, and that the failure to guard it caused the injury. Against this theory, appellant contends the statutes in reference to safeguarding machinery do not contemplate that an appliance, located where no workman is in danger of contact with it while in the performance of his task, shall be screened; and, as there was no chance for a workman to come in contact with the belt where it ran over the drum, a guard was not required. It is apparent that Findlay was hurt by one of the ends of the ruptured belt flying down through the aperture in the floor above and striking him. Therefore the theory of the respondent is that a guard, or screen, should have been placed under the drum to intercept the descent of the belt in case it tore in two. On the evidence, which was contradictory, the practicability of such a screen was properly left to the jury, if the question was material; but negligence on the part of appellant cannot be found from the simple fact that it was possible to guard the drum. It must further appear that the belting was placed where it would be dangerous to employés therein or thereabout, while engaged in their ordinary duties—which means, when applied to the present case, that it was dangerous to Findlay or other employés on the first floor of the building while at their work. The statute reads as follows: "The belting, shafting, gearing and drums, in all manufacturing, mechanical and other establishments in this state when so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabout, while engaged in their ordinary duties, shall be safely and securely guarded when possible; if not possible, then notice of its danger shall be conspicuously posted in such establishments." Rev. St. 1899, § 6433 [Ann. St. 1905, p. 3215].

The statute shows on its face that not all of the mentioned appliances need be guarded, and the point of law to be determined on the appeal is: What is meant by the words "when so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabout when engaged in their ordinary duties"? Appellant's counsel says the meaning is that no appliance of the kind specified need be guarded, unless there is danger of an employé getting in contact with the moving appliance while engaged in his ordinary duties. In other words, that the statute does not intend to protect employés against injuries arising from defective appliances or negligent management, for which the common law provides a remedy; but intends only to afford protection against such accidents as may occur from contact with the appliance while in motion, even if it is in good order and properly operated. And hence, if an appliance is so located that employés cannot come in contact with it while running, without going out of their way, the statute does not require it to be guarded. This argument is enforced by pointing to the clause of the statute which provides that, when it is impossible to guard an appliance placed where it imperils employés, notice of the danger shall be conspicuously posted. This clause is said to demonstrate that the purpose of the statute is to prevent accidents occurring from employés getting into contact with moving belts, drums, and shafting, as there would be no occasion for the warning if the statute intends that such appliances shall be guarded when set where employés cannot get against them. The following cases were determined on factory acts similar to ours: Dillon v. Nat. Coal Tar Co., 181 N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 978; Glens Falls Portland Cement Co. v. Insurance Co., 162 N. Y. 399, 56 N. E. 897; Byrne v. Carpet Co., 61 N. Y. Supp. 741, 46 App. Div. 479; Glassheim v. Printing Co., 34 N. Y. Supp. 69, 13 Misc. Rep. 174; Powalske v. Brick Co., 110 Wis. 461, 86 N. W. 153; Robertson v. Ford, 164 Ind. 538, 74 N. E. 1; McKechnie v. Bulloch (1892) 19 Sess. Cas. (4th Series) 971; Muer v. Milligan, Id. 18; Robb v. Bulloch, Id. 974. Those decisions cannot be said to accept appellant's proposition that such statutes are not intended to protect employés from injuries due to breakage or other mishaps to machinery. What they unquestionably decide is that when a machine, which otherwise the statute would require to be guarded, is located where there is no reasonable ground to anticipate injury to an employé either from its proper and regular motion or from some erratic movement outside its usual orbit, the master is not responsible for an injury caused by it, though unguarded. The statute is remedial, and its efficacy ought not to be weakened by interpretation. If belts, shafts, gears, and drums are accustomed to fly from their proper positions in consequence of breaking or slipping, and it is possible to guard them so as to prevent their movements from hurting employés, the language of the law is broad enough to require guarding. To rule otherwise would defeat, in part, the object of the Legislature, which is shown by the title of the original act to have been the promotion of the safety and health of employés. Sess. Acts 1891, p. 159. Whenever an appliance of the given kind is so placed as to endanger employés in the performance of their regular tasks, either by their coming into contact with it, or it with them, the duty to fence arises, if it is possible to do so. Suppose belts are in the habit of slipping off their drums and flying about in a dangerous way, why should this risk not be minimized, if possible? If a belt cannot be screened, notice of the fact would have no tendency to keep the belt from breaking or slipping off the drum; and this is the argument raised by defendant's counsel to support the theory that it is not necessary to screen machinery, save when employés may get into contact with it. But the notice might prevent a person from accepting a task which would expose him to risk of injury from an unscreened and dangerous appliance. Hence it is not obvious that the requirement of notice aims at no purpose except to warn employés not to get against a machine. It aims to have them warned of the risk accompanying a given task in proximity to an unfenced appliance. But this requirement is, at most, only part of the duty imposed on proprietors, and does not of necessity limit the duty of guarding, imposed in the preceding clause, to instances where employés may...