Strong v. City of Eugene
| Decision Date | 19 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:14-cv-01709-AA |
| Parties | REBECCA STRONG, DARRELL LYNN BYERS, MICHAEL A. YONALLY, and DONALD L. PETERSON, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF EUGENE, OFFICER SHAWN R. TROTTER (Badge #334), SERGEANT WILLIAM SOLESBEE (Badge #311), DETECTIVE DAVE BURROUGHS, and JOHN DOES #1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Marianne G. Dugan
Brian L. Michaels
259 East 5th Avenue, Suites 200-D/300-D
Eugene, Oregon 97401
Attorneys for plaintiffs
City of Eugene
125 East 8th Avenue, 2nd Floor
Eugene, Oregon 97401
Attorney for defendants
Plaintiffs Rebecca Strong, Darrell Byers, Michael Yonally, and Donald Peterson move to file an amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motion is denied.
On October 28, 2014, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court against defendants the City of Eugene, Shawn Trotter, William Solesbee, Dave Burroughs, and ten John Does, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law arising out of the execution of an allegedly invalid search warrant "[i]n the early morning hours of January 11, 2013." Compl. ¶ 13. Although not formally named as defendants, plaintiffs alleged that the following 25 officers "participated" in the deprivation of their rights and therefore may be subject to liability: "Vinje, McAlpine, Pope, Sergeant T. Martin, Officer Casey, Mainard, Led Better, Evans, San Miguel, Hoernlein, Griesel, Sharlow, Warden, Hubbard, Kidd, Wolgamott, Froelich, Parr, Anderson, McCormick, Conner-Jones, K. Williams, Rathje, [and] Grose." Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
On February 25, 2015, plaintiffs filed the present motion to amend, seeking "solely to substitute for the 'John Doe' defendants the names of the actual, participants on the SWAT raid" - i.e. the 25 individuals listed in paragraph nine of original complaint. Pls.' Mot. Am. 2; Proposed Am. Compl. ("PAC") pg. 1.
Leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Courts apply Rule 15 with "extreme liberality." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In determining whether a motion to amend should be granted, the court generally considers four factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility of amendment; and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). These factors are not weighted equally: "futility of amendment alone can justify the denial of a motion [to amend]." Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009).
Defendants contend that plaintiffs failed to confer as required by LR 7-1. In addition, defendants argue that the proposed amendments are futile because they do not relate back to plaintiffs' original complaint, as the additional defendants1 neither had notice of that pleading nor were omitted therefrom by mistake. Plaintiffs assert, to the contrary, that the PAC is timely because they were "'mistaken' in that they did not know whichspecific officers did the handcuffing, property damage, and other wrongful acts."2 Pls.' Reply to Mot. Am. 4.
The moving party must certify in the first paragraph of any motion that he or she made "a good faith effort" to resolve the matter via "personal or telephone conferences" and was unable to do so, or, alternatively, that "[t]he opposing party willfully refused to confer." LR 7-1(a)(1). The court "may" deny any motion that "fails to meet [the] certification requirement." LR 7-1(a)(2).
In this case, plaintiffs' counsel did not comply with either the spirit or the letter of the Local Rules. On January 12, 2015, plaintiffs' counsel sent an email soliciting defendants' counsel's "position on moving to amend to ad Scott Vinje as a named defendant." First Miller Decl. Ex. 1. Defendants' counsel responded the following day that he "would need to see the amended complaintfirst . . . but it seems time-barred." Id. On February 24, 2015, when the parties were discussing the possible extension of discovery deadlines, plaintiffs requested that defendants stipulate to allowing them until the end of discovery to amend the complaint "to add defendants to replace the John Does." First Miller Decl. Ex. 2, at 2. Defendants' counsel declined: "I've though a lot about this because I'd like to find ways to make this case less complicated and adversarial, but I can't agree to extend the deadline to amend pleadings [as] I disagree with your analysis of the law surrounding John does and relation back." Id. at 1. Plaintiffs' counsel then informed defendants' counsel that she would "file a motion to amend naming all of the 2 dozen or so officers who participated." Id. Without further discussing the matter with defendants, plaintiffs filed their motion to amend on February 25, 2015.
Thus, as defendants note, plaintiffs' counsel "never provided a proposed amended complaint, never called defense counsel, never disclosed who the defendants would be, what the claims would be, or provided defense counsel any opportunity to discuss why plaintiffs felt the need to make this case so unnecessarily complex . . . [she] simply announced what she intended to do [and then] remain[ed] silent for a day and a half [before filing] her motion at midnight on the day it was due." First Miller Decl. ¶ 4. Ordinarily, the Court would deny plaintiffs' motion withoutprejudice under these circumstances. However, following such a procedure is unlikely to a represent an efficient expenditure of both the Court's and the parties' time; defendants raised this matter in their opposition and were granted leave to file a surreply to respond to, amongst other things, plaintiffs' assertion that LR 7-1 was met. As a result, both the underlying motion and issues related to conferral are fully briefed, such that no benefit would be obtained by denying plaintiffs' motion on this basis.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs' cause of action arose on January 11, 2013. Compl. ¶ 13; PAC ¶ 13; Bergquist Decl. Ex. 1. It is also undisputed that plaintiffs' complaint was filed prior to January 11, 2015. See Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) () (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110). Further, it is undisputed that plaintiffs moved to amend outside of the statutory limitations period, such that the PAC is timely only if it relates back to the original pleading. Where, as here, "the limitations period derives from state law, [the court must] consider both federal and state law and employ whichever affords the 'more permissive' relation back standard." Butler, 766 F.3d at 1199-1201 (citation omitted).
To relate back under federal law:
(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received such notice [within 120 days from the filing of the original complaint as prescribed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) such] that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; [and] (3) that party must or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it.
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). Plaintiffs meet the first requirement, as the underlying conduct is the same. At issue is whether the additional defendants received notice within 120 days of the commencement of this lawsuit and whether naming John Does in the complaint was a mistake.
The Court answers both questions in the negative. Beyond merely concluding that listing the names of the additional defendants in the original pleading "put [them] on notice," plaintiffs neglected to provide any argument or evidence regarding the second requirement. Pls.' Reply to Mot. Am. 5; see also Wilkins-Jones v. Cnty. of Alameda, 2012 WL 3116025, *14 (N.D.Cal. July 31, 2012) (). As a result, nothing in the record indicates that the additional defendants had actual or constructive notice. See Defs.' Surreply to Mot. Am. 7 (); Second Miller Decl. ¶ 7 (); see also Wilkins-Jones, 2012 WL 3116025 at *13 ().
Concerning the third element, plaintiffs cite to Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 539 (2010), in support of the proposition that the PAC is timely. Plaintiffs also contend "that the statute of limitations was tolled for the purposes of 'relation-back' [until they could] determine the role of the individual defendants." Pls.' Mot. Am. 5 (citations omitted). Defendants, in contrast, rely primarily on a recent and directly on-point, but nonetheless unpublished, decision from this District, Hagen v. Williams, 2014 WL 6893708 (D.Or. Dec. 4, 2014), in arguing that plaintiffs did not commit a mistake within the purview of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).
In Krupski, the plaintiff "sought compensation for injuries she suffered on a cruise ship." Krupski, 560 U.S. at 538. She initiated suit against Costs Cruise Lines, whose address was listedon her passenger ticket, even though that ticket also made reference to Costa Crociere. Id. Because Costa Cruise Lines was...
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