Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 74-5.
| Decision Date | 02 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 74-5. |
| Citation | 392 F. Supp. 1184 |
| Parties | Etta Ruth STROUD v. DELTA AIRLINES, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
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David Crosland, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.
S. F. Davis and R. Anthony McKinnon, Law Department Delta Airlines, Inc., Dean Booth, Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.
This is an action to recover for alleged discrimination in employment based on sex. Plaintiff, a former stewardess employed by defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc., seeks injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement with back pay, as well as an award of attorney's fees, pursuant to the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (hereinafter Title VII). A pre-trial conference has been held and a pre-trial order entered on October 22, 1974. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate and defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment. These motions are presently before the court.
Plaintiff seeks to consolidate this action with a subsequently filed class action, Stanley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Civil Action No. 74-1778, which is also pending in this court. Plaintiff argues that the Stanley case and this action involve similar questions of law and fact. Defendant objects to consolidation of these actions; but the issues raised by the motion and the objections thereto have effectively been mooted, since this court has been informed that the Stanley case has been settled by the parties. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to consolidate is denied as moot.
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment presents issues which are somewhat more complex. In the first instance, review of the motion and the brief in support does not clearly indicate which portion of this action is subject to the motion. Plaintiff's brief in opposition further confuses this question. Following citation to substantial legal authority, plaintiff ends one portion of her brief in opposition by concluding as follows: "Defendant's motion that it be granted summary judgment on the Court's ability to hear evidence with respect to a discriminatory practice which existed prior to the effective date of the Act should therefore, be denied." In another portion of this brief plaintiff states that "failure to file an EEOC charge does not bar hearing evidence of discriminatory practices." A motion for summary judgment is not a means to obtain preliminary rulings on the admissibility of evidence; therefore, such questions are irrelevant in the context of this motion. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the proper inquiry involves a determination of which facts and which legal issues founded upon those facts present triable questions. See Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. Thus, in the present circumstances, the first inquiry concerns exactly which portion of this action may be resolved by application of the law to undisputed factual events. In Title VII suits, the ultimate factual issue is discrimination vel non. Defendant has not based its motion on this issue. A fair reading of the motion sub judice indicates that defendant seeks a ruling that certain claims presented by this suit are barred, for the reason, among others, that they were not presented to the EEOC by means of a timely complaint. The factual issues relevant to this motion are undisputed, but before turning to the legal issues presented, some review of these facts and the legal contentions of the parties is warranted.
Review of the pre-trial order entered in this case and the briefs in support of this motion indicates that plaintiff has raised four separate instances of alleged violation of her equal employment rights. First, plaintiff complains that she was required to resign her position in April, 1965, as a result of defendant's policy of refusing to employ married stewardesses. Subsequently, plaintiff reapplied for her former position as a stewardess; but she was not reinstated, admittedly as a result of the no-marriage policy, and more recently as a result of defendant's policy of refusing to hire divorced women as stewardesses. Plaintiff contends that defendant's marriage and divorce policies are sexually discriminatory; however, these policies were changed by defendant well before this lawsuit was initiated and before plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint. Plaintiff also alleges two instances of alleged discriminatory practices following the change in Delta's policies, in that she was denied employment in 1972 and in 1973. She filed an EEOC charge regarding these claims in March, 1972. Plaintiff contends in essence that Delta refused to rehire her in 1972 and 1973 as a result of a continuing pattern and practice of sexual discrimination in employment. In addition, plaintiff contends that the 1973 refusal was in retaliation for the filing of her EEOC charge.
Defendant does not specifically dispute plaintiff's contentions relating to the no-marriage, no-divorce policies in effect from the date of plaintiff's termination from employment, until the policies were changed. On the contrary, defendant admits that plaintiff was terminated as a result of those policies and that she was not reinstated, first, as a result of the no-marriage policy, and in 1970, as a result of the no-divorce policy. Defendant bases its defense to this action on the fact that these policies were abandoned in March, 1971, and thereafter ceased to be factors in employment decisions. This fact is also a critical element regarding the motion sub judice, for defendant contends that plaintiff's claims founded upon the pre-1972 employment applications are not properly before the court. Defendant also contends that the evidence will show that the 1972 and 1973 employment decisions did not result from discriminatory practices; but review of the motion sub judice indicates that this issue is not presented at this time.
As noted above, the partial summary judgment motion is somewhat unclear; this confusion is illustrated by a supplemental brief. In this brief, defendant states the following:
Defendant does not assert that it is entitled to summary judgment . . . on jurisdictional grounds as to its refusal to hire plaintiff on March 2, 1972 or June 22, 1973. Each of these unique, non-continuing acts took place either within 180 days prior to plaintiff's filing charges with the EEOC or after that time. As to the other events of defendant's refusal to hire plaintiff, however, the jurisdictional prerequisite was not met and defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
This portion of the brief indicates that defendant desires to resolve only those claims relating to the pre-1972 hiring practices by means of this motion. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the motion is styled as a partial, rather than a complete, summary judgment. Nevertheless, defendant's supplemental brief also contains the statement that "there are still no facts advanced by plaintiff to show that the refusals to hire in 1972 and 1973 were in any way based on sex discrimination." This statement is also consistent with the statement in defendant's initial brief in support of this motion to the effect that the uncontroverted facts show an absence of sex based discrimination in 1972 and 1973. If indeed there are no facts which show that defendant discriminated against plaintiff in 1972 and 1973, or that the decision not to rehire plaintiff on those dates was part and parcel of a continuing practice of sexual discrimination against plaintiff, then defendant would be entitled to a complete, rather than a partial, summary judgment. However, the naked allegation regarding the absence of such evidence, standing alone, does not entitle defendant to summary judgment; the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showin that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c). Review of defendant's Local Rule 91.72 statement indicates the only factual allegation relied upon by defendant in this regard relates to the change in its no-marriage and no-divorce policies in 1971. Although this change may indicate that the prior policies are no longer "continuing" insofar as jurisdiction to consider claims regarding discharges and refusals to reinstate pursuant to those policies is concerned, the policy change, without more, does not compel a finding that 1972 and 1973 hiring policies were non-discriminatory. Furthermore, the fact of this change is not sufficient to shift the burden of proof on this motion to plaintiff. See Rule 56(e). As a result, even if this motion were construed as a motion for a complete, rather than partial, summary judgment, judgment on the claims relating to the 1972 and 1973 hiring decisions could not be entered at this time. Therefore, the court will turn to the issues presented by defendant's motion for partial summary judgment regarding plaintiff's pre-1972 claims.
Defendant asserts three basic legal contentions in support of this motion. First, defendant contends that the claim regarding plaintiff's termination from employment in April, 1965, is barred because plaintiff was terminated before the effective date of Title VII, July 2, 1965. Secondly, defendant contends that plaintiff's claims regarding discriminatory failure to reinstate prior to 1972 are barred since these claims were not raised by a timely EEOC complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Lastly, defendant contends that it was entitled by principles of fundamental fairness to rely on the decision in Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F.Supp. 781 (E.D.La. 1967), in maintaining its no-marriage and no-divorce policies.
In opposition, plaintiff argues, as noted above, that evidence of past discriminatory policies is highly probative of possible present...
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Watson v. Republic Airlines, Inc., Civ. A. No. C82-1359.
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