Strong v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 22 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | C. A. 2:22-cv-1712-BHH-MHC |
| Parties | Josia M. Strong, Plaintiff, v. Charleston County School District, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff filed this action in state court, alleging employment discrimination pursuant to several federal statutes including 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as under state law. ECF No. 1-1. Defendant removed the case to this Court and filed its Answer on June 1, 2022.[1] ECF No. 1.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”), ECF No. 12, filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to dismiss three causes of action. Plaintiff filed a Response, ECF No. 17, and Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No 18. The Motion is ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C. This Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be granted.
Plaintiff was employed as a teacher by Defendant, most recently as a physical education teacher for three days a week at Mitchell Elementary School. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 25. According to Plaintiff, in 2020, she informed the school principal and others that the Health and Wellness Act of 2005 was not being followed. Id. at ¶ 28. She also complained about other matters, including discrimination towards other employees, a teacher assistant yelling at students and safety concerns for students. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.
Between late April 2020 and late July 2020, Defendant notified Plaintiff in writing of concerns over her interactions with colleagues and professionalism, among other things. April 29 2020 Letter, ECF No. 12- 1; May 13, 2020 Letter, ECF No 12-2; June 5, 2020 Employee Relations File Review, ECF No 12-3; July 27, 2020 Addendum to Employee Relations File Review, ECF No. 12-6. It is undisputed that Defendant asked Plaintiff to provide a letter from a healthcare professional certifying that she was fit for duty as a teacher in Charleston County School District. Plaintiff alleges that because of the “systemic operation to have her terminated, [the principal] convinced others that [she] should not be allowed to return to work due to her mental health.” Id. at ¶ 31.
On or about August 7, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter placing her on administrative leave. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 35; August 10, 2020 Administrative Leave Letter, ECF No. 12-7 at 1-5. On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter indicating she needed a medical letter as a “fitness for duty.” ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 36; ECF No. 12-7 at 1-5. Plaintiff alleges that she had several physicians provide statements that she was able to return to work. Id. at ¶ 33; see also August 11, 2020 Certification Letter from Dr. Alexis Jesup, ECF No. 12-8.
On August 31, 2020, in follow up to a query from Defendant, Plaintiff's physician rescinded her initial recommendation that Plaintiff was able to go back to work. August 31, 2020 Follow Up to Dr. Jesup, ECF No. 12-9; August 31, 2020 Rescission Letter from Dr. Alexis A. Jesup, ECF No. 12-10 at 1-5.
On September 3, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter of termination. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 37; September 3, 2020 Letter from Gerrita Postlewait, ECF No. 12-11 at 2-4.
Plaintiff filed an appeal of her termination, which appeal was denied as of February 10, 2021. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 38-39; January 29, 2021 Report and Recommendation and February 10, 2021 Order, ECF Nos. 12-12 and 12-13.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.” See Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). The nonmoving party, however, “must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013). When a party fails to establish an essential element to their case, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial,” thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991) ().
Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth seven causes of action. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on three of those claims: the third cause of action for wrongful termination pursuant to the South Carolina Whistleblower Statute, the fourth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and the seventh cause of action for negligent supervision.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant's Motion is premature and “should be rejected by the Court as the Defendant has failed to provide any testimony that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ECF No. 17 at 1. While the deadline for filing dispositive motions is January 27, 2023 (ECF No. 5), a party may file a dispositive motion in advance of the deadline. Moreover, testimony is not the only evidence a court can consider, and Defendant has presented documents in support of its position. Regardless, however, the determinative facts pertaining to Defendant's Motion are not in dispute.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's third fourth and seventh causes of action. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be granted.
Plaintiff's third cause of action for wrongful termination under “the South Carolina Whistleblower Statute” (the Act) is based on her allegation that Defendant fired her “for her reports and protests for a failure to follow the law.” ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 98. Specifically, she alleges that Defendant fired her because she “reported violations of the law, failure to properly provide PE to children, request to provide false information in order to make it appear the Defendant was complying with the law and a failure not to properly utilize funds to comply with the law.” Id. at ¶ 97.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ECF No. 12 at 5-7. The statute of limitations under the South Carolina Whistleblower's Act, SC Code Ann. § 8-27-10 et seq., is one year. Any action under the Act “must be commenced within one year after the accrual of the cause of action or exhaustion of all available grievance or other administrative and judicial remedies or is forever barred.” S.C. Code Ann. § 8-27-30(B).[2] Plaintiff acknowledges in her Response that she did not file her lawsuit in this case within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. ECF No. 17 at 2 (). Plaintiff's termination was upheld by Defendant's Board of Trustees on February 10, 2021. ECF No. 12-13. Accordingly, any cause of action under the Act accrued on February 10, 2021. Baber v. Greenville Cnty., 488 S.E.2d 314, 318 (S.C. 1997) (). Plaintiff did not file her lawsuit until April 6, 2022 - more than one year after the cause of action accrued. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination under the S.C. Whistleblower Act is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to Defendant on this claim.
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is based on her allegation that Defendant fired her “because she reported violations of the Health and Wellness Act of 2005, failure to provide a safe environment for children, and failing to provide the proper amount of Physical Education for children.” ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 102. She also alleges that her principal requested that she provide “false information,” and that she “reported all of her concerns regarding requests to provide false information, false test results and safety concerns to all proper entities.” Id. at ¶¶ 103, 108.
Under South Carolina law, the public policy exception to at-will employment does not apply when “the employee has an existing remedy for a discharge that allegedly violates rights other than the right...
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