Strong v. Whybark

• Citation: 204 Mo. 341,102 S.W. 968
• Parties: STRONG v. WHYBARK et al.
• Decision Date: 25 May 1907
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

102 S.W. 968

204 Mo. 341

STRONG v. WHYBARK et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 1.

May 25, 1907.

1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER — SUBSEQUENT BONA FIDE PURCHASER — TITLE ACQUIRED.

A grantee under a quitclaim deed for a valuable consideration and without notice, who had first recorded her deed, took title as against a prior grantee from the original grantor under Rev. St. 1899, § 925 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 847], declaring that no written instrument shall be valid except as between the parties and such as have actual notice until the same shall have been deposited with the recorder for record.

2. SAME — CONSIDERATION — VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.

A quitclaim deed reciting that the conveyance was made for and in consideration of natural love and affection and $5 to the grantor in hand paid by the grantee, the receipt of which was acknowledged, was based on a valuable consideration sufficient to entitle the grantee to the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value.

3. SAME — ADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION.

It is not necessary that the consideration for a deed should be adequate in point of value in order to constitute the grantee a bona fide purchaser.

4. SAME — NOTICE — QUITCLAIM.

The rule that a quitclaim is notice to the grantee of existing equities has no application where the grantee under a quitclaim deed from one whose prior deed to another grantee was still unrecorded acquired the title for value and without notice of the former deed.

5. EVIDENCE — PAROL EVIDENCE — DEED — WANT OF CONSIDERATION.

Want of consideration for a deed cannot be shown against a recital of a consideration for the purpose of defeating the operative words of the deed.

6. QUIETING TITLE — FRAUD — PLEADING AND PROOF.

In a suit to quiet title by the holder of a prior deed which was not recorded until after the record of a subsequent quitclaim deed from the same grantor, plaintiff was not entitled to claim that the subsequent deed was fraudulent where such defense was neither pleaded or proved.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Butler County; J. L. Fort, Judge.

Action by Francis E. Strong against Levi E. Whybark and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

This is a bill in equity, instituted in the circuit court of Butler county, wherein plaintiff seeks to have her title quieted to 520 acres of land. John R. Boyden was one of the several defendants named in the bill. He filed an answer, claiming an interest in and to 160 acres of said land, and also denied generally the allegations of the bill. No point is made against the pleadings, and he is the only defendant whose interest is involved in this appeal. The facts in the case are undisputed, and are as follows Seth D. Hayden was the common source of title, and on March 6, 1861, by his warranty deed, for a recited consideration in the deed of $640, conveyed said land to William A. Moore, and on August 26, 1863, said Hayden, by his quitclaim deed, for a recited consideration of "natural love and affection and five dollars," conveyed the same land to Josephine Hayden. The deed to Hayden was recorded April 11, 1868, and the one to Moore was recorded December 14, 1874. The plaintiff's title is derived through mesne conveyances from Josephine Hayden, while defendant's title is derived through similar conveyances from William A. Moore. It was admitted that the land was wild and unoccupied. This was all the evidence in the case. The court found for defendant, and rendered judgment for him. The plaintiff in due time filed his motion for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and to the action of the court in overruling said motion the plaintiff duly excepted, and has appealed the cause to this court.

James G. Strong and E. R. Lentz, for appellant. Wm. N. Barron, for respondents.

WOODSON, J. (after stating the facts).

1. The sole question involved in this case is: Did the subsequently executed quitclaim deed of Seth H. Hayden to Josephine Hayden, dated August 26, 1863, by virtue of its prior recordation, have the force and effect of conveying to her the title to the land in controversy by force and operation of the registry act, and thereby rendered invalid and inoperative the prior warranty deed made by him to William A. Moore, dated March 6, 1861, but not filed for record until December 14, 1874? There is no evidence whatever in this record tending to show that Josephine Hayden had any notice or knowledge of the execution of the prior unrecorded warranty deed from Seth D. Hayden to said Moore at the time he made the quitclaim deed to her, nor is there any evidence of fraud or collusion between Seth D. Hayden and Josephine Hayden. Both William A. Moore and Josephine Hayden neglected for years to file their deed for record, as provided for by section 923, Rev. St. 1899, yet the latter filed her deed about six years prior to the time when he filed his. The statute provides that "no such instrument in writing shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto and such as have actual notice thereof until the same shall have been deposited with the recorder for record." Rev. St. 1899, § 925 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 847]. According to the provisions of this section, the deed from Hayden to Moore was invalid and conveyed no title to the land in controversy in so far as Josephine Hayden was concerned, because she had no notice of its execution at the time she filed her deed for record. If the exception mentioned in the section just quoted was the only exception or limitation to that statute, then there would be no question as to the title of Josephine Hayden and those claiming under her, but the courts upon principles of equity and justice have repeatedly held...