Strom v. Dobrin, 30251.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1947
• Docket Number: 30251.
• Citation: 29 Wn.2d 198,186 P.2d 906
• Parties: STROM et ux. v. DOBRIN et ux.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

186 P.2d 906

29 Wn.2d 198

STROM et ux. v. DOBRIN et ux.

No. 30251.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 13, 1947

Department 1

Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1947.

Action by Oscar W. Strom and wife against Edward G. Dobrin and wife for personal injuries allegedly sustained when struck by defendants' automobile.From judgment of dismissal plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M. Jones, judge.

H. E Foster, of Seattle, for appellants.

Kahin &amp Carmody, of Seattle, for respondents.

HILL Justice.

If this is a controlled intersection case, and such is the appellants' theory, both the respondent driver and the pedestrian appellant were lawfully within the intersection controlled area.The streets involved are Broadway and east Pike, in the city of Seatlle.The former runs northerly and southerly and the latter easterly and westerly.It is the appellants' theory that, with the light showing green on east Pike street, the pedestrian appellant started west across Broadway on the crosswalk on the north side of east Pike street and was struck by the respondents' automobile, which was going north on Broadway.It is not disputed that the respondent driver, while proceeding east on east Pike street, had entered the intersection controlled area on a green light, then made a left turn, and started north on Broadway.The right of the respondent driver to so proceed is found in Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6360-98, which provides that vehicles facing the green signal may proceed through the section of traffic control, or turn right or left unless such trun is prohibited.

The respondents' theory is that the pedestrian appellant came out from between parked cars some considerable distrance north of the crosswalk and walked directly into, or into the path of, the respondents' car.The evidence in support of the respondents' theory, if believed, amply sustains the verdict in their favor.

The principal question which the appellants would have us consider is whether the law applicable to their factual theory of the case was adequately presented to the jury.Statements of appellants' counsel throughout the trial and the instructions proposed, indicate that appellants' view is that a pedestrian who starts across the street with a green light and remains in the crosswalk, has an almost absolute right of way, such as that given pedestrians at intersections where traffic control signals are not in place or operation.While it has no application to the present case, it may be noted that Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6360-99 provides that the operator of a vehicle shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to any pedestrian crossing a roadway within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk of an intersection where traffic controls are not in place or operation.The appellants apparently seek to apply the same rule to a controlled intersection.The second and third of their requested instructions, in effect, summarily direct the jury to find for the appellants if the appellant pedestrian was hit while lawfully in the crosswalk.These...