Stroud v. Farr Rentals, LLC
| Decision Date | 24 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-95-CDP |
| Parties | ALTHEA J. STROUD, Plaintiff, v. FARR RENTALS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Althea J. Stroud for leave to commence this civil action without payment of the required filing fee. The Court has reviewed the motion and the financial information provided in support, and has determined to grant the motion. Additionally, for the reasons explained below, the Court will give plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
This Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that "if the essence of an allegation is discernible," the court should "construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even pro se complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Plaintiff filed the complaint against Farr Rentals, LLC ("Farr Rentals"), Matthew Farr and Katie Farr (collectively "the Farrs"), the City of Canton, Missouri ("the City"), and Jarrod Phillips, the Mayor of Canton. Plaintiff also refers to the Farrs as "the landlords." She invokes this Court's federal question jurisdiction, and states she brings this case under the Fair Housing Act, along with several other federal statutes. Those statutes are the Toxic Substances ControlAct, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968;1 the Civil Rights Act of 1866;2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982-1983; 24 C.F.R. Housing & Urban Development; the Civil Rights Act of 1986; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. In an exhibit attached to the complaint, plaintiff repeats the facts from her complaint and states she wishes to invoke this Court's supplemental jurisdiction over two claims premised upon state law.
Plaintiff largely sets forth her claims in conclusory fashion, and she often refers to the defendants collectively and states they engaged in wrongdoing. However, it is clear that plaintiff believes she suffered discrimination and retaliation in relation to property she rented from Farr Rentals and the Farrs. Plaintiff describes herself as an "African-American, disabled, Christian with a white disabled, Christian spouse with two inter-racial children." She does not identify any particular disability. In February of 2012, she signed a lease for 207 North 6th Street in Canton, Missouri ("the property"). On November 1, 2015, the property was transferred to Farr Rentals, and the Farrs became plaintiff's landlords.
Throughout plaintiff's tenancy, the Farrs ignored her requests to repair electrical and air quality issues at the property. Attached to the complaint are copies of letters dated March 3, 2015and February 2, 2017 in which plaintiff asked the Farrs to repair the property's ventilation and electric breaker systems. She claims she suffered "Upper Respiratory Illnesses" from breathing sewer gas.
Attached to the complaint is a letter dated February 20, 2018 from the Farrs' attorney to plaintiff. The letter notified plaintiff that her month-to-month tenancy would terminate on March 31, 2018. The letter stated the "decision to end [plaintiff's] tenancy has nothing to do with [plaintiff and her husband] as tenants personally," but that the Farrs "intend to renovate the property, and [plaintiff is] welcome to submit an application to rent the property once renovations are complete and it returns to the market." Plaintiff claims that "Landlord retaliated and discriminated against & terminated tenancy" six months after she filed a "governmental complaint" and complained about the property's condition. She states without factual support that Matt Farr, "Landlord," and the Farrs engaged in conspiracy, were untruthful and misleading, committed slander and defamation, violated the Fair Housing Act, violated Missouri law and plaintiff's civil rights, and other such statements. Plaintiff avers that, after she vacated the property, it sat empty for a year while repairs were made. She does not allege she tried to lease the property after the repairs were completed.
Plaintiff also alleges that, in April of 2018, the City and Phillips refused to honor her written rental unit inspection request, and instead recommended she contact a dedicated home inspection service company. Plaintiff writes: "[i]t is sufficient to show that race was a consideration of at least several people from the city who personally discriminated Plaintiff, a disabled, black female." Plaintiff states the City and its employees are "all virtually white with a small black population." Plaintiff seeks monetary relief.
The FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f). A tenant subjected to discrimination in violation of the FHA can bring a private cause of action for damages. See Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 2003). The party asserting a housing discrimination claim under the FHA has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See Radecki v. Joura, 114 F.3d 115, 116 (8th Cir. 1997). Unlawful conduct under the FHA also includes "retaliating against any person because that person has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a proceeding under the Fair Housing Act." Burshteyn v. Cmty. Hous. Ass'n, Inc., 2020 WL 529308, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 2020) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5)). To state a claim for retaliation under the FHA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) defendants subjected her to an adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between the two. Id. (citing Wolf v. Hoene Ridge Subdivision, 2015 WL 8665406, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2015), aff'd, 669 F. App'x 345 (8th Cir. 2016).
In this action, plaintiff alleges she is a member of a protected class as a disabled African American Christian, and that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race, color, religion, familial status, or handicap. She appears to attempt to bring her FHA claims against the City and Phillips, but she does not allege, nor does it appear, that they were providers of housingor that they engaged in any conduct that can be considered violative of the FHA. The complaint therefore fails to state a plausible claim of FHA discrimination or retaliation against the City or Phillips. Plaintiff states that Farr Rentals and the Farrs discriminated against her in terms of seeking repairs, but she does not support that conclusion with facts permitting the inference that she actually was treated differently. She therefore fails to state a plausible FHA discrimination claim against Farr Rentals or the Farrs. Similarly, plaintiff alleges the Farrs terminated her lease after she complained about the condition of the property, but she alleges no facts permitting the inference of a causal connection between her complaint and the termination of her tenancy. She therefore fails to state a plausible FHA retaliation claim against Farr Rentals or the Farrs. See Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002) (); Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2017) ().
The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") provides that "any person who violates [the TSCA] shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a). The TSCA permits the United States, through the EPA, to penalize violators. It does not allow private citizens to enforce penalty provisions to recover compensatory damages. Sipes ex rel. Slaughter v. Russell, 89 F. Supp....
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