Stroebel v. Whitney

• Decision Date: 11 January 1884
• Citation: 18 N.W. 98,31 Minn. 384
• Parties: William Stroebel v. Constant H. Whitney and Wife
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

18 N.W. 98

31 Minn. 384

William Stroebel v. Constant H. Whitney and Wife

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 11, 1884

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Blue Earth county, Severance, J., presiding, overruling a general demurrer to the complaint.

Order affirmed.

Daniel Buck, for appellants.

Freeman & Pfau and Wm. N. Plymat, for respondent.

OPINION

Mitchell, J.

Action for defamation. The principle of common sense which now governs in the construction of words in such actions is that courts will understand them as other people would. The question always is, how would ordinary men naturally understand the language? It is going too far to argue that words must necessarily bear a criminal import, in order to render them actionable per se. It is not enough to show by ingenious argument that they might possibly admit of some other meaning. The question is whether, in the ordinary acceptation of the language, a person could reasonably doubt its signification. Woolnoth v Meadows, 5 East, 463. It is not necessary that the words should make the charge in express terms. They are actionable if they consist of a statement of facts which would naturally and presumably be understood by the hearers as a charge of crime. Lewis v. Hudson, 44 Ga. 568; Proctor v. Owens, 18 Ind. 21; Walton v. Singleton, 7 Serge. & Rawle 449. We think the language used in this case, prima facie at least, imports a charge of fornication. Indeed, we can hardly conceive how the hearers could understand it in any other sense. As is said in Walton v. Singleton supra, there is no offence which can be conveyed in so many multiplied forms and...