Strong v. Kennedy

Decision Date31 January 1879
Citation40 Mich. 327
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesReturn Strong v. James M. Kennedy

Submitted January 10, 1879

Error to Kent. Submitted Jan. 10. Decided Jan. 31.

Judgment reversed.

A. D Griswold for plaintiff in error. A demand is not liquidated by calculation, and cannot be a set-off when its amount depends on testimony, Smith v. Warner, 14 Mich. 152 16 Mich. 390; Mitchell v. Shuert, 16 Mich. 444. If the holder of a note secured by chattel mortgage appropriates the mortgaged property, it is a payment to the extent of the value of the property, Davis v. Rider, 5 Mich. 423; Place v. Grant, 9 Mich. 42; Mandigo v Mandigo, 26 Mich. 349; Stoddard v. Denison, 38 How. Pr., 296; Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 107; Palmer v. Richardson, 3 Thomp. & C., 436; Charter v. Stephens, 3 Den. 33; Ashworth v. Dark, 20 Tex. 825; Conkling v. Shelley, 28 N.Y. 360; Bird v. Davis, 1 McCart. (N.J.), 468; Thomas on Mortgages, 449, 450. Costs go to the defendant on recovery of less than $ 100, where the amount was not reduced by set-off, Ladd v. Duncan, 23 Mich. 285; Carter v. Snyder, 27 Mich. 484.

Frank G. Holmes for defendant in error, cited Wheeler v. Harrison, 28 Mich. 264.

Campbell, C. J. The other Justices concurred.

OPINION

Campbell, C. J.

Kennedy sued Strong on two promissory notes and recovered judgment for $ 54.12. The circuit court for Kent county where the case was tried held that the judgment had been reduced by set-off from the sum of $ 182.12, and therefore gave costs to plaintiff below.

The facts are all found, and among other things it is found that a mare which had been mortgaged to secure one of the notes had been delivered to the plaintiff below to be sold and the proceeds applied in payment. Instead of selling her for cash he exchanged her for other property, and the parties disagreed as to how much should be applied. This disagreement was held by the circuit judge to prevent its operation as payment and convert it into a counter claim or set-off. The amount which the judge finds as the value of the mare to be so applied is $ 100.

The agreement to apply the proceeds of the mare in payment could not be destroyed by the subsequent disagreement as to the amount. Plaintiff below, as soon as he received the value of the mare, received payment to the extent of that value, and a dispute as to its amount would not change its character as a payment any more than if it had been a money...

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