Strong v. Judicial Review Monterey Peninsula, Monterey Peninsula College
| Decision Date | 01 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-16126,93-16126 |
| Citation | 56 F.3d 73 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Romaner J. STRONG, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUDICIAL REVIEW MONTEREY PENINSULA, Monterey Peninsula College; Monterey Peninsula College, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before: REINHARDT, THOMPSON and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
Romaner J. Strong, Jr. brought an action in district court alleging that Monterey Peninsula College (the College) violated his civil rights and discriminated against him on the basis of race in the process of hiring its Instructor of Administration of Justice. His civil rights claims, asserted under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1988, were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. After a jury trial on Strong's employment discrimination claim, asserted under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000-e et seq., judgment was entered in favor of the College. Strong appeals pro se, alleging a variety of errors at the district court level. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we affirm.
Strong is an African-American attorney with ten years legal experience, a graduate of UCLA Law School, a member of the Texas and District of Columbia bars, and a former Assistant Attorney General for the State of Texas. He does not possess a degree in Administration of Justice.
Between 1987 and 1989, Strong was employed as a part-time instructor of Administration of Justice at Monterey Peninsula College. In 1989, the College advertised that it was seeking a coordinator for its Administration of Justice program. Although the job announcement called for a degree in Administration of Justice, Strong applied for the position.
The College designated a six-person committee ("selection committee") to review applications and interview selected candidates. After reviewing several applications, including Strong's, the selection committee decided to relax the job requirements in order to expand the applicant pool. The new criteria encouraged applications from persons who did not possess degrees in Administration of Justice but had degrees in related fields and were otherwise well qualified. Eleven additional applications were submitted as a result of the change.
The selection committee ranked Strong 36th out of 49 total applicants. Because the committee decided to interview only the top 17 candidates, Strong was not granted an interview. On July 31, 1989, Strong received notice that he had not been selected for the job. The person hired was a male Caucasian.
After exhausting his administrative remedies as required for Title VII claims, Strong, proceeding in propria persona, filed a complaint against the College in district court. The complaint, filed April 26, 1991, alleged employment discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000-e et seq., and civil rights violations, under 42 U.S.C, Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. At the district court level, Strong contended that the original job announcement, which called for a degree in Administration of Justice, was drawn up in a way which discouraged minority applicants. He further contended that his application was scored before the second job announcement was distributed and therefore he was not given the benefit of the relaxed degree requirement. 1
The district court granted the College's motion to dismiss Strong's civil rights claims because the applicable statutes of limitations had expired. Cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to the employment discrimination claim were denied. After a six-day trial before a jury, judgment was entered in favor of the College. The College was awarded $2,777 in costs. Strong's motion for a new trial was denied. This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, the College argues that 22 of Strong's 24 issues on appeal were not included in his notice of appeal, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), and therefore should not be considered by this court. 2
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) states in part that the "notice of appeal ... must designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from." The College contends that Strong's designation puts at issue only the denial of his motion for a new trial and denial of his motion for review of the College's costs bill. Therefore, the College argues, these are the only two issues properly before this court, and the remaining 22 should be dismissed.
"While some circuits construe Rule 3(c) strictly ... this circuit has held that a mistake in designating the judgment appealed from should not bar appeal as long as the intent to appeal a specific judgment can be fairly inferred and the appellee is not prejudiced by the mistake." Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) (quotations and citations omitted), aff'd, 488 U.S. 347 (1989). See also Stone v. Godbehere, 894 F.2d 1131, 1133 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). "In determining whether 'intent' and 'prejudice' are present, we apply a two-part test: first, whether the affected party had notice of the issue on appeal; and, second, whether the affected party had an opportunity to fully brief the issue." Lynn, 804 F.2d at 1481. When the appellant raises in his opening brief an issue omitted from his notice of appeal, and the appellee files a brief responding to that issue, we have found that failure to comply with Rule 3(c) does not warrant dismissal. Id. See also Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 691 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 807 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989); Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1988).
Here, all 24 issues were raised in Strong's opening brief, and the College responded to each of them in its brief. Additionally, each issue was listed in Strong's Notice of Transcript Portions to be Ordered. The College had notice of all the issues and was not prejudiced by Strong's failure to comply with Rule 3(c). Therefore, we have considered all the issues Strong raises on appeal.
Strong argues the district court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint to include additional defendants. 3
The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny a party's motion to amend his complaint. The denial of leave to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is reviewed for abuse of discretion. National Abortions Federation v. Operation Rescue, 8 F.3d 680, 681 (9th Cir. 1993). Such a denial, however, is "strictly" reviewed in light of the strong policy permitting amendment. Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
In general, leave to amend should be freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied if amendment of the complaint would be futile. Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195, 856 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1988). Amendment is futile when "no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense." Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988).
The district court found amendment of Strong's complaint would be futile for two reasons. First, his Title VII claim against the proposed defendants was barred because those individuals were not named in the charge previously filed with the EEOC. Second, each of his civil rights claims was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. These rulings were correct.
First, Title VII claimants may not sue individuals not named in the EEOC charge unless it can be inferred from the charge that the unnamed parties violated Title VII, and those parties should have anticipated they would be sued. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1990); Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000-e(5)(f)(1). Because Strong has not included his EEOC charge as part of the record, there is no way to determine whether the defendants he sought to add, none of whom was named in the charge, properly could be sued.
Second, each of Strong's civil rights claims was governed by a one-year statute of limitations. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48, n.12 (1984) (Sec. 1986); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (Sec. 1985(3)); Elliot v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994) (Sec. 1983); Taylor v. Regents of University of California, 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9th Cir, 1993) (Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985). 4 Strong's civil rights claims accrued on July 31, 1994 when he received notice from the College that he was not selected as Coordinator for the Administration of Justice program. See Clive v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981) (). His original complaint was not filed until April 26, 1991, eight months after the statute of limitations period had expired. Therefore, Strong's civil rights claims were time-barred.
Strong next argues the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. A grant or denial of summary judgment is a question of law which we review de novo. Daring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). "Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, [the appellate court] must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 19...
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