Strong v. United States

• Decision Date: 05 April 1899
• Docket Number: 897.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: STRONG v. UNITED STATES.

93 F. 257

STRONG v. UNITED STATES.

No. 897.

United States Circuit Court, D. Connecticut.

April 5, 1899

Lewis E. Stanton, for plaintiff.

Charles W. Comstock, for the United States.

TOWNSEND District Judge.

Motion to dismiss. On August 18, 1890, the plaintiff was appointed a marshal of the United States for the district of Connecticut which office he held until August 28, 1894. On September 3 1896, he brought suit against the government of the United States in this court by virtue of the provisions of section 2 of the act of March 3, 1887, which suit is still pending. The provisions of said section are as follows:

'Sec 2. That the district court of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims as to all matters named in the preceding section where the amount of the claim does not exceed one thousand dollars, and the circuit court of the United States shall have such concurrent jurisdiction in all cases where the amount of such claims exceeds one thousand dollars and does not exceed ten thousand dollars. All causes brought and tried under the provisions of this act shall be tried by the court without a jury.'

On June 27, 1898 (30 Stat. 494, c. 503), said section was amended by adding thereto, at the end thereof, the following:

'The jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the said circuit and district courts shall not extend to cases brought to recover fees, salary or compensation for official services of officers of the United States or brought for such purposes by persons claiming as such officers or as assignees or legal representatives thereof.'

Counsel for the United States moves to dismiss this action on the ground that by said amendment so much of said statute as conferred concurrent jurisdiction in such cases with the court of claims was repealed, and contends that the language, 'cases brought to recover fees,' etc., covers pending cases. Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the jurisdiction of this court in cases pending before it is not affected by said amendment, because said amendment does not operate as a repeal as to pending suits, and that the amendment is to be interpreted as though the language was, 'to cases hereafter brought,' etc.

This question has not been, so far as I know, judicially determined. As counsel has said, it is a question of great importance. Cases like the one under consideration are now pending in the various district and circuit courts of the United States, brought therein by officers of the United States on the faith of the remedial statute of 1887, providing for concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims. A considerable portion of such claims would now be barred by the statute of limitations in said act of 1887, which provides that suits thereon must be brought within six years after the right accrued. If, therefore, the construction contended for by the attorney for the United States be adopted, this statute, manifestly intended as a remedial one, in order to permit persons having against the United States lawful claims, not more than six years old, to prosecute them in the federal courts within their own states, instead of at Washington, becomes, by reason of this amendment, most oppressive.

Counsel are at issue as to whether or not the amendment under consideration operates as a repeal of the law which confers jurisdiction on this court. It is, of course, conceded that, if said law had been wholly repealed, this court would have no jurisdiction, and the suit would be dismissed. It is true, as contended by counsel for plaintiff, that, strictly speaking, the law, as a whole, is not repealed; for a large share of the concurrent jurisdiction of this court is not affected by the amendment. But it does not necessarily follow, as contended by him, that 'the amendment repeals nothing which relates to any past transaction or pending suits. ' In Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541, a suit was brought by virtue of an act passed in 1864, providing that the provisions of an act of 1833 should extend to certain classes of cases. While said suit was pending, the act of 1864 was repealed by an act which further provided that the act of 1833 should not be so construed as to apply to said cases covered by the act of 1864. The supreme court said:

'This is equivalent to a repeal of an act giving jurisdiction of a pending suit. It is an express prohibition of the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the act of 1833. * * * It is clear that, when the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon a statute, the repeal of the statute takes away the jurisdiction; and it is equally clear that, where a jurisdiction conferred by statute is prohibited by a subsequent statute, the prohibition is, so far, a repeal of the statute conferring the jurisdiction.'

See, also, Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429.

In the case at bar it seems clear that the amendment which provides that the concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit court shall not extend to cases brought to recover salaries is so far a repeal of the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The question then arises whether the term 'brought' can be so construed as to mean 'hereafter brought.' In consideration of this question, it is proper to refer to the first section of the amendment, which amends the first section of the act of 1887. The first section of said act provides as follows:

'That the court of claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine * * * all claims founded upon the constitution of the United States or any law of congress, except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in

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