Stromquist v. Cokayne

Citation646 P.2d 746
Decision Date12 May 1982
Docket Number16919,Nos. 16790,s. 16790
PartiesDonald M. STROMQUIST and Jane Stromquist, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Clifford COKAYNE, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Donald M. STROMQUIST and Jane L. Stromquist, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. R. Milton YORGASON, Salt Lake County Assessor, et al., Defendants andRespondents.
CourtSupreme Court of Utah

Brian M. Barnard, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Bill Thomas Peters, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.

STEWART, Justice:

Plaintiffs, private citizens and taxpayers, brought two successive actions to compel the Salt Lake County assessor, auditor, and treasurer to comply with their respective duties for the years 1978 and 1979 under Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 59-5-30, § 59-8-7, and § 59-10-9, which require the preparation and delivery of the county tax assessment books to the county treasurer and the mailing of assessed valuation notices on or before the statutorily prescribed dates each year. 1 The complaint sought to enjoin payment of the county assessor's salary until he complied with the provisions of § 59-5-30, and to compel a forfeiture by the assessor of a statutory $1000 penalty pursuant to § 59-5-33 for failure to perform his duties in a timely fashion. The two cases, which raise identical issues, have been consolidated on this appeal.

On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that by the time of the hearing the county assessor had substantially complied with his statutory duties and ruled that § 59-5-30 provided for a suspension of compensation only during the period of a delinquency and that the delinquency had been cured.

The trial court also ruled, relying on Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 575 P.2d 705 (1978), that the statutory deadlines established for the preparation of assessment books were directory rather than mandatory, and that in any event there had been "substantial compliance by the assessor and a de facto extension by the State Tax Commission." From the adverse judgments, plaintiffs appealed.

The initial briefs filed by the parties failed to address the issue of plaintiffs' standing to maintain these actions. Pursuant to an order of this Court, supplemental briefs on the issue have been filed.

As a general proposition the right to commence a legal proceeding depends on the plaintiffs' suffering an injury to a legally protected right for which the law provides a remedy. Absent such a showing, there is no right to complain in the courts. 2 In legal parlance, the plaintiff lacks standing. Sears v. Ogden City, Utah, 572 P.2d 1359 (1977); Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 866 (1975); Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 329, 203 P. 637 (1922). The plaintiffs allege no personal injury inuring to them from the asserted failure of the assessor to comply with the specified time deadlines. In this regard plaintiffs stand on no different legal footing than any other citizen of Salt Lake County.

In some cases there is an exception to the general rule requiring that standing be based on a particularized injury. In Crockett v. Board of Education, 58 Utah 303, 199 P. 158 (1921), this Court held that a taxpayer may maintain a mandamus action to compel a school board to publish a statutorily required statement of receipts and disbursements. The statute required the statement for the benefit and interest of the taxpayers in dealing with local school matters. The Court held, first, that it was not necessary that the action be brought in the name of the State or by a state official and, second, that the plaintiff taxpayer was a member of the class intended to be benefited by the statute, and consequently had standing.

Had the instant actions been timely brought to compel delivery of the assessment book and a timely issuance of the tax assessment notices, so as to protect plaintiffs' right to appeal the assessment of their property, or to avoid some other legal detriment or...

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5 cases
  • State v. Guard
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • November 15, 2013
    ...child pornography, and each claimed that the statute “was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face”); Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1982) (consolidating the appeals from two separate cases that “raise[d] identical issues”); see also, e.g., Wasatch Cnty. v. Okelber......
  • Jenkins v. Swan
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Utah
    • November 10, 1983
    ...stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Stromquist v. Cokayne, Utah, 646 P.2d 746 (1982); Sears v. Ogden City, Utah, 572 P.2d 1359 (1977); Main Parking Mall. It is generally insufficient for a plaintiff to assert on......
  • Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Utah
    • March 7, 1986
    ...have a personal stake in the outcome of a specific dispute. Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 1150; see also Stromquist v. Cokayne, Utah, 646 P.2d 746, 747 (1982); Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289, 290 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978); Sears v. Ogden City, ......
  • Estate of Hunt, Matter of
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Utah
    • November 5, 1992
    ...v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Utah 1983); Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1982); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978), acting as an individual, he is a separate entity from Richard L. Hunt, a ......
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